The Education in the Weft of Language

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ABSTRACT – The Education in the Weft of Language. This article aims to bring to the discussion the theme of language from the hermeneutic perspective inscribed in heideggerian thought. Having as a guiding thread the phenomenological-reconstructive method, explores some interpretive possibilites that this tradition of thought offers for the construction of a dialogue with education. Like this, through a hinge of analysis with education, seeks to look at language from its internal principles of proliferation and, in the opposite direction to the classic conceptions on the subject, exposes the thesis that noting happens outside of language. Therebyl, understands that it's *in the* language that live the possibilites of establishment of sense in education.
Keywords: **Education. Language. Happen.**

RESUMO – A Educação nas Tramas da Linguagem. Este artigo tem por objetivo trazer à discussão o tema da linguagem a partir da perspectiva hermenêutica inscrita no pensamento heideggeriano. Tendo como fio condutor o método fenomenológico-reconstrutivo, explora algumas possibilidades interpretativas que esta tradição de pensamento oferece para a construção de um diálogo com a educação. Assim, desde uma dobradiça de análise com a educação, busca olhar para a linguagem a partir de seus princípios internos de proliferação e, na contramão das concepções clássicas sobre o tema, expõe a tese de que nada acontece fora da linguagem. Por fim, entende que é *na* linguagem que moram às possibilidades de instauração de sentido em educação.
Palavras-chave: **Educação. Linguagem. Acontecimento.**

Introduction

Writing about language does not represent an attempt to bring language into the universe of what is written, because according to the understanding exposed here, it is language itself that supports writing. So writing about lenguage means go to meet of your happen. So, therefore, it means to wander through its crevices like someone who seeks refuge in his home. And that means that writing about language is, perhaps, it is just a way of sniffing out the place where your way of being pevails. That said, my goal here is not to drag language into the plots of representation, but listen, in the sense of *auscultate* what the language it self speaks. This for understanding that it is in their normativity that stay our possibilities to understand what sustaints the educate. But how can this beckon paths for the educational field? Where can this company take us? Nowhere but the one we find already ourselves on. And even if it sounds paradoxical, understand language from of herself it is an effort that can contribute, significantly, so that we can get to where we are already. And wouldn't this be the effort of science? No doubt. With different purposes and from different perspectives, this is the purpose of science: get to where we are already. This, however, does not mean that here language one seeks to *arrive* once and for all. In addition to this pretension be part of a philosophical project that this text does not accompany, it is it would be a naive pretense, because our *be in the world* it's deeply dynamics, rhizomatic and woven by an incommensurate range of events and complexities that prevent any kind of immobility. The fact is that, in the world of life, there will always be entropies that will make mutants the realities. And it is not in the midst of these metamorphoses that also the education if meets? Certainly. And it is precisely in the face of this continuous mutability that the theme of language assumes even greater importance. Why? Because language is our home. So, to get to, at least once, where we are already there is no other way than that of language. Why? Because according to Heidegger (2003), "the language speaks" (p. 9). And if the language speaks it is, therefore, in the speech of language that live our possibilities to understand the world and at things.

This, however, does not mean making language a foundation of education and, even less, make education a foundation for language. The language is language and this suggests to us, precisely, the opposite: more than offering us a *Gründe*, she always puts us for closer to one *Abgrund*. And even if language leads us to the edge of an abyss this does not mean that she it precipitates to nothingness. Abyss is a place of depth. And where there is depth there is always the possibility of we find what does not usually reach the surface. In the narrow crevices of deep places live unknown species of knowledge that only surrenders to those who abdicate from the surfasse to sniff, just like Zaratustra, the winding path that the *to be known* determines. So, in an attempt to sniff out the vigor of language in the slit of language itself, i separate the article into two sections.

The first: *What does it mean to speak? From the classical notion of language to heideggerian reading* talks about the main aspects that supported the classic notion of language and it also shows how the language goes disconnecting from metaphysical representation for, henceforth, achieve its ontological reframing and register your *being* in the historicity of understanding. The second: *The saga of saying and the appropriating happening of learn* seeks to support the thesis that it is *in* language that educating shows himself, materially, as an happening appropriator that enables the learn. Letting the language speak and acting on what in your speech shows himself, i try, here, to activate some interpretive levers that your internal principles in proliferation offer to thinking the establishment of sense in education, above all, from a hermeneutic reading of language.

What does it mean to speak? From the classical notion of language to heideggerian reading

If we pursue different positions about what it means to *speak,* we will realize that, in general, it is understood that the speech is the sound expression of things of the soul. In other words, this view subordinates speech to the field of mechanics and makes language a means of externalization. This position is basically supported by three descriptions. The first, and most usual, is that which understands *language* how pure expressiveness. In this characterization, speaking is the way to bring out what is internalized. It is surprising, however, that the representation more external to language the consider expression just when this characterization is based, according to Heidegger (2003), by the resource of an interiority. The second seeks to support the notion that language is an activity that man performs, for example, when speaking a language (in the idiomatic sense of the word). In this characterization anthropocentric it's the man whom speaks. Here, we cannot say, like Heidegger, that language speaks, because then man would only be his promise. The third description considers that speech is an expression of man's language that seeks "[...] a representation and presentation of the real and the unreal" (Heidegger, 2003, p. 10).

These paradigmatic descriptions of what it means to talk, have maintained, for hundreds of years the current representations that guided our understanding of the meaning of language. And although we do not agree with such representations, it must be clear that these characterizations are correct insofar as they are fruit of what research on the phenomena of language can conclude. In education, these descriptions still support much of the literature and research that have in the language their axes of analysis. In a quick examination on the subject, it is possible to note that, in current production, a good portion of the studies[1] that deal with the theme of language, treat language *how a means of communication; how a means of teaching and learning; how a pedagogical mediation tool; how technique; how an instrument that can be used by the teacher in an activity; how a capacity for lexical*

or grammatical expression. Some still speak *of language acquisition* and defend the idea that the teacher is a *language tutor*. There is no problem regarding the validity of these characterizations. What happens, however, is that these perspectives seek an exact and unshakable description of language. The language how language is practically unobserved. Preserving a classic notion of language they seek, almost always, to describe the language through a vision external to the language. In the well-known work *The words and the things*, Foucault shows us how this notion took root on paradigmatic models of language characterization. Starting from the notion that, hegemonically, the representation of language was formed by a quadrilateral composed by theories of *proposition, articulation, designation* and *derivation*, Foucault traces a kind of polygon classical of language to show on what basis of understanding she remained supported for a long time.

The quadrilateral elaborated by Foucault acts and is organized as follows. In general, the *articulation* would be what gives content to the verbal formation that is projected from a *proposition*. The *articulation* is what fills the verbal void of the *proposition*. However, she it opposes the *proposition* to differentiate things that, in their assignments, connect again an the each other. The theory of *designation* is the segment of the quadrilateral that manifests the connection of the nominal forms that the *joint* highlights. However, the *designation* is opposed to the generalities that the *articulation* produces. The *derivation* theory shows, in turn, the movement of words from their origin, however, the deviation that language produces on the surface of the representation creates an opposition that breaks the stable character that, in a metaphysical perspective, supposedly links the root of a word to the representation of one thing. In this way, the *derivation* returns to the *proposition* because without it the *designation* would remain stuck in itself. Without this return she would not be able to account for the generality that, for Foucault, authorizes an attribution bond.

It is important to say that, for Foucault, the language quadrilateral operates in diagonal relations. The first diagonal unites the *articulation* with the *derivation*, that is: if there is a language articulated by words it is because since the founding act of *designation* they (the words) do not stop deriving and, thus, acquire what Foucault (2000) says is a *variable extension*. For the same author, it is precisely in this axis of the quadrilateral that the state of a tongue is fixed. This is due to the fact that the articulatory function of a language is determined by the derivation stage in which she finds herself. It is at this stage that are also the your historical dimension and its power of discrimination defined. The other diagonal of the quadrilateral goes from the *proposition* to the origin. In other words, she goes from the statement present in the act of judging to the *designation* present in the act of naming. It is on the axis between these segments that the relationship between the words and the things is located. So, if we consider that a representation is that through which we can dispose what a thing is, so what words do is not to say the being of a thing, but just name something already represented by the

language. Thus, if "The first diagonal marks the progress of language in its power of specification" (Foucault, 2000, p. 164), the second marks the "[...] undefined entanglement between the language and representation" (Ibid, p. 164). To use Foucault's terms (2000), sometimes the word works *with its power to represent*, sometimes she acts *with her power to compose and of decompose.*

This is exactly where the name is. he is at the point where the diagonals of the quadrilateral intersect. Therefore, for this notion, naming means representing a verbal form representation within a panorama of things already represented. It is in the name that the functions of language intersect and that representation jumps over a *proposition*. In it, the discourse articulates to knowledge. That way, if the names were accurate and the language was *well-done*, for use an expression by Foucault (2000), it would not be difficult to separate the judgment true from the false. Finding the error would be a simple operation. However, the infinite derivation of language produces deviations that prevent one prophylaxis of error which, consequently, would put us before the very truth.

Nietzsche (2000) was responsible for making this more explicit. In the aphorism 11 of the work *Human, too human*, when discussing the representational character of language, it brings the notion that for a long time man believed in *names of things* with the same vehemence that believed in *aeternae veritates*. Based on this, the *name* has become the term of speech. For Foucault, for example, the name exhausts the possibility of speaking, because it makes everything revolve around what it he represents. In Nietzschean terms, this is because representation establishes a permanence of meaning. In this direction, it is clear that the four segments of this quadrilateral frame the classic view of language. Let's say, a peneumatic vision that has reached its limit exactly at the point where its diagonal lines intersect. This notion external to language is born out of an intention and a set of representational demands who seek "[...] merely understand what the text means, and not to sniff, or even presuppose, a double sense" (Nietzsche, 2000, p. 19). So, for romanticism, being able to name things was a huge achievement, but, in a Foucaultian perspective, this was also the reason why the name has ceased to be understood as the essence of language to then become your most fervent enigma.

And for Foucault (2000), after language became detached from the primacy of the name, it has become increasingly clear that there is a non-discursive discourse through which language manifests itself in its *crude being*. According to the same author, i understand that it is precisely on this crude being of language that we should sniff the language *of* language. This, based on the notion that "language itself has its inner principle of proliferation" (Foucault, 2000, p. 56). There is, therefore, no one external logic that acts in its functioning, since language is normative. The functioning of things is already the very way of being of language. So, to say in Foucaultine terms what could well be said in Heideggerian terms, an educational practice *in* language is only possible as

long as the search for its function is not limited to the word. This search must be carried out in the very existence of language, in its historical relationship with the world and with things. It is precisely this relationship that, from now on, i intend to explore to, who knows, extract from there the possibility of thinking about an experience with language in education.

The saga of saying and the appropriating happening of learn

If for a long time language was dissolved like ember in the ashes of representation, the twentieth century was the place where we saw its flames reignite. It was with the *linguistic turn* that a new clearing opened in front of theme. With Wittgenstein as a figurehead, the linguistic turn paved the way for countless changes that, later, marked the thought about the language. Thus, the main change that this movement produced in the conceptions belonging to the phase that preceded it, it was determined by Wittgenstein's recognition that the limits of language represent the limits of the world. In other words, the fundamental idea of this turn is that we are beings, properly, linguistic. It was in view of this notion that, according to Berticelli (2013), we move to the understanding that the world that exists is the world that is *in* language. Therefore, even though many authors[2] have carried out the effects of the linguistic turn, it was Heidegger (and later Gadamer) who unveiled a horizon specific to language to then redefine its path in the very redefinition that made *being*.

However, this discussion lends itself to all sorts of misunderstandings. The first, and perhaps the most childlike, is to recognize in Heidegger the original notion about a supposed unity of being. To avoid any confusion, it is essential to note that this is not Heidegger starting point, but Husserl. Heidegger is not a philosopher of identity, but of difference. Nevertheless, the question of being in Heidegger does not accept idealism and does not require its ultimate foundation. On the contrary. What is suspended there is the definitive abandonment of metaphysics. Thus, the elaboration of the question of being in Heidegger is a starting point and not a finishing line. A starting point that shakes the firm Husserlian terrain to show that the notion of being present in its hermeneutic turn, it requires an understanding that, in turn, metaphysics is unable to provide. And it was in Nietzsche's succession that Heidegger saw the problems of transcendental metaphysics, it was also there that he saw the designation of an opening that allowed him to understand being as a historical happenig. It is in the midst of this hermeneutic turnaround that Heidegger, therefore, paved the way for an important reconsideration of language. A reconsideration that made man himself a path of language. But why are we a language path? Because language speaks. But if we are the way, where does the speech of language from? She comes from what is said. In the said the speech of the language start its saga. And where she does it end? Nowhere. Why? Because speech takes

shelter in what is said just as sweetness takes shelter in honey. Here, neither party can separate from the other. Both constitute unity, in the plurality of voices. In other words, the said is the shelter in which the speech of language if protected. However, for Heidegger (2003), we have to seek the speech of language in a tell genuine. But what does it mean to genuinely say? "To genuinely say is to say in such a way that the fullness of saying, proper to what is tell, is in turn inaugural" (Heidegger, 2003, p. 10).

In education this is fundamental, because it is in the appropriation of tell what happens the realization of learn. Not in a habitual saying, but in an appropriating saying. Not in a saying copied, pasted, decorated if we prefer, but in a tell genuinely thought. But what is an appropriation? It is a learning that converts what is learned in own thing. It is, therefore, what is genuinely inaugurated in the gesture of saying. However, learning is not simply seize. Learning means appropriating what we seize. This is what the word appropriation tells us. In such a way, to take ownership of something, we need to get closer. Thus, one appropriation depends on one approximation. In turn, this approximation built on the hermeneutic dialogue that the to educate determines. It is a dialogue that seeks to insert itself in the multiple entrances of thought. Often, though almost always, these interpretive inputs are ignored in the pedagogical process. Sometimes it's because the class ends, sometimes because the subject is different and sometimes because we also underestimate the students interpretations. The notion of dialogue I refer to must be open to the plurality of voices. It is only on this horizon that such proximity can be achieved. And this is fundamental, because it is in the space of proximity that the dialogue rises and, when he rises, he provokes, genuinely, the say appropriator of learn. Here, the reading experience illustrates a little bit of this processo of dialogue. That is: reading is not learning by word. Read is evoking by reading. Read is bring close what is shown in the evoking what is read. Read, in this perspective, is much more than mastering the lexicon of one idiom. Reading is to attribute world. Therefore, read is also nominate world.

But what does it mean to nominate? Naming is not assig words. To nominate is to evoke in the latin sense in which the word *evoco-are* means to call. Thus, to nominate is to call for close to the word. To name is, therefore, to approximate what appears when evoked. However, this approach does not create what is evoked in the gesture of appointment. This approximation shown in the evocation just summons and brings it close to the word the validity and vigor of what is retract in the absence. It is, therefore, in this call that evocation provoke what is evoked. But in what sense does this provocation take place? In the sense of bringing for near what is in the distance that prevails in the absence. So, to provoke is to call, is to claim the proximity, is to remove from the distance what is evoked of an absence for the discovery of one appear. Let us think so. When I write Sun, Moon or Star, I take them, immediately, under the sky. Why? Because language is performative. As Berticelli wrote (2004), language is normative. So, in naming i evoke, and in evoking I sum-

mon at things for close to what the word brings together. These things gathered about the word are what characterize the *nominate*. In this way, naming is not to give name for things, but to evoke, gather, bring, summon, provoke, invite what prevails in an absence for the discovery of one appear that shows in the happening of a presence. Therefore, reading is evoking. At the same time, read is harvest of what is evoked. However, the word is not introduced into the language by appointment. She it introduces itself independently. It is precisely in the presence that naming causes that things are evoked. It is also in this evocation that the way of being of the thing unfolds.

Therefore Heidegger (2003) will tell us that, being what they are, the things unfold world and, being its own duration, she persist in the world. As things persist, they support the world. How? Being a gesture of the world. However, it is worth remembering that supporting means: *to endure.* In this way, if the thing supports a world, so naming doesn't mean just evoking things. To name is to attribute world. Following this perspective, Heidegger (2003) shows us that the same evocation that names things, also calls-provokes the saga of say that names the world. In this sense, the say is that it delivers the world to the thing and gives to the thing abode in the world. But what gives the thing and the world its ways of being? The language, because their ways of being are operated by linguisticity present in the historicity of understanding. It happens, then, that language speaks and speaking of language things are evoked for the beginning of a saga that reveals itself in say. Thus, it's in the saga of saying that things and the world receive their ways of being.

That said, it is worth reinforcing that one thing is everything what that somehow *is*. And the world is the gesture of things and the place where things are structured. So here, the word world ceases to have a metaphysical meaning because it doesn't seek to represent the universe, history, nature, or else determine the totality of existence a single blowin of understanding. There is not, in the concept of world exposed here, that pretension idealized by illuminist materialism, of a unitary history, therefore, universal[3]. The world that exists is the world present in the plurality of language. But if we take it in this direction, where, then, does the world and thing meet? Where do your ways of being merge? Well. These questions in themselves indicate a path insofar as they presuppose the existence of a place where the world and thing meet and a place where their ways of being merge. Thus, these questions indicate the existence of a place *between* world and thing. Therefore, is in this *between* which world and thing meet. The *between* is the place. And as know, *between* is the place that is in the middle of two. Remember that the word *between* comes from the latin *inter*. *In* is a latin prefix that indicates an inward movement for the *in*-land. Thus, the *between* is not a place that only distinguishes the parts of which it is middle. *Between* is a place where the parties also come together and, in your *inter*, intertwine. Therefore, the existence of a *between* indicates a place of intimacy between world and thing.

But where does this intimacy prevails? For Heidegger (2003), the intimacy world-thing prevails, precisely, in the difference that the *between* collects. Gathered in the intimacy of *between* the difference brings together world and thing. In the heideggerian perspective, it is possible to say that, when bringing them together, the difference in support for the world and also for things. Therefore, it is clear that, as it is conceived here, the word *difference* does not indicate differentiation, much less is it a way of representing a relationship. Difference is means. To use Heidegger terms (2003), the difference is middle what appropriates things in the gesture of the world and that, too, adds world granting things. Therefore, the between calls world and thing to the middle of its intimacy. In other words, the difference *is* not before or after the world and the thing. The difference prevails in the happening of the world and thing. It collects and sustains the middle in which the world and thing intertwine. she It is not what sustains the world. What the difference does is support a place, a middle, on which the world and thing are accommodated.

In this sense, the difference evokes-flame world and thing for the middle of an intimacy and, in doing so, it accommodates the making of things in the making of the world. In other words: the difference quietens things in the world. Quieting means accommodating things so that they can, in your gestures, safeguard the world. Thus, the difference doesn't just rest things in the arms of the world, but does the world rest on things. In other words, things rest in the world and the world is sufficient in things. It is in this pair of movements what the stillness occurs. And stillness doesn't mean what doesn't sound. Not to sound is just the absence of an intonation movement. And that absence should not be assumed as an empty space. The deaf student does not sound chanting, but something sounds in this absence of intonation. Therefore, the stillness that prevails in the absence of intonation it is not an empty space, but, rather, a space of happening. Thus immersed in stillness is that the world and thing protect the difference. And quiet, therefore, in their ways of being, they are quiet in the intimacy of difference. It is here, in the silence of this stillness, that something sounds. We will not understand the meaning of this if we think that to sound is to produce a sound. Something sounds in the silence. And that sound only occurs in the stillness that silence collects. There is a sound that only silence produces. There is a sound that does not occur outside of silence. In other words, from the silence comes a tell that only sounds while something that not said. So the difference calls for what sounds in the stillness. The difference evokes in to recall. This is precisely where language speaks. She speaks "[...] when the call of the di-fference evokes and summons world and thing for the simplicity of their intimacy" (Heidegger, 2003, p. 24).

Like this, it is possible to say that the speech of language happens in the consonance with stillness. And this is because the language appropriates the difference for *happening*. But how can man appropriate the speech of language if it happens in stillness? Since man belongs to

this consonance, it is in the speech of language that he achieved such appropriation. The appropriation of man occurs in the speech of language and not the other way around. Man is capable of producing noise, that is: he is able to speak by intoning sounds through words. Therefore, through the articulation of the word, man's speech brings the speech of language out of stillness for your happen. Thus, "[...] the speech of language projects the word of man in the world, and the world, in turn, is reflected in the linguisticity of the word" (Sichelero, 2019, p. 5).

In view of this, the man's word breaks the silence of stillness and with that disruption the stillness then sounds in words. It is, therefore, in the breaking of stillness discourse is also born. The man's speech intones words, breaks the stillness and calls the difference that language appropriate in your happen. It is in the difference that the speech of language appropriates the speech of man. Is of the difference that man collects his words. It is also through difference that man corresponds to language. By the way: "the man speaks just right that corresponds the language" (Heidegger, 2003, p. 26). It is worth remembering that, for Heidegger, to correspond is to listen. But how to listen the speech of language? Corresponding to the called of difference. But where can it take us? For the language path. But the speech of language should not put us before language she herself? No. The speech of the language shown in the correspondence of the difference it just points the way to language. In this indication that the speech produces is that, according to Heidegger (2003), is that we can get closer of possibility of bringing the language like for the language.

But for that, it is necessary to pay attention to what, in one way or another, is speaking in your speech. However, even if the one who speaks be present in your speech what is speaking in the speaker speech does not belong to him. Why? Because what do speech in speech does not belong to speaking the speaker. Speech as what, in different ways, is pronounced by a speaker it's just a residue of what the speaker says. What is speaking in speech is not pronounced, expressly, by the speaker's speech. Speech only sustains and summons what is speaking for inland of saying. When the teacher says that spring is coming to an end he announces, through what is not spoken, the beginning of summer. The impression this gives us is that what is said seems to be separate who's talking. Therefore, even if students stick to the teacher's speech it is the speech of what is not spoken that guides them in understanding what the teacher says. Thus, what the teacher teaches about a subject speaks in different ways through what he does not say. What the teacher's speech says it is separated of speaking how pronounce. Pronunciation mechanics only summons and gathers through the word's naming sound.

Therefore, the speaker is not the word intoned by the speaker. Who speaks in a speech is, paradoxically, what did not come when speaking. In other words, what is not pronounced in speaking is what gives meaning to what is said indeed. Without this correspondence, there would be no sense in what is said. That is: what is not allowed to speak is part

of the discourse present in what is said. Thus, what is not allowed to be said only exists as long as something not said. In this direction, what speaks in a speech does not belong to man, but to the universe proper to language. This is where language lives: in the articulation of those who speak with their speech and what is not spoken in that speech. However, we need to look carefully at the meaning that, here, carries our speech about speaking. If we don't pay attention to what talking in what is said here, we will also not be able to do, a thinking experience with the language of language in education. Although the phonetic-sound-mechanical definitions of language are correct, they do not provide us with an educational experience of the consonance of what sounds in the stillness. The less they enable us a correspondence between the provenance of stillness and what it means to sound.

Thus, in addition to the language being reduced to the field of what sounds intonate. Educating ends up suffocated for a reason that seems to contain the limits of what a speech says. It is ignored that quietness also accommodates a way of knowing. And by ignoring that sound that the word doesn't support the support for a new education is also ignored. And here the word *new* doesn't adjective anything better. The word *new* suggests an educational experience that, even not following the model of traditional pedagogies, it is part of the educational process. It is, therefore, an experience where "[...] speech and what is spoken already show themselves as that through which which something comes to language, this is, something appears *to the extent that something if said* [emphasis on the original]" (Heidegger, 2003, p. 201).

The educational importance of this placement is decisive, as it shows a marked difference between *speak* and *say*. This difference is illustrated on those occasions when someone speaks and for hours speaking ends without saying anything. However, this difference can also be seen, conversely, on that occasion when, even without speak anything, the student say a lot. But what does it mean to *say*? Based on philosophical hermeneutics it is possible to maintain that, the saga of saying means showing. Everything that speaks in a speech, speaks showing. The work of art, for example, speaks showing. She shows when she gives news to the spectator. And your news always shows itself in different ways because your show is always historical. Hence it is understood that in everything there is a show. When educator and educator talk to each other they participate in a process in which they show things to each other. In saying they offer the other what emerges of talking and, in that conversation, inaugurate a knowledge that is shown in interpreting. It is exactly this interpretative appropriation of knowledge, that emerges one genuine say. Here it is essential to clarify that the genuine character of this happening does not discard the *images of thought*, to use an expression from Deleuze (2018), but it only indicates the presence of something that before was not presente, whether as creation or repetition. He who learns to ride a bicycle lives, in the first time he rides, a genuine experience. That's not what happens to the student who, for the first time, write one word any? Something genuine happens

to both. Therefore, learning genuinely refers to that learning that, even though it is conducted by the teacher, only happens on the private plane of a singularity that cannot be measured.

Thus, the appropriating happening of learning brings together what is articulated in the saga showing of say. This is fundamental, since the appropriation of know it only occurs in the emergence of learn. However, care must be taken not to confuse *know* with *learn*. Knowing and learning are like two sides of the same ditch, however, among them there is a logical trait that puts them in different places. This is: know does not mean learn. Only reaches the know he who first understands what he learn. In other words, only learns that one who, before, understands. First the student understands and understanding is that he learns. It is worth mentioning that, here, there is no space for an abstractionist reading of learning. Anyway, an example to illustrate this notion, can be removed from the experience of one who tries to ride a bicycle for the first time. This is: just learn to walk one who, before, understands the signs of balance. It is only in this way that walk here becomes a possible learning. And is this something abstractionist? It seems not to me, because there is a dynamic of understanding on which knowledge is materially established. The educational experience itself shows us that when the student understands a contente him starts to show significant advances in learning. Thus, it is possible to say that only reach the know that learns to understand. Thus, different from notion that the critical historical pedagogies built that the student learns for know how to understand the world, here is an inverse design.

In this sense, it is important to note that, not always the genuine happen of a say reveals itself in what shown, for example, in an assessment. He can protect itself as an indication of something that is guarded in what don't let yourself talk. This goes against our representational habits who seek the meaning and evaluate the result of the educational process, exclusively, in the structure of what the student verbalizes. It is disregarded that what the student does not verbalize protects the original character of something that has not yet been shown. Little is taken into account the possibility of an original learn present in the *to be known* that the unspoken things preserve. It is also in the unspoken things that the structure of a say has your support. What was not allowed to be verbalized is what, for a long time, guaranteed the possibility that the man would continue talking. If in the verbalization of his speech the man reached the fullness of what say and leave nothing unnoticed in his say, long ago, the man-world dialogue would have failed.

Thereby, in the face of evaluative inflation that goes through education and the frantic measuration of learning through the objectification of knowledge, we ended up hiding the vigor of language and we avoid the dialogue shown in the saga of say. The saga of say gathers in the vigor of language what in speech has not yet been considered. And resting on the saga of saying is that the language prevails and, in its vigor, she keeps showing. That's why that "*The vigor of language is the saga of say while that shows* [emphasis on the original]" (Heidegger, 2003, p.

203). A little different from the pragmatic conception that comes from Peirce, here, there is no sign that supports what the language shows, because for Heidegger, what the language shows is that it sustains the signs. However, whether in peircean pragmatics, whether in the heideggerian hermeneutics, we cannot say that this show is the effect of man's action in the sense that it is not the man who shows, but the sign (for Peirce) and language (for Heidegger). However, in contrast to the peircean position, understand that the sign only shows as a language match. And even when this show it happens through the speech of the sign, what is shown there, it is preceded by letting it show that it lives in language. The sign speaks the language of language *in* language. And this is only possible because, according to Heidegger (2003), have always belonged to language. His speech pursues the saga of say to there show himself. We can say that the language speaks showing. And it speaks to the extent that it shows from itself. "In that sense, we listen the language letting her tell us her saga" (Heidegger, 2003, p. 203). And regardless of how it happens, what we hear is a say that always accompanies our listen. Our speech pursues the say that there we listen. Therefore, *speech* is listening of language. In other words, we speak by listening to the language as those that your saga belongs to.

Final considerations

Based on what I've presented so far, it is possible to consider that the saga of saying is that it guarantees and gives man the ability to *speak*. From what is meant that the human speech it appropriates in what the saga of say grants to our listening. It's like listening of language that man's speech is built. Thus, man's speech is a of language correspondence delivered to him by the saga of say. Faced with this understanding, man is a promise of language. In this sense, language itself determines the appropriating happenig of learn. However, we don't see the vigor of language because it is corresponding to her that we belong the yours saga. That said, the vigor of language puts man on the path appropriate of a of a mutual to belong. This is not only in the sense that man belongs mutually to what appropriates, but also in the sense that it only appropriates in correspondence the language as yours belongings. Therefore, the say while saga sends speech from language to man's speech as sonorous recommendation of what, in the listening to a saga, grants man the verbalization of words. And this verbalization can also occur in the way that the deaf verbalize or the aesthetic way that art makes use of. In this sense, showing up in the saga of say the speech of language rests in the appropriator happen of learn. The appropriator happen brings, in turn, what is hidden for the discovery of one appear. In this direction, the brilliance of know that shows itself in this appear does not give in to modern representation about what it means to learn. The know that shines as the discovery of an appear remains, deliver the appropriating saga of say.

In this direction, for to do an experience of thought with language in education, we need a radical transformation in the relationship we establish with it. This also implies a reframing of the notions we have about *evaluation*, because if *learn* is movement and singularity, there are experiences that cannot be objectified. And even if it is impossible to access the singularities, because they constitute the subjective world of each one, education acts as if this were frankly possible. Here, language offers us a way out. This is: if teachers are under the impression that all students attended the same class, it's just because the language produced adjustments and agreements of understanding, because actually, no student sees the class in the same way. Therefore, a transformation in the understanding of what language means for us educators, it can prevent our pedagogical habits from destroying the common world that language builds. However, this transformation must not be assumed in a purely psychological sense let alone on the horizon of an epistemological appeal. She it must be assumed in its ethical-aesthetic nature. That is why, even given the fact that we belong to the language, I understand that this transformation must be determined by the way we let ourselves belong to its appropriate happen. And this implies in a hermeneutic attitude that recognizes normativity that the language exercises in pedagogical processes. If we understand that the establishment of sense hasin language its material place is because we understand that the experiences held there are finite. Here is a notion antipode the any foundation that does not recognize language an insurmountable basis of the experience the *being* of education. Perhaps this notion provides, within the scope of pedagogical practices, an educational experience that, in my view, the classical conceptions of language can't provide. And if, in some way, this text contributed to that, then, will have accomplished its goal. Goal that, by the way, didn't have the intention to of see or demonstrate, but only interpret language as an happen decisive in the process of establishing of sense in education.

Notes

1 Saviani and Duarte (2010), Gontijo and Campos (2014), Ehrenber (2014), Martins, Alves and Sousa (2015), Tonelli (2017) and Azevedo and Abib (2018), just to name a few.

2 As is the case with Richard Rorty, Ferdinand de Saussure and Michael Foucault, not to mention others.

3 On this, see Gianni Vattimo in: *Adiós a la verdad*. Barcelona: Gedisa, 2010.

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