INTRODUCTION

The management of “the public thing” in Brazil holds inseparable peculiarities with the sociability built from the Colonial Period and whose model was heavily carved in the monarchical phase. The nation that emerges from this context, was marked by the impasse between: tradition - sedimented in the Lusitanian sociopolitical mentality (bossy and patriarchalist); and, modernity - that came from the countries that adopted the liberal society model (non-interventionism posture of the State toward the economy; formal equality principle validity; and, assurance of fundamental individual rights). The tension between tradition and modernity created an arrangement whose ruptures and continuities characterized the Brazilian State, accommodated in the contemporary social contract - the capitalism. In this path, along with the nation’s history, a concept of a liberal bourgeois democracy was adopted as politic-social organization model. The proclaimed “transformations” that marked consolidation trajectory of this State, always opposing/accommodating the perceptions of tradition and modernity, didn’t change the Brazilian reality, specially in one of its main aspects: the relation between State and Neopatrimonialism, sedimented in the local elites’ socio-political interests, that profits in the conversion of the public thing - res pública - in private thing - res privata (^{BOBBIO, 2017}; ^{MAZZEIO, 2015}). And, if the separation between the public and private goods is an essential element in order to constitute a Democratic Management of the State, for its part, of the public institutions, there is a paradox about the implantation of a substantive democracy in Brazil.

As in the “laws for English see”, democracy and the design of public policies were taking shape in Brazilian lands, between emancipatory yearnings and dictatorial intensities. In the second half of the 1980s, with the end of the murky Civil-Military Dictatorship (1964-1985), we witnessed the (re) democratization of the country whose progeny, 1988 Constitution and the Law of Guidelines and Bases - LDB nº 9.394 / 1996, intensified changes in the educational policy of the country, such as “implementation” of Democratic Management of Public Education.

Public power promoted actions aimed at “modernizing” the state that would lead, in the words of its heralds, to the consolidation of the Democratic State of Law and the efficiency of the public machine. At the same time, orchestrated in tune with multilateral organizations (International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Bank; United Nations (UN) Organizations; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)), the proposal of LDC nº 9.394 / 1996 by Darcy Ribeiro, of privatizing character (^{SHIROMA; MORAES; EVANGELISTA, 2011}; ^{SAVIANI, 2013}; 2016), as well as the educational reforms which came from this Law, increased the proclaimed ideology of “modernization” and overcoming the “Brazilian roots” - patrimonialist, clientelist, “coronelista”, illiterate, inefficient, among other traits - through a formal education in the mold of bourgeois liberal civility.

Based on these initial premises, this article discusses the possibilities present in the Democratic Management of Public Education in Ceará, sponsored by a state that has its administrative structure marked by neopatrimonialist orders, and whose principles of “modernization” of public administration (New Public Administration) are by these encapsulated practices. This allows us to unveil the subtleties present in the implementation of the mechanisms (System) that ratify this principle of Management that presuppose vigorous participation of society.

From this assumption arise the problematizations that guide this study: Is it possible to materialize the Democratic Management of Public Education in the organizational and administrative structure of the state of Ceará? What socio-political relations, in the symbiosis between State and neopatrimonialism, can be deduced from the implantation or inhibition of the mechanisms that make up Democratic Management?

It is a preliminary hypothesis, in this work, that predominates in the aspects that govern Democratic Management a paradoxical hybridism, that is, if, on one hand, the mechanisms of civil society participation are reinforced, on the other hand, its implementation reinforces the instrumental, legitimizing educational policies appropriate to the tendencies of globalized capitalism.

To capture this movement in a contradictory reality in which the correlations of force, class antagonisms and, among others, the interests present in the execution of educational policies reveal the laws that govern the phenomena researched. Reality is not a complex of finished things, but a complex process, which is in continuous and uninterrupted transformation of becoming. Essence is the very movement of the “thing” or the “thing in itself” (^{DUARTE, 2004}), thus not a mere knowing, but a means and method of transforming knowledge, of analyzing the real object, the real facts, the objective world and its interrelationship between thought and being.

In research and studies guided by dialectical historical materialism, the collection and articulation of objective and subjective data, as mediation for the understanding of the investigated phenomena, seems to be a conditio sine qua non, as historical counter-tests. Triviños clarifies that

O materialismo histórico é a ciência filosófica do marxismo que estuda as leis sociológicas que caracterizam a vida da sociedade, de sua evolução histórica e da prática social dos homens, no desenvolvimento da humanidade. O materialismo histórico significou uma mudança fundamental na interpretação dos fenômenos sociais que, até o nascimento do marxismo, se apoiava em concepções idealistas da sociedade humana (^{TRIVIÑOS, 1987}, p. 50).¹

In the field of education research, the use of qualitative-quantitative data is enriching. If the class struggle is the motor of history and the proletarian class compose the subordinates, deprived of goods and rights, their socio-economic condition is measured by quantitative data that must be decoded in qualitative data.

^{Marx (2013}), in Capital, walks through the alleys of statistics, built between the plots of social exploitation and labor, quantified in the salaries paid to workers (children, women, elderly and men) and in deplorable and exhausting hours of work. The perception of the (dis) order dictated by capital, which commercializes education and human life itself, can be densely perceived, following in Marx’s footsteps, in the dialectical use of qualitative-quantitative data.

In this sense, to deny or confirm the hypothesis of research, it is anchored in Dialectical Historical Materialism, using a qualitative-quantitative approach, although non-Marxist thinkers are used to deal with specific approaches, in whose fields these intellectual ones are references. In addition, a theoretical contribution is sought in the classics of national political science, about the Brazilian State, a process whose complexity was not restricted to the end of the period of subordination of Brazil to the Portuguese Empire, and the controversial (re) democratization in the country. This is justified in view of the changes in the political-social-economic structure of the country, the control of the dominant elites, the process of Independence and the advent of the Republic, and their mutations, which sought and seek to implement transformations without changing the status quo.

To achieve the goals outlined in this article, the same was structured in five sections, the first being the introduction; in the second section we discuss the formation of the Brazilian State, with a view to the thematization of the concept of patrimonialism and its current perspective - neopatrimonialism; In the third section a brief analysis of neopatrimonialism in the political-institutional and political-administrative spheres is carried out, focusing on public management in the state of Ceará, with emphasis on what has been observed since the 1980s, a period marked by the incorporation of managerial principles and public governance by the Brazilian / Ceará State; the fourth section discusses the Democratic Management of Public Education in Ceará, analyzing the functioning of the Municipal Councils of Education (CMEs); and, as a conclusion, aspects discussed during the study are reaffirmed.

The Brazilian neopatrimonialist State: the democratic dilema.

For ^{Restrepo (1990}), in an instigating article on “Civil Society and the State”, in order to understand socio-political relations in Latin America, “none of the European classics offers a satisfactory notion, although all contribute to an important referential mark and elements of analysis that must be preserved, corrected or complemented “(^{RESTREPO, 1990}, p.62). In this question, Restrepo shares similarity with Florestan Fernandes, an important thinker of Brazilian critical sociology, who in developing a dialectical approach to the society movement makes him aware of the specificities of Brazilian history.

^{Fernandes (2006}) perceived the sociopolitical formation of Brazil not as a structure and permanent political way of acting, but a formation that spirals forward, accommodating transformations and permanencies. His methodology, by combining in a cohesive way influences by Hegel, Marx and Weber (^{CHIEZA, 2006}), identifies the singular mismatch of capitalism at the local level, which was only possible by avoiding analogies or hasty conclusions, such as equating the mill master and bourgeois.

Understanding the subtleties that have engendered development, be it from the state to civil society or from capitalism to liberal bourgeois democracy in Brazil, is one of the most herculean tasks of historiography and political science, and is first crossed by an understanding of the national conjuncture. The deliberative capacity of the new participatory formats, based on the constitutionality of the 1988 Charter - the Constitution, has occurred in the midst of the new “metabolic partner of Capital” order due to neoliberalism and productive restructuration (^{MÉSZÁROS, 2015}), towards which Brazilian capitalism, peripheral and in inequality with the economic center, is politically oriented (^{FAORO, 2005}).

This hegemony of neoliberal discourse in Brazil has consolidated what ^{Dagnino (2004)} called “perverse confluence”: the contradictory coexistence between the project of minimum state - which exempts public power from its socio-political attributions; and the participatory project of society - with its search for rights, which emerged with the end of authoritarian governments. This coexistence proved to be asymmetric, since social achievements did not operate equally in relations between the State and civil society. (^{DAGNINO, 2004}).

In the deterioration of res publica and the low popular participation in public affairs - phenomena that characterize the subversion of democratic fundamentals -, ^{Holanda (2013}) and ^{Faoro (2005}) interpretations of the absence of rationalism, formality and legality in the which refers to the exercise of the public function - the distribution of public positions and the consequent execution of the same in Brazil. Both, from the theoretical conceptions of ^{Weber (1991}, ¹⁹⁹⁹) sought to untangle this extensive web of peculiarities, responsible, in their view, for the underdevelopment of Brazil, using for this purpose the Weberian category of patrimonialism.

If the formation of the modern state is guided by a triple beaconing: the idea of sovereignty - the result of a long and gradual process of concentration and centralization of power; the depatrimonialization of power - the separation of public and private law, implying the separation between incomes and state and private patrimony; and, the depersonalization - distinction between political power and its holder (^{TORRES, 1989}, pp. 47-75); these are not predominant traits in the Brazilian State, which gives it peculiar characteristics. As Nogueira points out:

(...) a teoria do Estado e sua organização no Brasil teve expressão na forte tendência para o modelo liberal e (...) este serviu para o aparato burocrático-legal que daria sustentação ao funcionamento e à independência das instituições políticas; contudo, foi evidentemente a fragilidade das estratégias voltadas para a conciliação do Estado patrimonial, que como tal se mantinha, como o modelo liberal do exercício do poder (...) (^{NOGUEIRA, 1994}, p. 35).²

In line with these aspects of patrimonialism, ^{Filgueiras (2009}) states that

[...] a tradição política brasileira não respeita a separação entre o público e o privado, não sendo o caso brasileiro, um exemplo de Estado moderno legitimado por normas impessoais e racionais. O patrimonialismo é a mazela da construção da República, de maneira que ele não promoveria a separação entre os meios de administração e os funcionários e governantes, fazendo com que esses tenham acesso privilegiado para a exploração de suas posições e cargos (^{FILGUEIRAS, 2009}, p. 388).³

For ^{Faoro (1993}, 2005), this patrimonialism that characterizes the Brazilian political tradition uses a metamorphosed liberalism that advances or recrudesce to the extent that the interests of the ruling classes benefit or are threatened by socio-political and economic freedom. This logic of the state and of the Brazilian elite itself corroborated that we did not achieve modernity, as well as a broad democracy, but a conservative modernization (^{FERNANDES, 2006}).

Faced with the socio-political and socio-economic transformations that have impacted society since the second half of the twentieth century, this classic Weberian typology of patrimonialism came to be questioned, being considered inadequate the new world order characterized by the modernization process and the advancement of democracy in diverse countries around the world. Guenther Roth (1968) and later, Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt (1973) made a distinction between “traditional” patrimonialism and a modern version of this system, called “neopatrimonialism”, whose difference

(...) se situa[...] no âmbito da relação privado/público. No patrimonialismo, todas as relações (políticas e administrativas) entre governantes e governado são de cunho privado: “não há qualquer diferenciação entre domínio público e privado”. No neopatrimonialsimo, a distinção público/privado existe, ainda que apenas formalmente, e é aceita. O exercício “neo-patrimonial” do poder se dá “no quadro e com a reivindicação de um quadro estatal (stateness) moderno de tipo legal-racional”. (^{BRUHNS, 2012}, 63).⁴

Neopatrimonialism therefore consists of a phenomenon in which the rational-legal state “cohabits” with an informal patrimonial system. But in this relationship, decisions about managing public affairs are exterior to the formal institutions of the state, they are concentrated in the hands of the political elite and its peers, intertwined in a network of clientelistic influences and interests. This network of influence is rooted in the exchange of favors for job offers and / or positions, until the defense of public policies aimed at privileging particularistic companies or interests, among others.

The changes in the theoretical field involving the “traditional” interpretation and the “modern” version of patrimonialism need to be thought in the light of the capacity of political practices to adapt to new economic contexts, with clientelistic social relations as one of their dynamos. This relationship is justified by the fact that clientelism is considered “as a mean for the state and politicians to meet the specific demands of the poorest populations and to integrate them into the political system and a way of co-opting new social groups.” (^{BEZERRA, 1999}: 27).

Despite the modernization, the emergence of social movements and legal changes that institutionalized social participation channels in state management, clientelistic practices persist in Brazil. The persistence of these practices is due, in large measure, to the fact that they constitute Brazilian political life as a continuum, not an addendum to it. (^{AVELAR and LIMA, 2000}).

This phenomenon, in turn, is reinforced by the Brazilian reality, marked by social exclusion and dependency relations, aspects that reaffirm the characteristics of clientelism, in which

[...] predomina um certo consenso de que as relações assim denominadas se caracterizam especialmente por serem relações do tipo assimétricas, isto é, são estabelecidas entre pessoas (patrão e cliente) que não possuem o mesmo poder (econômico e político), prestígio e status. Além disso, ela se distingue por ser uma relação do tipo pessoal (em que predominam os contatos face a face), pela troca de serviços e bens materiais (gentilezas, deferência, lealdade e proteção) entre os parceiros e pelo seu conteúdo moral (que remete frequentemente à honra dos parceiros) (^{BEZERRA, 1999}, p.14).⁵

So, in the clientelist relation

[...] é essencial o papel do político enquanto mediador entre as demandas e as decisões capazes de atendê-las. Os mecanismos impessoais e universalistas de canalização e processamento de demandas cedem lugar a vínculos de cunho pessoal entre líderes e sua rede de indivíduos ou grupo subordinados.[...] Essa mediação como que privatiza a obtenção de um bem público, na medida em que o patrocínio de um político influente aparece como requisito necessário para o acesso a serviços públicos fornecidos pelo Estado ou para solução de questões específicas. (^{DINIZ, 1982}, p.217).⁶

The implications of these clientelistic relations for Brazilian political life, for the exercise of democracy and more specifically for the functioning of Democratic Management are nefarious, which can be seen as:

[...] um problema do ponto de vista democrático, pois opera sob o princípio da dádiva, implicando sentimentos de lealdade e empenho individual. O eleitor, ao invés de se identificar com seu grupo ou classe, como trabalhador e cidadão, se identifica como beneficiário de um político influente, tornando a política inacessível sem a interferência das relações pessoais. (^{KUSCHNIR, 2000}, p.141-142).⁷

The reproduction of clientelism, its capacity to transmute itself by altering its source of resources, links in a umbilical way the theoretical questions that surround the debate about patrimonialism, since both incorporate practices more appropriate to the contemporary era. In this perspective, the debate about the inadequacy of patrimonialism as a category of analysis of the Brazilian reality, had another unfolding.

In this perspective, with ^{Luiz Werneck Vianna (1999)} and Jessé ^{Souza (1998}) ahead, a critical revision of Weberian matrix of interpretations on the formation of the State and of society began. Souza has taken up the classics of Brazilian patrimonialism seeking to identify the distortions and exaggerations of these works / authors, which he describes as “sociology of inauthenticity”, questioning the “determinisms” in relation to the underdevelopment of the country; in his work, “A ética protestante e a ideologia do atraso brasileiro”, ^{Souza (1998)} classifies interpreters of Brazilian patrimonialism into two lines: the “culturalist” side - under the influence of Sergio Buarque de Holanda; and the institutionalist side - under the auspices of Raymond Faoro and Simon Schwartzman.

According to the Weberian conception, the State as to its formation process can be: Contractualist - one starts from the idea that the modern State needs a social contract, an agreement between the members of the society, in order to preserve the social order (In order to enjoy this order, the members of society gave up of certain individual rights, recognizing the authority, equally over all, of a set of rules, of a political regime or of a ruler, which is the model of the European States); or Patrimonialist - correspond to those in which a centripetal power, of a strong patriarchal tendency, overlaid them on the other social forces, treating them as domestic instances, on which the king’s authority were relentless (^{RODRÍGUES, 1994}, p. 43).

To ^{Vianna (1999)} and ^{Souza (1998}) the Weberian matrix interpreters - Holanda, Faoro and Schwartzman - came to the conclusion that the dominant elite takes hold of the public patrimony aiming at the concretization of their particular objectives. However, there are problems in this interpretive lineage, since it falls into a “determinism”, losing sight of the peculiarities of Brazil, marked by the contradictory coexistence between the rural world, the system of social dependence, rational-legal administration and patrimonialism. There would be not a culture of backwardness, but a capitalism dependent on the state and vice versa; “Politically oriented”, constituting “a pathological modality of access to the modern”. (^{VIANNA, 1999}, p.176).

Considering the panorama analyzed up to the present moment, independent of the interpretation about the formation of the national State and its relation with neopatrimonialism, we can see the difficulties of operationalizing the participatory forms of the citizen - here taken as the individual who has rights and duties and who participates in the conduct of political power. From Holanda, through Faoro and Schwartzman, to Vianna and Souza there is an atrophied society in connection with a hypertrophied and patrimonial State. Paradoxically, there is an authoritarian pattern of organization of the Brazilian State, which is now supported by the neoliberal model, which maintains the excluding socio-political and economic structures.

The very idea of “modernization” in collusion with neo-patrimonialist principles has led to the persistence of a conservative-authoritarian democracy, since it does not aim at a real extension of decision-making mechanisms and, consequently, an extension of political participation, but rather a transfer of responsibilities, especially in areas such as social policy. The interests of local elites and their web of relations are still obstacles to the actual exercise of civil society in the management of public affairs, as follows.

THE NEW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE “ACCOMMODATION” TO THE NEOPATRIMONIALISM

The quest for autonomy of social movements and civil organizations reverberated critics to the conception of administration of the public thing. The technical-bureaucratic dimension came to be confronted with the concrete reality of the Brazilian public machine, marked by neopatrimonialism - contradictory and conflicting logic of the State administration, due to the coexistence between the traditional and the modern order (^{FILGUEIRAS, 2009}; ^{NOGUEIRA, 1994}). Dissonant voices in the political-governmental structure began to criticize the Brazilian laissez-faire⁸ way of managing, proposing a change of administrative paradigm: a political-philosophical dimension of a human-institutional / pluralist character (emphasis on mobilization of civil society and its acting as “actor” of social change).

In the case of Ceará, in which this study is emphasized, in the 1980s, the critics focused on the “Pacto dos Coronéis” (Covenant of the Colonels) that perpetuated the oligarchic and clientelistic practices that, according to the self-proclaimed “modernizing” groups, were the culprits of economic backwardness of the northeast. Entities linked to the nascent industry, such as Ceará Industrial Center (Centro Industrial do Ceará - CIC), initiated political actions to reorganize the map of power in the state. Funded by the CIC, a series of forums began to debate economics and politics, with the participation, even of figures representing the Brazilian left such as the economist Maria da Conceição Tavares. In the meantime, in the wave of denunciations against neopatrimonialist practice in Ceará, sectors of the left, with broad support from social movements, were able to elect the Labor Party (PT) candidate to the City of Fortaleza (1985), Maria Luiza Fontenele, defeating the government candidate, Paes de Andrade, in one of the most exciting electoral upheavals in the city’s history. (^{BARREIRA, 1992}).

In the quest to also elect representatives for the governmental sphere, the CIC organized the “group of changes” supporting the candidacy of Tasso Jereissati in 1986 to the state government as an alternative to clientelism and the corruption of the colonels. Victorious against the governor Adalto Bezerra, Tasso sets itself up as a new paradigm of relations between the State, the economy and society. The public sector would, in the words of the “tassists” ideologues, be managed by universalist principles, by a legal model of domination, in the Weberian perspective, understood as bureaucratic, efficient and as another “oligarchic model”, now unconnected to the land, but to the industry, that is, “modernized.” (^{MARTIN, 1993}). The strong business discourse of efficiency was at the heart of the novelty presented to the political scene by the “young entrepreneurs”, as Francisco de Oliveira points out:

Que os empresários sempre fizeram política, isto é, obvio ululante, uma espécie de axioma nelson-rodriguiano. Mas não a fazem pelos meios e com as formas da política. (...). A novidade consiste em empresários que querem fazer a política enquanto empresários, e imprimem à política as características da atividade empresarial, segundo a ideologia weberiana. (^{OLIVEIRA, 1993}, p. 2).⁹

The intense debates about the administrative professionaliza-tion of public affairs have become a recurring theme in the national and Ceará political agenda. In the wake of this ideology of “professionalization” and “modernization”, the Weberian bureaucratic model itself came to be questioned: in the face of the search for solutions to the fiscal crisis of the State in question; the rise of neo-liberal values; of social complexity; and of the competitive disputes for private investments (internal - fiscal war between the states and municipalities of the federation, and, external - market disputes, transnational corporations investments, participation in economic blocks, etc.) and labor. The influence of the private sector administration on the public sector was intensified, allowing for the advancement of concepts such as Managementism, Public Governance, or New Public Management.¹⁰

The Weberian bureaucratic model is characterized by formality (responsibility and duty); impersonality (based on function and lines of authority); and, professionalism (based on merit as a criterion of justice and differentiation). (^{KEINERT, 2000}; ^{GUERREIRO RAMOS, 1989}). In addition, it is linked to the Taylorist model (scientific administration) of division of tasks (those that elaborate / manage, and, the operators perform manual tasks), and therefore, it was inadequate: for the institutional context of globalization; of the State in fiscal crisis; and of the productive restructuring begun at the end of the 20th century (based on neoliberalism and toyotism).

Unlike the Weberian bureaucracy, the new administrative models are now seen as advanced and dynamic. According to ^{Secchi (2009}), managerialism would be identified with two practices: the Public Management Administration (APG - initials in Portuguese) and the Entrepreneurial Government (GE - initials in Portuguese). Models that “share the values of productivity, service orientation, decentralization,[and] efficiency in service delivery ...” (^{SECCGI, 2009}, p.356). APG would be defined by its principles of efficiency, neutrality, flexibility, rational allocation of resources; while GE would be guided by ten commandments, of which two are of crucial relevance: the catalyst - “governments should not assume the role of implementing public policies alone, but rather harmonize the action of different social agents ...” ; and, market orientation - “governments must promote and enter the competitive market logic, ... acting as an intermediary in the provision of certain services,[and] creating regulatory agencies ...” (^{SECCGI, 2009}, p.357).

As regards Public Governance (GP - initials in Portuguese), according to ^{Secchi (2009}), this translates into a “change of the role of the state (less hierarchical and less monopolistic) in the solution of public problems,” linking to neoliberal policies. The State would be inefficient and should therefore be subject to the guidance of international organizations (regional blocs, the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank), to non-governmental organizations (market and non-governmental organizations) and to local organizations (...). “(^{SECCGI, 2009}, p.359).

The theoretical clash was also present in the way of governing in Ceará. One of the most distinctive features of the “government of change” has become the articulation between the governance project and governance. Efficiency and “modernity” became instruments of legitimation of power, which necessitated a new realignment of the correlation of forces of the traditional Ceará elites; in addition to the accommodation of the “modern” with the traditional, such as the control of social movements (the “agents of change” program was implemented - community leaders trained and paid to act under the aegis of official bodies). (^{MOTA, 1992}, p.112; ^{BARREIRA, 1991}).

In the combination of interests, political elites end up finding in their own social demand for autonomy, rights, overcoming social or economic exclusion mechanisms to strengthen themselves politically. This conjunction, however, cannot be explained only by the correlation of partisan or ideological forces to the extent that there are political-family interests - which go back to the very structure of the Brazilian State and the organization of civil society.

For Maurício ^{Duverger, in Political Parties (1967}) - a work whose ideas had a strong influence on Brazilian sociological thinking after 1950 - the analysis of politics must be carried out from party structures, acronyms and numerical results in the elections, to the detriment social understanding, intertwining involving family, civil society, party and state. At the same time, there is a conception that the family and political relationship only operates at the local level, without connection with the national scope. Contrary to these two analytical positions, this work relies on the conception that “[a] rationalization, bureaucratization and modernization of the political field (...) have not been able to suppress the presence of families dominating politics in the most different spheres of power (...). “(^{OLIVEIRA, 2017}, pp. 176-177). In this logic, Oliveira synthesizes the discussion by stating that the state of Ceará is perhaps the most fiercely oligarchic among all Northeastern states (^{OLIVEIRA, 1978}, 55). (See Tables 01-04, following the work, which shows that of the 184 municipalities of Ceará, in 83 the same families dominated for many years the political scenario). The Brazilian political structure / order “is not based on republican political ideology,” but “it is correlated with elements of the private world, forms of domination, relations and ties of kinship, “compadrio”, complicity and friendship.” (^{OLIVEIRA, 2017}, p.167-169).

Brazil underwent transformations in the bureaucratization of the state, in the management of public affairs, in the participatory advance of society, but these transformations failed to overturn the non-rational structural forms of domination in society and in the government dynamics itself. In this sense, subsists in the Brazilian State a hybrid model of administration between the ideologies of modernization - with the New Public Administration - and neopatrimonialism - or by its genesis, patrimonialism. A model that, concealed in the Brazilian capitalist universe, preserves state control in the hands of political groups, for decades, as can be seen from tables (01 , 2, 3 to 4) below, which portray the reality of Ceará and Brazil:

It is clear from the tables listed that the structure of power is embedded in familiar ties and “compadrio”. The so-called political clans command at least 83 prefectures in Ceará - 45% of all municipalities - are widely present in the federal legislative power, are diluted in the most diverse political parties and control, in terms of sampling, the Northeastern public sphere. Political-partisan ties appear to be mere mechanisms of a political game whose purpose is to preserve control of public affairs for private enjoyment. This political-family order is rooted in national politics, and in Ceará, the occupation of public office refers to the century XVIII-XIX, still in the colonial period. This capital (based on political and economic power), accentuated in the ethos of the group, was transmitted over time. Whether in the phase of “coronelismo” or in the contemporaneity with neopatrimonialism, the family groups seek to remain in power instrumentalizing the public apparatus for their benefit.

When analyzing the family power structures in Ceará, it is said that this usufruct of the public, through the occupation of public offices, as well as through the elaboration of Laws, Projects, Public Policies, etc., are fundamental instruments for the guarantee of power - as a source of spurious revenue or bargaining of favors involving voters and / or beneficiaries of these exchanges, the clientele. (^{MOUNT, 2016}, ^{MARINE, NOBLE, 2017}). This aspect helps to understand why so many family groups maintain in power, such as in the municipalities of: Granja - the Arruda family has more than half a century of power at the head of the municipality; Inhamuns - power begins in the period of the Old Republic, where the Feitosa family exerts a strong influence in the region; São Gonçalo do Amarante - the family of the former governor of Ceará, Lúcio Alcântara, has dominated the municipality’s policy for more than 50 years; Morada Nova - the traditional families Castro and Girão, control the municipality since the 19th century, when, in 1877, was elected the first City Council; In the Cariri Region - the Bezerra de Menezes family has been the political-economic group for more than 50 years; Sobral - the domain of Ferreira Gomes dates back to the 19th century, with the most outstanding figure being former governor Ciro Gomes (including being presented as a probable candidate for the Presidency of the Republic in 2018).

At the present time, the complex political-partisan relationship and family structures are adapting the capitalist logic appropriating the ideas of modernization, competence and professionalism present in the New Public Administration. From the relationship, clan-politics-economy-administration, one sees the continuous metamorphosis or adaptations of political and administrative theories, among other practices, to the Brazilian neopatrimonialist order, aiming at maintaining the status quo, giving new contours to traditional policy and management of the public thing. It is in this scenario that the three organizational models (Weberian, Managerialism and Public Governance) present distinctions, and in which the most relevant aspect for the present study is highlighted: the conception of citizens in the bourgeois orbit:

No modelo burocrático, o cidadão é chamado de usuário dos serviços públicos. Na retórica dos modelos APG e GE, os cidadãos são tratados como clientes, cujas necessidades devem ser satisfeitas pelo serviço público. Sob o guarda-chuva da GP, os cidadãos e outras organizações são chamados de parceiros ou stakeholders, com os quais a esfera pública constrói modelos horizontais de relacionamento e coordenação. (SECCGI, 2009, p. 363).¹¹

From the perspective of bourgeois citizenship, in the educational sphere, until the 1980s, the administration of public education reproduced, in a majority way, a centralizing conception of a strong unifying and technicist vision. (^{KEINERT, 2000}). There was little room for the historicity, conflict, and subjectivity of political individuals, understanding citizens as “organizational men,” “economic men,” with the goal of maximizing profit (^{GUERREIRO RAMOS, 1989}). The criticism of the Weberian bureaucratic management model and the advent of new administrative theories, coupled with the insertion of social movements, constitutional effervescence, and the rejection of authoritarian practices have generated criticism from sectors of civil society linked to education. The model of educational administration in force underwent changes, replacing the term administration by management, incorporating the concept into the daily life of schools and the education departments of states and municipalities.

These reforms were implemented both by the strong pressure of the civil society, which aimed at the autonomy (political, financial, etc.) of the school, the deliberative participation of the community in managing its operation and in the construction of the Political Pedagogical Project - P.P.P (^{PARO, 2008}); as well as, they walked in orchestral synchrony with the international agenda (World Conference of Education for All - EFA - Jomtien, 1990, Washington Consensus - 1995, World Conference of Education for All - EFA - Dakar, 2000) , which required the implementation of reforms that would meet the needs arising from the productive restructuring of Capital. (^{SHIROMA; MORAES; EVANGELISTA, 2011}). In addition, a broad “State reform” was delineated in Brazil, which was implemented in the 1990s, based on the document “Master Plan for Reform of the State Apparatus” (1995), organized by the Ministry of Federal Administration and Reform of the State (MARE), Mr. Bresser Pereira (1995-1998) was ahead of the project, who was influenced by the new managerial forms: the Management Public Administration (APG) and the Entrepreneurial Government (EG) and, above all, Governance Public (GP).

With intense debates involving the various theoretical conceptions (sociological, political and administrative) around the way of administering public educational units, it was sought to develop a new institutional culture, with an organizational matrix, aiming to reduce the operational costs of school spaces, aligning them new forms of management. (RAMOS, 2009). In this bias, policies and actions were implemented such as the Decennial Education Plan (PDE), the reformulation and approval of the new Law of Directives and Base - LDB nº 9394/96, Fund of Maintenance and Development of Elementary Education Law n ° 9.424 - FUNDEF (later replaced by FUNDEB), among others. Thus, among the assumptions that are defended, the democratic management of the public school instituted through the Federal Constitution of 1988 and LDB 9,394 / 96 are inserted.

THE DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE CASE OF CEARÁ

The deliberations of the Law of Directives and Base - LDB nº 9.394 / 96, reflecting the (counter) reformist wave of the Brazilian State, established in title II, article 3, paragraph VIII - “democratic management of public education, in the form of this Law and the legislation of education systems “; which in its articles 14 and 15, states the following:

Art. 14. Os sistemas de ensino definirão as normas da gestão democrática do ensino público na educação básica, de acordo com as suas peculiaridades e conforme os seguintes princípios: I - participação dos profissionais da educação na elaboração do projeto pedagógico da escola; II - participação das comunidades escolar e local em conselhos escolares ou equivalentes;

Art. 15. Os sistemas de ensino assegurarão às unidades escolares públicas de educação básica que os integram progressivos graus de autonomia pedagógica e administrativa e de gestão financeira, observadas as normas gerais de direito financeiro público. (LDB, Lei nº 9.394/96).¹²

In this sense, the Basic Education Secretariat (SEDUC / CE), aligned to the national and international conjuncture, developed at the local level the projects for Quality Education for All and the Sustainable Development Plan (PDS / SEDUC 95/98). contemplating the promotion of the Democratic Management policy in schools, which:

[...] implica num processo de aprendizagem político e organizacional tanto para os professores/diretores como para os alunos, seus pais e a própria população, pois terão que assumir responsabilidades enquanto dirigentes técnicos e políticos, conviver com pontos-de-vista diferenciados, comprometer-se com o projeto pedagógico da escola onde estão inseridos (CEARÁ: PDS/SEDUC 95/98, p.05). (grifo nosso).¹³

Such passages are revealing of the political-ideological capacity of the bourgeois state to captain “flags” of the social movements by reframing them. For Maria da Glória Gohn, “it is observed that there is a total and complete emptying of the political content of the mobilization and its transfiguration in process to achieve results”, besides launching Democratic Management in a “troubled and contradictory scenario,[...] and institutionalize themselves as focused, often manipulative and compensatory policies. “ (^{GOHN, 2001}, p.58-59; p.62).

Thus, given that in the neoliberal system the market, with the consent of the State, regulates social and political-economic relations, the school had and has the task of preparing “human capital” for the labor market. Democratic Management, with the discourse of decentralization and autonomy, becomes one of the mottoes of bourgeois-governmental reform by linking the State’s lack of accountability to public education, since the State seeks to transfer the responsibility of public policies towards the society.

The institutionalization of the Democratic Management of Public Education, in Ceará, subverted to the neoliberal management dictates, represented a decentralization of the administration, now denominated as school management, umbilically linked to the centrality of the director, which is evidenced in the document of the Education Secretariat, O Diretor faz a Diferença (The Director makes the Difference) (04/04/1985), which deals with the election of school principals. This centrality ended up generating changes aimed at maintaining the status quo, reproducing in the quotidian of the (electoral) choice of public school administrators (directors) practices of the Brazilian political-electoral routine - clientelist system and representative of local power.

Ramos (s /d), in his studies on Democratic Management in the Government of Changes - Ceará (1995-2001), presents testimony of a representative of the Single Union of Education Workers of Ceará (SINDIUTE), very illuminating about the relationship between election of directors and local elites:

(...) a gestão democrática não é só a questão da eleição. Esta é um dos aspectos que também tem sido usado, mas que reproduz o processo político eleitoral, a máquina, o dinheiro, a bandalheira que era, em certas situações, tanto na capital e muito mais no interior. Que reproduz a mesma patifaria existente nas eleições parlamentares do executivo onde pesa muito o fator econômico, no financiamento da campanha e no vínculo com o político também que atua. (SINDIUTE/SILVA, In RAMOS, s/d, p. 3).¹⁴

The way in which the election of directors was conducted brings in its core the interest relations of the political elites, reflecting a simulacrum of legalities that often aim at the constitution of political-electoral bases, subverting the social ideas of autonomy. Moreover, the very process of decentralization without prior preparation in the municipal structures or an organization of the collegiality of civil society itself, around the school, created possibilities for the weakening of Democratic Management and its appropriation for political reasons.

Thus, also, municipalization, with the transfer of expenses from the central government to the municipalities, instead of building democratic bases in the local political-administrative systems, has sharpened clientelistic and neopatrimonialist practices. In the educational sphere, decentralization did not respect the immense economic disparities of municipalities at national and regional level.

In the same path, the creation of equalization policies, such as the Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and Valorization of the Magisterium (FUNDEB) -Lei nº 11.494 / 2007, did not solve the educational problems (^{SAVIANI, 2007}). In fact, an auspicious mechanism was created for municipal finances and for their rulers. The question of the real quality of education has been overlooked in favor of statistics; the establishment (implantation) of the Systems that involve the Democratic Management ended up being instituted due to the legal obligation, as well as the financial revenue links to such implantation.

In the state of Ceará, in eighty-three percent (83%) of the 184 municipalities surveyed, there is a Municipal Council of Education (CME) (Table 05), that is, a total of one hundred and fifty-two (152) counties. Of this group, only in sixteen percent (16%) of municipalities C.M.E. accredited the schools (as shown in Table 06), revealing the fragility in the implementation of Democratic Management in Public Education, and only in the formal interest of the law, which is necessary for the release of funds from the former FUNDEF, currently FUNDEB.

In relation to the existence of a legal act that establishes the Education System (portrayed in Table 07), in only 40% of the municipalities surveyed there is the legal act that establishes the Municipal Education System. When these same data were collected by the Regional Coordination of Education Development (CREDE), it can be seen (as shown in Tables 08 and 09) that when distancing itself from the metropolitan area of Fortaleza towards the more inland zones, there is a considerable decrease in the institutionalization of the Municipal Education System and C.M.E. either by the financial and technical dependency of the municipality before the state, or by only financial interest of the municipality ruler, who wants to obtain funding from FUNDEB but does not care about the politicization of the school space.

Breaking with the concept of fluid participation (elections of directors, sporadic assemblies, meetings for secondary decision making, etc.) and without major consequences for the organization of educational policies is one of the challenges of Democratic Management, which presupposes the creation of mechanisms and devices of participation, which usually does not please large sectors of Brazilian politics. In this light, it is understood that the simple legal act of creating such instruments (mechanisms and devices) does not guarantee democratic relations. The school is a space of struggle for hegemony (^{GRAMSCI, 2004}), in which the subjects of the subaltern class usually have their participation limited by the ruling class and by their interests.

The tables portray as a whole the manifest contradictions in the implantation of a Democratic Management in a country like Brazil, starting from the reality of Ceará.

The creation of the legal act that establishes the Municipal Education System and the existence of the Municipal Council of Education (CME) in the municipality are mechanisms that must be appropriated (quantitatively and qualitatively) by the subaltern class, in their struggle for hegemony, breaking with only figurative participation. The creation of the Municipal Council of Education is legally supported by the Federal Constitution of 1998, LDB nº 9.394 / 96, National Education Plan, Law 10.172 of 09/01/01, as well as in the principles of democratic and participatory management of public education, with normative, consultative, deliberative and auditing functions. According to data collected from the National Union of Municipal Councils of Education (UNCME / CE), of the 152 municipalities that have Municipal Council of Education, only 25 (16%) Accredited Schools and 127 (84%) of the Councils do not accredit the Schools.

The data presented above, in relation to the Municipal Education System that aims to enable municipalities to create their own rules of educational management, which consecrates local power as a space for meaningful decisions for society, are revealing of centralizing and clientelist practices. Furthermore, the data show that the most distant municipalities of the capital are those that do not have SME, and “coincide” with many of the municipalities in which family clans proliferate, and the municipalities whose CREDES are located in the metropolitan region of Fortaleza in its broad majority created their SME. Thus, in accordance with PNE 2014/2024, Law 13,005 / 2014:

Art. 9^o Os Estados, o Distrito Federal e os Municípios deverão aprovar leis específicas para os seus sistemas de ensino, disciplinando a gestão democrática da educação pública nos respectivos âmbitos de atuação, no prazo de 2 (dois) anos contado da publicação desta Lei, adequando, quando for o caso, a legislação local já adotada com essa finalidade.¹⁵

This prerogative, in line with LDB 9.394 / 96, makes clear, on the one hand, the importance of SMEs and, on the other hand, indicates the commitment of municipalities to democratic principles. The fact that municipalities do not comply with these precepts requires the permanent struggle of social movements, civil society and components of the educational circuit, in view of the possibility of making Democratic Management of Public Education an instrument that contributes to transform society, the political order, seeking the overcoming of the sociometabolic order imposed by Capital.

In this sense, the concept of participation by ^{Bordenave (1994}) is used, according to which man is not born knowing how to participate: “Participation is a skill that is learned and perfected. That is, the various forces and operations that constitute the dynamics of participation must be understood and dominated by people” (^{Bordenave 1994}: 47). Coutinho says that:

O processo de crescente democratização, de socialização da política, choca-se com a apropriação privada dos mecanismos de poder. Temos aqui uma contradição: o fato de que haja um número cada vez maior de pessoas participando politicamente, participando organizadamente, constituindo-se como sujeitos coletivos, choca-se com a permanência de um Estado apropriado restritamente por um pequeno grupo de pessoas, por membros da classe economicamente dominante ou por uma restrita burocracia a seu serviço. (^{COUTINHO, 2002}, p.17).¹⁶

As ^{Bordenave (1994}, p. 14) points out, “[...] popular participation and decentralization of decision-making prove to be the most appropriate way of addressing the serious and complex problems” that affect today’s society. What leads us to the perception that the public school is a profitable field of confronting the social inequalities (re) produced by the economic policies of the contemporary State.

Bordenave, in discussing “the participation provoked, directed or manipulated ... by external agents, who help others to achieve their objectives” points out that human emancipation is only possible if in the democratic State there is “taking part, taking part, take part, be part “. (^{BORDENAVE, 1994}, p.22).

According to ^{Paro (2008}), mechanisms and spaces for participation, such as Councils of Education and Schools - Municipal Councils of Education (C.M.E.) - Municipal Education Plan, election of Directors, among others, are potentialities to be explored for the Democratic Management, which must be understood beyond mere legal prerogative, contained in the 1988 Constitution and the Law of Directives and Base - LDB nº 9394/96. This is due to the immeasurable relevance of the implantation of such mechanisms to achieve an education and social participation that allow democratic spaces, helping in the fight for an education beyond capital, that breaks with the commodification of education. (^{MÉSZÁROS, 2008}).

It is important in a process of Democratic Management that these spaces are not only endorsed as mere formality, but the necessary conditions for the participation of society must be developed and guaranteed. On this Gohn states that “[...] it is necessary to develop certain conditions and articulations; it is necessary to give political weight to this representation[...] to the struggle of the social segments[...] for the democratization of public spaces “ (^{GOHN, 2001}, p.64).

Democratic Management is therefore involved in a socio-economic context whose institutional / instrumental logic resembles the dynamics of some public associations, which, when created, are intended to meet the guidelines of international organizations such as the World Bank, developing the concept of client-consumers (target population) in order to increase the efficiency of public bodies. This action would have repercussions on the reduction of public machine costs (with the reduction of public policy expenditures), enabling the State to have surpluses in the public accounts and immediate capacity to pay its debts, contracted with large international financial institutions. As pressure mechanisms for the fulfillment of their objectives, such agencies condition the release of funds to the adoption of their policies. ^{Farias (2000}), in his work Clientelism and Capitalist Democracy: elements for an alternative approach, clarifies that:

A estrutura organizacional das Associações - o legalismo, o burocratismo - contribui para a continuidade do vínculo das lideranças ao Estado. Encontram-se ligados aos programas a manipulação de estatutos, as cláusulas contratuais, a contabilidade, o gerenciamento - elementos que terminam transformando as lideranças das Associações mais em funcionários do Estado do que em representantes dos setores populares. Esse fato revela os limites da participação comunitária, uma vez que ela pode ser, com relativa facilidade, apropriada pelos esquemas políticos dominantes, transformando-se em um mecanismo de conquistas eleitoreiras. (^{FARIAS, 2000}, p. 49). (grifo nosso).¹⁷

In this political game, in the educational space, professional instability, administrative persecution, low wages, dependency relations, among other factors, end up creating difficult conditions to overcome the manipulative practices that involve and subvert social yearnings, strengthening the mentality of that it is too “uncomfortable” to be opposition, or be out of the sphere of influence of governmental power. Which leads to the maxim of Colonel Manoel Inacio, from the backlands of Pernambuco: “The Government has changed, but I do not change: I am with the Government”, or as one of your disciples said, it will be more categorical: “In politics, I am intransigent: I vote in government “(^{FAORO, 2005}, p.551).

The conscious exercise of social control by the members of C.M.E is linked to the model of management of the society’s own policy. Once the C.M.E. is set up, this does not guarantee its performance in order to meet the requirements for the full exercise of a Democratic Management. Still about this Gohn states:

Para que tenham eficácia e efetividade na área em que atuam, e na sociedade de uma forma geral, é necessário desenvolver algumas condições e articulações; é preciso dar peso político a essa representação e consequência a luta dos segmentos sociais que acreditaram e lutaram pela democratização dos espaços públicos. (^{GOHN, 2006}, p. 10).¹⁸

To adopt a new management practice that effectively reproduces democratic conceptions, breaking with alienating paradigms of our culturally established capitalist and neoliberal society, is very difficult, because in States whose democratic order is fragile and generates political spaces devoid of decision-making power, there is no culture of participation, especially because according to ^{Wood (2003}), democracy is incompatible with capitalism. In this sense, it is understood that there are several limitations to participation, just as democratic spaces are few, and the very time the working class has for participation is limited, given the demands of the capitalist mode of production, which stimulates consumption, but prevents access for the vast majority of the population, which in this way, runs insistently in the search for it. Against this tendency, it is demanded a continuous action of confrontation on the part of the civil society, which must prevent false democrats from appropriating the administrative and / or representative positions, typical action of neopatrimonialist “leaderships”, that subvert the public to the private one. ^{Paro (2001}) in discussing Democratic Management and its actual implementation, through the actions of C.M.E., alert on the false democrats:

Há pessoas trabalhando na escola, especialmente em postos de direção, que se dizem democratas apenas porque são “liberais” com alunos, professores, funcionários ou pais, porque lhes “dão abertura” ou “permitem” que tomem parte desta ou daquela decisão. Mas o que esse discurso parece não conseguir encobrir totalmente é que, se a participação depende de alguém que dá abertura ou permite sua manifestação, então a prática em que tem lugar essa participação não pode ser considerada democrática, pois democracia não se concede, se realiza: não pode existir “ditador democrático”. (^{PARO, 2001}, p. 18-19).¹⁹

In addition to the subversion of the idea of C.M.E, another tendency in the appropriation of the Council’s ideology, by the hegemonic groups linked to the state and the bourgeois elite, is the permanence of a patronage practice on the part of the local powers, as Gohn states:

A lei vinculou-os ao Poder Executivo do Município, como órgãos auxiliares da gestão pública. É preciso, portanto, que se reafirme em todas as instâncias, seu caráter essencialmente deliberativo, já que a opinião apenas não basta. Nos municípios sem tradição organizativa-associativa, os conselhos têm sido apenas uma realidade jurídico-formal, e muitas vezes um instrumento a mais nas mãos dos prefeitos e das elites, falando em nome da comunidade, como seus representantes oficiais, e não atendendo minimamente aos objetivos de controle e fiscalização dos negócios públicos. (^{GOHN, 2006}, p. 8).²⁰

This assertion of Gohn leads to an understanding of the political situation in Ceará and may explain the fact that the creation of the Systems and Councils and their effectiveness are linked to oligarchies that settled in the State, rooted in the interior but exerted influence in the government of the State. Faced with this juridical, social and political amalgam, when analyzing empirically the reality of the C.M.E. in the state of Ceará, there is a discouraging scenario, which leads us to understand the reasons that generate the predominance: of lack of resources, precarious infrastructure, of the consultative nature of the councils, residual participation of councilors in meetings, low degree of institutionalization, limited autonomy, strong dependence on State / Municipal executive power, strong influence of local power, often acting with intense interference, political use of the councils, instrumentalization of councils with the aim of allocating / releasing funds from government agencies, and the very condition imposed on the working class by the current mode of production, among other aspects.

Contrary to bourgeois ideals, the maintenance of the economic, political and social order imposed by the mode of production that values capital, to the detriment of the human condition, however, Democratic Management can and should be thought of as its mechanisms, as means lead to an understanding of the connection between society, education and the State; a relation inserted in the field of dispute by hegemony, of correlation of forces. It is considered that the public space is strategic, a privileged locus of opposing actions and a space of clashes that reflect the antagonism of classes, which characterizes capitalist society in full productive restructuring, where “the proletariat[in this case, the subjects that make up the educational space, especially the teacher and the school manager, must abandon[...] the corporatist mentality[...] “. They should, therefore, stop “defending only their immediate, group interests, thus becoming ... a class that assumes and makes all the demands of the working classes” (^{COUTINHO, 2012}, page 68), which are exactly the characteristics of the current mode of production, which separate, hierarchize, individualize in an individualistic character. In this view, the importance of the working class’s appropriation of the spaces that the capitalist mode of production itself offers, in the sense of forming the masses for the transformation of the model, that is, they are not an end in itself, but a means for such.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Investigating the materialization of Democratic Management of Public Education in the State of Ceará and what socio-political relations can be inferred from the implantation or inhibition of the mechanisms that comprise it were the main challenges of this work. Faced with these provocations, it is worth noting that it was not possible to deepen the analysis of all the problems raised in the research, in order to be only an article, but it is hoped that the study will contribute to the understanding of relations between the State, neopatrimonialism, civil society, clientelism, democracy and Democratic Management; and, as such categories are present in the socio-political and economic daily life of Brazil, as well as in the state of Ceará, at the juncture of a (counter) state reform that imposes a particular form of government based on the New Public Administration model.

In the delineation and implementation of Democratic Management, what stands out is the consolidation of citizenship, still identified by its bourgeois character, and the control of the State by civil society, that is, some of the mechanisms in the construction of democracy in a country like Brazil. Therefore, civil society can not be thought of as a justifying instrument for the State’s policy of disengagement, and neither can municipalization / decentralization be an instrument for strengthening the power of elites at the local level. Democratic Management needs to be a mean for the concreteness of democracy, of the adjectivization of the management of public education as a principle built by broad social participation.

One can not conceive the idea of participation as dictated by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank or neoliberal projects that commercialize education, which undertake educational reforms adequate to the policies of financial readjustments that are appropriate to the logic of Capital and that amplify the socioeconomic and political-educational exclusion. It is necessary to seek a Democratic Management that transcends the legal framework, generating effectively a collective participation in the most diverse formal and regulatory procedures of the school, from the elaboration of the pedagogical political project; and with broad participation in councils and collegiate or equivalent.

When highlighting, in this work, especially the neopatrimonialist characteristic of the Brazilian State, it was sought to locate one of the main resistances to the process of Democratic Management of Public Education, since even the most dynamic social participation and implementation of democratic mechanisms and devices have/would have difficulties to function by virtue of the appropriation of the public thing and its conversion into a private thing, to the detriment of the common good, by neopatrimonialist rulers and their clientele.

This situation seems to be evident when it emerges that in the municipalities of Ceará, closer to the capital, the Municipal Councils and Systems were installed and have a certain autonomy, especially when it comes to the accreditation of schools, however farther away from the capital in which these clientelist, bossy families who are perpetuated in power exercise the local command and the councils and advisers, as well as the SMEs, when they exist are mere decorative figures.

The bureaucratization of the State in Brazil managed to generate a rational-legal administrative order that was embedded in political-family relations reinforcing the power structures of the hegemonic elite, creating a hybrid between the “modern” and the traditional, hindering the economic development of the country. The autocratic and authoritarian way of functioning of the State permeates the way of governing, imposing constant changes in government policies, as amended, to the taste of political conveniences. In order to correct these and other misconduct, the state reform, in the midst of globalization and neoliberalism era, sought to boost the productive order (through economic policies that would dynamize productive restructuration internally) and public efficiency (New Public Administration). At this juncture, Democratic Management is included as an instrument of State non-accountability, reduction of public spending through municipalization and the establishment of national evaluation systems, without actually being placed as a collegiate way of administering the public school.

To oppose this logic is an exercise. Participatory management is built in the field of confrontation, in the struggle for hegemony, in the context of the political dispute. Democracy or social achievements are not achieved spontaneously, they are fruit of the tensions of the historical process, in collective construction, always immersed in the concrete reality of life. This participatory process operates in overcoming old habits of centralizing management or conceptions of democracy as a legal principle only.

It is not enough, therefore, to change the terminologies of “administration” to “management”, or to convey to education methods of “organizing” or “planning” from private enterprise. Education cannot be limited only by having statistical results, results-based management. Still, it cannot be used as a form of bargaining or processing of certain groups. The construction of knowledge, subjectivity and political education need to be the guiding principles of education, and by opening space for broad social participation in daily school life, the democratic dimension is consolidated. In this way, the Democratic Management of Public Education could be seen as a mechanism whose formation/constitution is continuous and uninterrupted.