Abstract

SCHULER, Fernando L.. Rawls, economic models and the pluralist argument. Conjectura: filos. e Educ. [online]. 2018, vol.23, n.spe3, pp.197-229.  Epub Sep 02, 2019. ISSN 2178-4612.  https://doi.org/10.18226/21784612.v23.dossie.9.

The article argues in two ways. On the one hand, he argues that John Rawls’s theory of justice, and in particular the difference principle, rather than stablish an egalitarian conception of justice, has an opposite goal: to dissociate social justice from the demands of economic equality. Economic inequality, in justice as fairness, is a kind of good, since it works for the improvement of all individuals prospects, and particularly those of the less fortunate. In defending this concept, Rawls appeals to the idea of social pluralism and the convergence of living standards in the context of what he calls a well-ordered society. The article also argues that the conception of justice as fairness can be better understood when it is detached from adherence to historically situated institutional and economic regulation systems. A proper distinction between the ethical sense given by the philosophical foundation of the theory and its possible institutional developments is the best path for a theory that proposes to serve as an overlapping consensus among multiple visions of good competing in our democratic tradition.

Keywords : Rawls; Economic models; Difference principle.

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