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Conjectura: Filosofia e Educação

versão impressa ISSN 0103-1457versão On-line ISSN 2178-4612

Resumo

KETZER, Patricia. The irreducibility of the concept of trust in the epistemology of testimony. Conjectura: filos. e Educ. [online]. 2016, vol.21, n.3, pp.496-513. ISSN 2178-4612.  https://doi.org/10.18226/21784612.v21.n3.03.

Trust is an indispensable concept whenever we think of human beings interacting with other individuals because it helps us to think about the political order and social cooperation, however, it is far from having a single definition. The search for a definition has proved that it is necessary to come back to the origins of the concept in order to seek for understanding its use in epistemology. In moral philosophy, it is established a distinction between two ways of trusting: 1) trust, which is characterized by a deeper interpersonal relationship that involves good will and vulnerability; 2) rely, which is a kind of trust but more basic in how the world and the things work. The concept of trust becomes relevant in epistemology when we start to consider the transmission of knowledge by testimony. The main issue is when we can trust other people to acquire knowledge based on their acts of speech. In order to seek for understanding its use in epistemology we need analyze the use concept in moral philosophy. Therefore, we exposed the concept of moral trust and evaluated the possibility of a reduction in epistemology. However, the reduction is not possible because moral trust presupposes risk acceptance, the attempt of eliminating risks through rational thought weakens the act of trusting. Besides, trust makes us resistant to evidences and, in epistemology, it is wrong to neglect evidences. We defend that, only rely should be, prudently, used. It is a concept that has already been established in epistemology literature. Considering moral aspects of trust is important for identifying the problem. The concept of trust cannot contribute to the debate because it does not play an epistemic role. As for the concept of rely, it can be used in epistemology of testimony, just as it has been used in other epistemological debates.

Palavras-chave : Epistemic Trust; Moral Trust; Rely; Interpersonal Relationships; Testimony.

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