INTRODUCTION

At the end of their lives, Deleuze and Guattari asked themselves "what was this that they had been doing all their lives?", "what is philosophy, after all?". The answer is apparently simple: "Philosophy is the art of creating, inventing, fabricating concepts" (^{DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1997a}, p. 10). The appearance soon becomes complicated, because concepts demand conceptual characters. Now, what the hell are these characters? They are the conceptual operators, the concrete, literary or fictional entities that trace the concepts by linking them to a singular moment, geographical position and landscape. The conceptual character can be invoked by philosophy in broad daylight or it can inhabit the underground of thought; its function is to describe or trace the plane of immanence. In its Hellenistic origin, it was the friends and competitors who dispute, in this deterritorialized territory of philosophy, this immanence of thought, the competence over the concept:

Friend would designate a certain competent intimacy, a sort of material taste and potentiality, like that of the joiner and wood: the good joiner is, the potential of the wood latent in the good joiner; is he the friend of the wood? (...) The philosopher is good at concepts, and in the absence of concepts, he knows which ones are unviable, arbitrary and inconsistent, they do not last an instant, and which ones, on the contrary, are well made and testify to a creation, even if disturbing and dangerous (^{DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1997a}, p. 11).

This article takes up one of the major polemics of Deleuzian studies in the field of Education. In this controversy, two important elements are discussed: the literality, a philosophical and literary procedure described by Deleuze, and the theory of learning. The central issue in this debate is whether it is possible to think of a Deleuzian theory of learning or instead whether the concepts of the philosophy of difference do not lend themselves to this purpose. We intend to follow this discussion among philosophers of our time, those friends and rivals who nowadays inhabit universities in conditions very different from those experienced by the wise Greeks who once courted concepts in the agora. This article consists of an almost complete reworking of a chapter from our doctoral thesis. This debate began at the II French-Brazilian Colloquium on Philosophy of Education, held on November 18-19, 2004 at the Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro. The presentations were published the following year, in a special issue of the journal Educação & Sociedade, in the dossier “Entre Deleuze e a Educação” ( in English, "Between Deleuze and Education"). In the following we present the polemic from its conceptual characters, as a "literal dramatization" that subverts Aristotle's conception, for whom drama consisted in the mimesis of human action. We adopt here a method of dramatization that consists in moving the ideas outlined by the conceptual characters. It is neither to imitate nor to narrate an action, but to trace the different philosophical perspectives and stances in a discursive and performative action, to constitute a philosophical landscape in which different characters take the stage and operate through concepts.

In the first part, we begin the exposition with the analysis of the text "Literality and learning" by François ^{Zourabichvili (2005}). We follow, in the second part, with ^{Schérer's (2005}) text about the concept of learning in Deleuze that, despite not being directly part of the polemic, was presented in the same congress and published in the same special issue of Educação & Sociedade. The text does not exactly deal with the question of literality, but we decided to include it because it deals with the question of learning in Deleuzian philosophy from the same philosophical premises proposed by Zourabichvili, making use of significant literary-philosophical resources for the discussion of literality. In the third and fourth parts, we analyze, respectively, the texts by Peter ^{Pelbart (2005}) and Tomaz da ^{Silva Tadeu (2005}), presented as replications of Zourabichvili's communication. In the fifth part, we include the analysis of a reading by Luiz ^{Orlandi (2011}) of the paper presented by ^{Zourabichvili in 2005}. In the last part, we argue for an alternative reading of Zourabichvili's theses. We propose to read the text as a system of serial relations that aims to dramatize and polemicize systematically some assumptions of the educational field. In this sense, this author would not be proposing a theory of learning based on Deleuzian concepts, the "Deleuzian pedagogy" would simply be a way of playing with concepts to polemicize and problematize educational thought, taking it to its limits.

ZOURABICHVILI OR DELEUZE'S DOUBLE, THE TEACHER AND THE AUTHOR

In "Deleuze and the Question of Literality," ^{Zourabichvili (2005}) considers a double register of Deleuze's character: the teacher and the author. Zourabichvili sets out to deduce a Deleuzian theory of teaching from this parallel. Deleuze is transformed into a double conceptual character who will connect the flow of thoughts to the flows of teaching. Zourabichvili's thesis consists in affirming that learning is the model of every thought experience (^{ZOURABICHVILI, 2005}, p. 1310), that learning and thinking reiterate the same act of creation. The author's intention raises suspicion: how is it possible to deduce a pedagogical "theory" from an author who has not written more than a few passages on education? Zourabichvili deduces the Deleuzian "theory" from three punctual themes/references taken from three distinct works, ordered in a non-chronological manner, as Luiz ^{Orlandi (2011}, p. 147) rightly points out. Each reference concerns an element of the author's thesis.

The first Deleuzian theme on education is taken from the books Dialogues and Difference and Repetition. In Dialogues, Deleuze says that the classroom 'is like a research laboratory: one teaches about what one researches and not about what one knows' (^{DELEUZE, 1992}, p. 173; ^{ZOURABICHVILI, 2005}, p. 1310); in Difference and Repetition he states the same idea in another way, applied this time to the realm of writing:

We write only on the edge of our own knowledge, on this extreme edge that separates our knowledge and our ignorance and transforms one into the other. It is only in this way that we are determined to write. To overcome ignorance is to transfer writing to a later stage or, rather, to make it impossible. Perhaps we have there, between writing and ignorance, a relationship that is even more threatening than the relationship generally indicated between writing and death, between writing and silence. We speak, then, of science, but in a way that, unfortunately, we feel is not scientific (DELEUZE p. 18).

In these two books, published a little over twenty years apart, Deleuze repeats a theme that runs through his work: the empirical and experimental character of creation. Thinking, knowing, philosophising, writing, learning and teaching are forms of creating and experimenting that are effected through empiricism. By putting the two quotes side by side, Zourabichvili suggests that the act of creation and experimentation are common to both philosophical thinking and pedagogical practice. Consequently, teaching consists of a form of thinking and creation. Sandra ^{Corazza (2015}) reached the same conclusion by drawing a parallel between didactics and translation. Based on this parallel, the author argues that these knowledges are not limited to repeating or transmitting the meaning of an original, they present a creative dimension as important as that of the original, since both activities always involve a differentiation and a translation.

The second element of the "Deleuzian theory of learning" is expressed in the quotation from Proust and the Signs: "Who knows how a student can suddenly become 'good in Latin', what signs (perhaps loving or even unconfessable) have been helpful to him in learning?" (DELEUZE, 1987, p. 22 apud ^{ZOURABICHVILI, 2005}, p. 1310). We also quote the full paragraph in the original (followed by Richard Howard's ³English translation), which offers a more contextualized perspective of the problem developed by Deleuze.

C'est pourquoi, quand nous croyons perdre notre temps, soit par snobisme, soit par dissipation amoureuse, nous poursuivons souvent un apprentissage obscur, jusqu'à la révélation finale d'une vérité du temps qu'on perd. On ne sait jamais comment quelqu'un apprend; mais, de quelque manière qu'il apprenne, c'est toujours par l'intermédiaire de signes, en perdant son temps, et non par l'assimilation de contenus objectifs. Qui sait comment un écolier devient tout d'un coup « bon en latin », quels signes (au besoin amoureux ou même inavouables) lui ont servi d'apprentissage? Nous n'apprenons jamais dans les dictionnaires que nos maîtres ou nos parents nous prêtent. Le signe implique en soi l'hétérogénéité comme rapport. On n'apprend jamais en faisant comme quelqu'un, mais en faisant avec quelqu'un, qui n'a pas de rapport de ressemblance avec ce qu'on apprend. Qui sait comment on devient grand écrivain? A propos d'Octave, Proust dit : “Je ne fus pas moins frappé de penser que les chefs-d'œuvre peut-être les plus extraordinaires de notre époque sont sortis, non du concours général, d'une éducation modèle, académique, à la de Broglie, mais de la fréquentation des pesages et des grands bars” (DELEUZE, 1964, p. 31 -32).

This is why, when we think we are wasting our time, whether through snobbery or the dissipation of love, we are often pursuing an obscure apprenticeship, until the final revelation of a truth of the 'lost time'. We never know how anyone learns; but, whatever the ways, it is always by the intermediary of signs, by wasting time, and not by the assimilation of objective content. Who knows how a schoolboy suddenly becomes 'good at Latin', which signs (if need be those of love or even inadmissible ones) have served in his apprenticeship? We never learn from the dictionaries our teachers or our parents lend us. The sign implies in itself heterogeneity of relation. We never learn by doing like someone , but by doing with someone , who bears no resemblance to what we are learning. Who knows how a man becomes a great writer? Apropos of Octave, Proust says: "I was no less struck to think that perhaps the most extraordinary masterpieces of our day have come not from the official competitions, from a model academic education, à la de Broglie, but from the frequentation of paddocks and of the great bars and cafes” (DELEUZE, 2008, p. 15 and 16).

In the text, Deleuze deals with the question of the learning of the writer, more specifically of a great writer. The question refers to the production of a great artist who will invent a real problem and a real difference. Zourabichvili - as translated by Corazza e Silva - gives the impression with his quotation that there are no rules for learning. However, reading Deleuze's original text carefully, one observes the repetition of the composition between the elements of an untimely learning and a traditional learning. In the first place, Deleuze says that nobody knows how one learns, nobody knows which love signs will arouse a student to Latin. In a second moment, Deleuze quotes Proust, who states, with a certain irony, because the text has an indelible formal language, that the greatest masterpieces of the time were produced earlier in the great bars than in the academic competitions of a model education. Proust plays with obscure education and traditional education, privileging, in content, the former and, in expression, the formalism of the latter. The school curriculum referred to by Proust is absolutely traditional. The writer's learning involves, on the one hand, being good at Latin and, on the other, losing time in bars.

The third element brought by ^{Zourabichvili (2005}, p. 1310) is taken from Difference and Repetition:

We are led to believe that the activity of thinking, along with the truth and falsehood in relation to that activity, begins only with the search for solutions, that both of this concerns only solutions (...) As if we would not remain slaves so long as we do not control the problems themselves, to a participation in and management of the problems (DELEUZE, 2004, p.197). ⁴

The same element appears some years earlier in the work Bergsonism (^{DELEUZE, 1999}; originally published in 1966). In the three themes that underlie the author's argumentation, learning arises from the composition between a structured element and a deterritorialized element. In the first passage, learning takes place on the threshold between knowing and not knowing; in the second, it takes place between traditional teaching and obscure learning and, in the last one, the condition of the truth and the false is determined in the creation of a problem that requires a rearrangement of our faculties.

To these three elements, ^{Zourabichvili (2005}, p. 1311) adds that of the literality of language, which consists in understanding to the letter: "Literality is the motif of a pedagogy internal to philosophy, of a pedagogy properly philosophical." Now, in what sense is this linguistic procedure pedagogical? Deleuze insistently repeats that his concepts are not metaphors. Well then, how to understand the concepts of "war machine", "abstract machine", "rhizome", "line of flight", "nomadic distribution"? Zourabichvili says that one must believe in what the philosopher says, believe that his concepts are not metaphors, but literal relations. The concept of belief, developed in Empiricism and Subjectivity (^{DELEUZE, 2001}), does not concern only the discourse, but a way of living in the discourse, of placing oneself in language. To understand a philosopher is not to do like him but to do with him. "To believe in what the philosopher says is thus to do with him what he does when he enunciates, never to separate his concepts from the deviation, the slippage or the dislocation, of which they are, so to speak, the cases." (^{ZOURABICHVILI, 2005}, p. 1312). This belief is distinguished from religious belief to the extent that it defines a philosophical attitude that seeks to destabilize common sense by proposing an "uncommon perspective".

Zourabichvili takes up the question of metaphor in pragmatic philosophy, especially in Wittgenstein, to explain what Deleuze means when he states that his concepts are not metaphors. The traditional metaphor substitutes one signifier for another, maintaining a real referential. In philosophy, something different occurs, since this discipline does not have real entities as an object, but metaphysical entities or pure linguistic entities. This distinction between a figurative mode and a proper mode of language was bequeathed to us by Plato, who, in the dialogue Cratylus (^{PLATO, 2001}), rejects Hermogenes' nominalism, sustaining an adequate and true way of naming things, a direct relation between words and things. About the figurative sense and the proper sense in school writing, ^{Aquino (2011}) criticizes the separation between discursive genres as a mechanism of limitation of writing and ways of life, approaching the position defended by Zourabichvili. For Deleuze, in the wake of pragmatism, the metaphorical procedure presupposes the distinction between the proper and the figurative meaning, between distinct domains of language, one literal and proper, the other symbolic and impure. However, meanings are never pure, because they are always derived from and contaminated by other meanings: "what interests Deleuze is the idea that the contaminations change, and the need to think the spaces of these mobile contaminations, which is also the space in which our experience is structured and transformed. (^{ZOURABICHVILI, 2005}, p. 1315).

The author illustrates his argument with the aphorisms "The brain is a tree" and "The brain is a herb". For him, Deleuze is not pointing out the similarity between brain structure and organization and plant structures, but rather producing an effect of meaning that is maintained in the immanence of the terms brain and herb. It is not a matter of illustrating a property, but of producing a disruptive relation that inaugurates a new field of semantic and conceptual possibilities. An empirical experimentation that takes the condition of signification itself as an element of problematization. The brain-herb relation also connects with propositions from other areas of knowledge, such as, for example, the discoveries of neurology on the a-centred functioning of the brain, but this does not imply a relation of translatability. Instead of merely repeating the proposition of neurology, Deleuze creates a relation that connects to the scientific proposition: 'To believe that the brain is a herb is a new horizon, both for neurology and for philosophy” (^{ZOURABICHVILI, 2005}, p. 1317)

Belief constitutes a pre-philosophical ground, understood not as a set of precepts supported by a "pre-rational faith", but as a relation that opens the experience to a new field of possibilities: "Belief is an event, a passive synthesis, an involuntary act, which is confused with the opening of a new field of intelligibility." (^{ZOURABICHVILI, 2005}, p. 1317). This relation of literariness between two terms inaugurates new fields of problematization. However it is a product of a crystalline intuition, a perception that shocks and violates the spirit, transforming the way one sees the world. This relation makes visible a term not given, it presents a new perspective. Thus, the formula "the brain is a herb" allows us to understand thought as the product of heterogeneous and a-centred relations, and this is not without importance. This learning allows us to affirm in a single shot the figurative meaning and the literal meaning of a work as dissonant and irreducible chains. Philosophy conquers immanence when it produces relations that inscribe themselves in Nature, in the pure Plane of immanence:

In effect, if this field is constituted by relations, we do not reach it unless we become capable of tying these relations together, that is, if we write and speak literally. In other terms, the "thing itself" is experience as it is made; it is becoming, always singular, before being in general. The "thing itself" is thus its property without signification: we reach it at the moment when significations are left in abeyance, when we know how to take enunciation to one of its disconcerting relations, deeper than any theory, which stubbornly assert themselves in thought and force it to glimpse new possibilities of thinking and living (^{ZOURABICHVILI, 2005}, p. 1319).

SCHÉRER, THE SIGNS EMITTED BY DELEUZE-EDUCATOR AND LITTLE BOY ERNESTO

René ^{Schérer (2005}) takes a different course from the one taken by Zourabichvili. Instead of trying to find a theory of learning in Deleuze's work, he prefers to investigate what Deleuze has taught us "about himself, about the world, and about us" (^{SCHÉRER, 2005}, p. 1184). The conceptual character chosen by the author to outline his concepts is Deleuze educator "in the manner of [a] Montaigne or [of a] Nietzsche" (^{SCHÉRER, 2005}, p. 1184). Teaching is not transmitting gestures to be imitated, it is acting in the midst of signs with the learner. In this sense, what Deleuze teaches us is inseparable from the signs he emits. For Schérer, the Deleuze-educator character is fractured between the signs kept in the memory of those who saw him speak, who observed his gestures and features, and the signs of the Deleuze-image captured in the video-interview published under the title of L'abecedaire. The replication and repetition of the signs emitted by Deleuze's body in a video and the possibility of taking them up again at will, thus returning what we learn from him, gives a new support to the materiality of his thought. The gestures and signs emitted by the character, Schérer tells us, are inseparable from what he teaches us: "For, it seems to me that this sensitive and affective impregnation - which this repetition in difference actualizes - illustrates one of the Deleuzian ways, one of the great ideas about a learning that will never end in the acquisition of a knowledge, but that consists in a process to be ceaselessly begun anew." (^{SCHÉRER, 2005}, p. 1184-1185).

Now, what does this educator Deleuze teach us? He teaches us above all to free thought from all its chains: common sense, good sense of thought individuality, anthropocentrism, clichés, categorical representations, dogmatic images of thought, etc... "To get rid of everything that immobilises, that sedentarises: word-refrain" (^{SCHÉRER, 2005}, p. 1185). Deleuze's thought teaches us deindividuation, he helps us to escape the terrain of universal subjectivity, to enter the land of nomadic singularities. "And this is the great Deleuzian liberating revolution, the radical empiricism of the dispersion - which I would call naturalistic or cosmic - of our most anchored certainties of being consciousnesses and subjects.” (^{SCHÉRER, 2005}, p. 1186)

Learning involves an unlearning or, to take a term from ^{Nietzsche (2009}), an active forgetting. It is necessary to deconstruct the subject we are in order to empirically experience a molecular, mineral, vegetable thought in which man and subject are no more than surface effects. It is the idea and the problem that will occupy the centre of Deleuzian thought, determining the conditions of possibility of understanding, and not the subject, the product of a certain image of thought. In this sense, Schérer confirms Zourabichvili's reading, according to which thought and learning take place not in the subject, but in the plane of immanence formed by the set of linguistic and non-linguistic heterogeneous relations. Subverting numerous philosophical currents, Deleuze and Schérer claim that we only think for ourselves when we depersonalise ourselves, when we detach ourselves from the subject that we are and affirm a block of becoming that takes us and affects us. "On the contrary, an individual acquires a true proper name at the end of the most severe exercise of depersonalisation (...)" (^{DELEUZE, 1992}, p. 15). That is, we must learn to "open up to the multiplicities that cross us” (^{DELEUZE, 1992}, p. 15).

Just as for Zourabichvili, learning and thinking are in close connection. Thinking consists in learning a new becoming, updating a new power, establishing a connection not known, extending knowledge into a zone of indiscernibility. Schérer lists four notable points outlined by Deleuze's character as an educator:

PELBART, THE NIETZSCHEAN, OR BARTLEBY, THE SCRIBE

In the following, we present the three replications of Zourabichvili's text, starting with Peter Pál Pelbart's. There is a significant difference between Zourabichvili's and Pelbart's interpretation of Deleuze's work. It stands out, among other things, that the Frenchman tends to give more weight to the Deleuzian reading of Spinoza and the Hungarian-Brazilian author gives more weight to the reading of Nietzsche. Embodying the spirit of the German philosopher, Pelbart's text manifests a generalized bad mood and unease with the form of the event and the function imposed on his text, which was to debate Zourabichvili's text. Pelbart says it is "with a certain embarrassment" that he participates in "yet another colloquium on Deleuze" which, according to the author, have an "artificial character" and a dimension "ignoble of circus and seduction" (^{PELBART, 2005}, p. 1324). Having discovered his function on the morning of the meeting, ^{Pelbart (2005}, p. 1327) says that he could not even reflect properly on the text and, moreover, he hates the function of replicating the position of another author.

Although one does not know whether the author is telling the truth or "setting a scene" to make a performance, the reader's first sensation is one of resistance. Pelbart refuses to conform to the role imposed on him and decides to write about loneliness and fascism in language. Such an attitude refers to an excerpt from What is philosophy? (1999, p. 14), in which Deleuze and Guattari say that philosophy is not an exercise in dialogue or conversation, much less an exercise in consensus; on the contrary, philosophy consists in the realization of a unique and singular thought experience. It is in this same sense that the class surpasses communication and the lecture, because the class works on "a matter in motion - the matter-thought" (^{PELBART, 2005}, p. 1324). The movement of the text operates a non-communication, a resistance to dialogue.

This resistance to dialogue is expressed in a critique. The article situates itself in the thought of difference to criticize the sectarianism of some "Deleuzian" theorists. As mentioned at the beginning of the article, Zourabichvili proposes to deduce a Deleuzian theory of thought; he formulates a pedagogical proposal from a sequence of precepts and oppositions. Pelbart draws attention to binary formulations and the multiplication of slogans in academic research:

[...] above all in a moment in which binary divisions redraw not only planetary geopolitics, but also that of thought, in which we see ourselves impelled to take sides in the field of good or evil, of truth or lies, of so-called democracy or so-called terrorism... But also among us, intellectuals of alternative sensibility, the temptation of reaffirming words of order grows, and we surreptitiously slip into the cackets that Roland Barthes denounced as being the two greatest dangers intrinsic to language, assertiveness and gregariousness (emphasis added). (^{PELBART, 2005}, p. 1325)

Language is fascist⁵ because it forces us to occupy certain places in a segmented social agency. Language imposes a series of discourses. In this sense, ^{Pelbart (2005}, p. 1325) asks himself "How to sustain a discourse (...) without imposing it? How to make teaching itself an exercise in unlearning?". Pelbart scrutinises Zourabichvili's thesis. According to his interpretation of the text "Deleuze and the question of literality", "tradition has habituated" us to think that knowledge is recognition and representation, that language and knowledge have their own domains that condition discourses. However, in fact, thinking is fused with learning, with the passage from the known to the unknown and, conversely, from the unknown to the known. To think is, according to Zourabichvili, to establish heterogeneous relations. Tradition, follows ^{Pelbart (2005}, p. 1327), paraphrasing Zourabichvili, "shapes our experience and domesticates our thinking, determines our repugnances and directs our desires, our circulation, our connections, our affections." In contrast, literality, which is the method of associations, disrupts this logic, producing a "short-circuit in the distribution of domains, the disciplines, the genres, the categories, as well as the planes of existence. Thus, new meanings are released” (^{PELBART, 2005}, p. 1327). Literality is the condition of every singular experience, thus opposing itself to recognition. At the end of the text, Pelbart poses the following question to his colleague: to what extent is literality able to resist the growing movement of gregariousness? Pelbart problematises the capacity of the procedure of literality, described by François, to escape binary thinking based on the distinction between a good element and a perverse elemento.

The way out advocated by Pelbart, as the movement of his text suggests, is the refusal to the processes of signification, the resistance of the text to let itself be interpreted, unveiled or re-represented. Cintya Regina ^{Ribeiro (2014}) takes up this issue in an article that connects Foucault's philosophy, Cortázar's literature and research on curriculum. One writes to escape the flattening of language and the dogmatism of the concept, to resist the blank sheet covered with clichés, to frustrate the reader; one writes against representation and meaning. Here is the pedagogical feature of the literary procedure operated by Pelbart: to show the power of refusal. In this sense, Pelbart takes the stance of Bartleby, the clerk, who refuses his role in the social agency by uttering the famous formula: "I would prefer not to" (^{MELVILLE, 1987}, p. 20; ^{DELEUZE, 2011a}, p. 80). In his refusal to accept his role as debater, in refusing the sectarian form of discourse, Pelbart puts in check the very possibility of a Deleuzian thought and pedagogy.

TOMAZ TADEU OR PROFESSOR CHALLENGER, THE PRAGMATIST

Tomaz Tadeu da Silva writes the second rejoinder to Zourabichvili's text. He begins his argument by recovering the Deleuzian precepts elected by Zourabichvilli as tripods of a possible "Deleuzian pedagogy", term that the author also puts in quotes, unlike Zourabichvili. Resuming his research in the area, Silva adds to the four constituent elements of the theory of difference in education mentioned in "Deleuze and the question of Literality," the pedagogy of the concept, developed by Giuseppe Bianco, and the pragmatics of teaching, discussed by Tadeu Silva himself (²⁰⁰²) in a text that discusses the theory of curriculum from a Deleuzian reading of Spinoza.

The conceptual character articulated in Silva's text is Professor Challenger, a fictional character created by ^{Deleuze and Guattari (1995a}) in the third chapter of a Thousand Plateaus, "10,000 B.C.:The Geology of Morals (Who does the Earth think it is?)". The chapter is a fantastic narrative of a class in which an eccentric professor ends up dissolving in front of his students, thus emitting a molecular becoming that literally realises the theory he utters, a theory that inadvertently passes from anthropology to embryology and from embryology to geology. Tomaz Tadeu mentions the character very briefly, saying that he is a precursor of a pragmatic and performative pedagogy. Well, it is precisely the pragmatic and performative aspect of Deleuze's writing that will occupy the centre of the author's argument.

The main problem with Zourabichvili's proposition according to Tadeu is the stated but unexpressed relationship between literality and the three principles of Deleuzian theory of learning. Tadeu also questions the possibility of distinguishing between a 'theory of learning' and a 'properly philosophical pedagogy' (^{SILVA, 2005}, p. 1333). What is the scope of literality? Does it apply only to the teaching of philosophy or does it also apply to that of physics and mathematics? Does it serve a general theory of teaching, or a specific property of Deleuzian writing?

^{Silva (2005}, p. 1334) summarizes Zourabichvili's thesis on the literality procedure in the following terms: Deleuze's apparently metaphorical propositions should be read according to Hume's principle, according to which "relations are external to their terms or ideas". However, Tomaz Tadeu does not see the connection between the impossibility or the resistance to metaphorical discourse and the exteriorities of the terms of a relation. Moreover, if we were to change the term "relations" for "structure", we would arrive at something very close to what the structuralists propose, to which Deleuze says he is opposed.

According to Silva, Zourabichvili seems to deny the figurative and attributive character of Deleuzian language, claiming that the apparently metaphorical propositions are, in fact, relational. This would mean denying a number of possibilities for reading Deleuze's texts. For instance, taking Zourabichvili's thesis as true, the proposition "the brain is a herb" does not attribute the qualities of the term "herb" to the term "brain", so the proposition could not be translated by the expressions "the brain is decentralized", "the brain is non-hierarchical" (^{SILVA, 2005}, p. 1334). Although apparently well founded, the thesis is difficult to defend, even because the writers of Anti-Oedipus expressly attribute some of these qualities to the brain (^{DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1995a}, p. 25, 33; 1997a, p. 267-279).

However, ^{Deleuze and Guattari (1997a}, p. 53, p. 268) warn that the brain they speak of is not to be confused with either the organ or the scientific object. As we read in the last chapter of What is philosophy? the brain is the plane of immanence that gathers all three forms of thought that affirm their potency in themselves and for themselves. Therefore, the brain brings together a set of relations, a set that embraces all difference and all creation in the field of thought. In fact, in the phrase "the brain is a herb", the word brain does not represent an object that would be translated by comparison with an illustrative figure. The brain is, from the beginning, a set of relations, as well as the herb.

Tomaz Tadeu da Silva states that Zourabichvili's solution is too complex and that Deleuze's literality is explained by the question of pragmatics in a much simpler way (^{SILVA, 2005}, p. 1336). According to Silva the literality of language derives from its real and immediate connection with the world. For Deleuze and Guattari, language is one of the strata that make up the Earth, enjoying no privilege over the others. Words really connect to things, constituting machines in which they are no more than one element among others.

Everywhere are machines, by absolutely not metaphorically, machines of machines, with their couplings, their connections. An organ-machine is connected into a source-machine: one emits a flow which the other cuts off. The breast is a machine that produces milk, and the mouth, a machine coupled to it. The anorexic's mouth hesitates between a machine for eating, an anal machine, a machine for talking, a machine for breathing (asthma attack). That is why we are all bricoleurs, each one his little machine. An organ-machine for an energy-machine, and always fluxes and cuts. (...) Something is produced: machine effects, not metaphors. (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1976, p. 15-16 apud^{SILVA, 2005}, p. 1335)

While the metaphor operates by similarity and analogy, the literality and the pragmatics, according to Silva, operate by effectuation in a state of things. Deleuze and Guattari's procedure is not a metaphor, because it does not substitute one signifier for another; literality, according to ^{Tadeu da Silva (2005}, p. 1336), is a pragmatic and materialist procedure in which terms are designated in their exact sense. So far, the interpretation of the two authors does not differ much. Both agree that language produces real relations that are inscribed in heterogeneous sets of concrete signs. Language constitutes a dimension of reality that resignifies and connects all the other.

Silva briefly analyses the use of expressions like "really", "in fact", " effective", "effectively", "to the letter" throughout A Thousand Plateaus to show the immediacy and the pragmatic and materialistic character of Deleuze's literality. Literality produces a real relation within nature, articulating different material dimensions. The examples chosen by the author to illustrate his position synthesise this simultaneously productive and material character of language: the concept of the mouth-machine conjugates food and verbal flows to a series of other flows by literally connecting flows of sounds and corporeal fluids (Cf. ^{DELEUZE, 2011b}, pp. 25-31). The concept of capitalist axiomatics, in turn, does not describe the characteristics of the economic model; instead, it expresses a model of realization taken by the State today (^{SILVA, 2005}, p. 1337).

The major difference between Zourabichvili's position and Silva's is on the issue of the materiality of language. The first one thinks of the plane of immanence as a set of relations between ideas, while the second conceives the field of consistency through the relation between language and the materiality of things. Thus, the thesis that language begins with the watchword, mot d’ordre (^{DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1995b}) gives intelligibility to the concept of social machines, insofar as it formulates a theory of language linked, from its origin, to the composition of concrete social relations. Literality, in this sense, teaches the material and pragmatic nature of language and knowledge, it shows thought at work. However, as Tomaz Tadeu da Silva rightly warns, the value of this procedure cannot be generalized in education. Metaphor is an important element in several philosophical and literary works and cannot be reduced to the Deleuze-Guattarian thesis of language. Moreover, literality has a strictly philosophical and artistic value. As much as scientific language does not mimic nature, its internal structure cannot be understood from literality, in the sense that Deleuze gives to the term.

ORLANDI OR THE CHILD WHO SINGS AGAINST CHAOS

Some years later, in 2011, Luiz Orlandi writes a posthumous tribute to his colleague Zourabichvili, who deceased in 2006. Right at the opening of the essay, Zourabichvili's question is shifted from the function of literality in learning to the question of the consistency of the Professor's thinking: "what should someone, called educator or teacher etc., do to think in the most demanding way possible about the learning experience?" (^{ORLANDI, 2011}, p. 145). The teacher faces at least two portions of chaos in his activity: on the one hand he is entangled in the chaos proper to his brain, "this strange thing that thinks in him because it is full of folds involving interiorities and exteriorities" (^{ORLANDI, 2011}, p. 145), and another portion concerning the students' learning. After all, as Deleuze and Zourabichvili say, one never knows how good someone will become in a discipline. Orlandi leaves aside the question of literality and devotes herself to developing some implications of the thesis on learning in the colleague's text.

In the article published in 2011, the three themes of learning theory outlined in "Deleuze and the question of literality" are discussed. The first theme destabilises the habit and dogma by which the teacher is regarded as the herald of a knowledge that he has mastered. "Undoubtedly, he (the teacher) has been initiated into some knowledge, from the situation in which he acts and the problematic field that involves him with others" (^{ORLANDI, 2011}, p. 148). The first axiom of Zourabichvili means that teaching does not only involve the transmission of a knowledge, it involves a research, a search " unleashed by something that intensifies sensitivity and forces all the faculties to go beyond their usual inertia or the accumulation of an abstract knowledge” (^{ORLANDI, 2011}, p. 148). Temporal learning, discussed by Deleuze in Proust and the signs and briefly commented on at the beginning of this text, differs from abstract knowledge because it involves an afecto (affectus ⁾⁶ encounter with signs.

The second principle manifests the multiplicity of forces, dispositions and individual indispositions involved in the teaching process. Temporal learning, which is the learning experience involving signs, implies the apprehension of a heterogeneous field occupied by singularities or differences. "The learning of thinking is immersed, therefore, in a chaotic of encounters that initially shake sensitivity" (DELEUZE, 1988, p. 270 apud ^{ORLANDI, 2011}, p.149), causing an imbalance in our faculties.

The third theme of Zourabichvili's thesis, follows ^{Orlandi (2011}, p. 149), takes the other two to the limit, because, firstly, it shifts learning from the question of knowledge acquisition to the question of the development of a complex, autopoietic and deindividualized thinking; secondly, the principle eschews the model of solution-centered thinking, favouring a problem-centered constructivism; finally, thirdly, the Deleuzian maxim politicizes learning, because it distinguishes between a free way of thinking, which involves the elaboration of problems, and a servile way of thinking, centered on the solution of pre-established problems. This political and ethical distinction between two forms of knowledge derives from the Spinozian distinction between adequate idea and inadequate idea. The following is a collection of definitions and propositions from Spinoza's Ethics that express the relationship between knowledge, thought and freedom:

[Parte I] Def. 7. That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone. But a thing is called necessary,or rather compelled,which is determined bu another to exists and to produce an effect in a certain and determinate manner. (^{SPINOZA, 2009}, p. 13).

[Parte II] Def. 4. By an adequate idea I understand an idea which, while considered in itself, without relation to the object, has all the intrinsic properties or denominations of a true idea. Explanation. I say intrinsic to exclude the extrinsic , namely, that which refers to the agreement of the idea with its object (^{SPINOZA, 2009}, p. 51).

Prop. 35. Prop. 35. falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas, that is, fragmentary and confused ideas involve. Demonstration. There is nothing positive in ideas whereby they can be said to constitute to be false (pela prop. 33). But falsity cannot consist in the absolute deprivation (…), nor in absolute ignorance, for ignorance and error are different. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate knowledge of things - that is to say, inadequate and confused ideas - involves (^{SPINOZA, 2009}, p. 77).

[Parte III] Def. 1. Parte III Def. 1. I call that an adequate cause whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it alone. I call that an inadequate or partial cause whose effect cannot be understood through it alone..

Def. II. I say that we act when in us or outside of us something happens of which we are the adequate cause, that is... when something follows in us or outside of us from our nature, something that can only be understood clearly and distinctly from it. I say, on the contrary, that we suffer when in us something happens, or when something follows from our nature of which we are only a partial cause. (SPINOZA, 2009, p. 98).

Prop. 1. Our mind sometimes acts is sometimes acted on. Insofar as it has adequate ideas, it necessarily acts; and insofar as it has as it has inadequate ideas it necessarily is acted on. (^{SPINOZA, 2009}, p. 99).

It is necessary to clarify that, for Spinoza, freedom and potency to act correspond to the degree of perfection proper to the essence of the body considered. God, in this theory, is infinitely potent and absolutely free, which means that his actions, his thought, his modifications and all his attributes are determined by reason of their respective essences. Spinoza's concept of freedom is opposed to free will, insofar as, for the philosopher, to be free is to act in conformity with one's own nature. Well, the human being thinks, therefore, insofar as he is a thinking being, he is only free if he composes his intellect from adequate ideas, because from the adequate ideas actions in accordance with the human essence and, therefore, free. For Spinoza, freedom to act and to think, which are opposed to servitude, are based on the possibility of the individual to be the cause of his own ideas and to effect his own potency, determined not by himself but by the divine essence itself. That is, the individual is free insofar as he enters the causal chain of the whole of Nature. For Deleuze, reader of Bergson, freedom is in producing the very problems which will constitute the conditions for the creation of the ideas-difference. Conversely, when thought is determined on the basis of problems that are exterior to it, it remains a servant, enslaved by an image of thought. To think freely is to be the cause of one's own problems. Let us not confuse here thought with the psychological subject, because, for Deleuze, the subject is not the source or cause of problems, but thought, considered in its impersonality and immanence.

Orlandi goes on to say that knowledge and learning occur from the encounter with heterogeneous signs, which "[...] open our sensibility to the problematic fields in which we live" (^{ORLANDI, 2011}, p. 149). The signs are real expressions, are material sensations. Thus, learning and thinking are not arbitrary inventions, unreal deliriums; they are products of the encounter with real signs - signs of nature, art, philosophy, love signs, etc. Nevertheless, the philosophy of difference resists the dualism between Nature and Thought. For Deleuze and Guattari, the Real, the thing as itself, is the undifferentiated chaos of the relations of flows that run at infinite speeds; the world is the chaos selected and transformed by thought and perception. Consistent knowledge is that which is constituted in a direct relationship with the signs emitted by the chaos-world, chaosmos⁷. Thought, according to Deleuze and Guattari in What is Philosophy? is divided into three modes: art, science and philosophy. Each one approaches chaos in a particular way. However, chaos is, at the same time, the main ally and the greatest adversary of thought, because it cannot deal with the totality of the deterritorialised flows comprised in chaos. Only art is capable of absorbing the voracity of chaos and relaying it in its wild state. From this property, derives the power and the specific nature of art and image in the school curriculum and in educational research in general.

Knowledge always cuts out, constrains or recodes the portions of the chaos on which it unfolds. It is also true that the different fields of thought connect at various converging points, thus outlining a plan that brings together the three forms of thought. Orlandi lists three hazards for thought in this clash with chaos and in this search to connect the various planes of immanence. The first of them is to give in to opinion, which consists of pseudoscientific, dogmatic, religious discourses and many others that close themselves to chaos through generalizations, moral prejudices and pre-established truths; the second is to fall into undifferentiated chaos; the third hazard is the imposition or accommodation of the subject to models of life and knowledge (^{DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1997a}; ^{ORLANDI, 2011}).

In this sense, Orlandi obliquely takes up a theme also discussed by Pelbart: fascism. Now, the fascism of everyday life is the action of prescribing pure forms of living and knowing, which project a negative image about the subject and her desires. There is a certain conception of knowledge, very common in some religious, scientism followers and Marxist activist circles, and perhaps in "Deleuzian actvism", that attributes to theory a determination of practical power. These discourses consist of forms of opinion (doxa) produced from the illusion inherent in reason (scientific or religious), an illusion that tends to consider language, understanding and knowledge as copies or representations of nature, the world or the Being. Rodrigo Pelloso ^{Gelamo (2007}) studies the illuminist conception of education that strives to reduce the pedagogical phenomenon to a system of truths and scientifically demonstrable procedures. This eagerness of reason could be understood as an effect of the transcendental illusion (^{DELEUZE, 2006}) engendered in the middle of the thought itself, especially the scientific thought, which, in face of the undeniable successes and advances in some fields, is convinced of the universality of its procedures and, consequently, ends up going beyond the limits imposed by itself.

We could object that Deleuze and Guattari use the word "model" in several moments, as ^{Orlandi (2011}) points out. The authors suggest a possible opposition to the rhizomatic model and the arborescent one: "Would there not exist in the East, Oceania in particular, offer something like a rhizomatic model opposed in every respect to the Western model of the tree?” (^{DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1995a}, p. 29). A few pages later, the authors claim that they use binarisms to "achieve a process that refuses every model" (^{DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1995a}, p. 32). Rhizome does not represent a model, but rather expresses a moment, it happens in an interval " in which things acquire speed" (^{DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1995a}, p. 37). In this respect, Ada ^{Kroef (2001}) and Kaustuv ^{Roy (2002}) propose the concepts of mini-intervals of learning and catalytic zones of knowledge. Rhizome and territory are constituted from a modification of rhythms. Rhizome is a way to trace a territory, to draw a map or to sing a song that shelters us from chaos, as:

I. A child in the dark, gripped by fear, comforts himself by singing under his breath. He walks and halts to his song. Lost, he takes shelter, or orients This song is like a rough sketch of a stabilizing and calming, calm and stable, centre in the heart of chaos. Perhaps the child skips as he sings, hastens or slows his pace.But the song itself is already a skip: it jumps from chaos to the beginnings of order in chaos and is in danger of breaking apart at any moment.There is always sonority in Ariadne's thread. Or the song of Orpheus. (^{DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1997b}, p. 116 apud^{ORLANDI, 2011}, p. 153)

II. Now we are at home. But home did not pre-exist. It was necessary to draw a circle around that uncertain and fragile centre, to organise a limited space. Many very diverse components intervene, references and marks of all kinds. This was already true in the previous case. But now they are components for the organisation of a space, and no longer for the momentary determination of a centre. Here the forces of chaos are kept outside as much as possible, and the inner space protects the germinative forces of a task to be accomplished, a work to be done. This involves an activity of selection, elimination and extraction, so that the inward earthly forces, the inner forces of the earth, are not submerged, so that they can resist, or even borrow something from chaos through the filter or sieve of the traced space. Now, the vocal, sonorous components are very important: a wall of sound,or at least a wall wthi some sonic bricks in it. A child hums to gather within him the forces of the school work to be done (^{DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1997b}, p. 116).

INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION OF LITERALITY POLEMIC

To conclude, we would like to propose a briefly an additional reading of Zourabichvili's thesis in the light of the comments made by the other authors. All the texts analysed here think the conception of teaching/learning in Deleuze. However, they dialogue only with Zourabichvili's text, they do not communicate horizontally with each other. We propose a synthesis of inclusive disjunction of the positions held by the authors of the debate, a divergent conjunction of the different theses and a brief provocation to the traditional theories of teaching.

Silva, Pelbart and Orlandi question whether Zourabichvili would be proposing a learning model for all possible experience, a universal form for all the phenomena and differences that make up the phenomenological and theoretical field of learning. Schérer goes in the same direction in rejecting the possibility of a Deleuzian pedagogy and advocating an essentially critical approach to the philosophy of difference in the field of education. For example, the classification of language modes into two opposite poles, the literal and the representational, operates a reduction of the possibilities of school writing. According to ^{Aquino (2011}), based on Foucault, writing is an aesthetic exercise through which the subject produces him/herself; it is intertwined with life itself and plays a central role in the aesthetic processes of subjectivation. Thus, a school that reduces the possibilities of writing to certain genres or certain models would reduce the possibilities of life. The imposition of a life/writing model, whether literality, Clarice Lispector's prose, Foucault's genealogy or any other, is the product of what ^{Orlandi (2011}, p. 151) calls "disciplined rebellion”. Such behaviour consists of taking an author, a revolutionary, a science, at the same time as an identity and as a form of thought. In this sense, the imposition of literality as a generalizable form of expression ends up creating an identity of Deleuzian theory that limits the potency of his thought. Zourabichvili's text, despite scribbling a theory of learning, presents a language that resists fixation and categorization. As Tomaz ^{Tadeu da Silva (2005)} observes, the question of literality neither explains nor complements the three elements of the pedagogical theory of difference. And it is precisely this schism between the two parts of the text that enables open readings of Zourabichvili's thesis. The greatest proof of this are the completely different analyses of an article that is not even fifteen pages long. However, Silva and Orlandi seem to point out an inherent weakness to the position defended in "Deleuze and the question of literality”.

All the authors who discuss Zourabichvili's text seem confused by the introduction of the theme of literality into the discussion of learning theory. Perhaps the key to understanding the thesis of the philosopher Zourabichvili is precisely to apply the method of literality on his statements, to believe in the procedure of literality as described by the author. Thus, "Deleuzian pedagogy" should not be understood as a theory of education, a system or conceptual grid that covers all the phenomena of this field of study. It should be understood as a relation of two terms, of two independent and irreducible series: pedagogy and the philosophy of difference. On the one hand, the various theories of teaching, problems, phenomena and events in the field of education; on the other, the concepts, affectus, ideas and questions coined by Deleuze. We propose that, in the impossibility of building a Deleuzian model of learning, it might be possible to take the terms "learning theory" and "Deleuzian" as heterogeneous sets of provocations and relations whose purpose would be to produce different relations, unusual and extemporaneous relations. The disjunction of the elements derived from the two terms could offer to educational theory a series of problematizations and critiques capable of revealing and displacing the limits of the field.

Taking up again the question proposed by Schérer, what does Deleuze have to teach us about education and about thought itself? He invites us to resist consensus, common sense and clichés. In the field of education, this approach contributes to a philosophical theoretical unlearning (^{Pelbart, 2005}; ^{Schérer, 2005}; Almeida, 2013), a re-examination and a deconstruction of the consensuses and common beliefs rooted in educational theory, an opening of the field to the forces of chaos. Such movement would serve to promote new perspectives to pedagogical problems.

According to Zourabichvili, in the famous Deleuzian expression "the brain is a herb", the first term would gather a series of relations that would cross and connect with the constituent elements of the second one, forming a new series of senses: the brain does not have a hierarchical organisation, it is a-centred; it operates as a rhizome, because its axons connect rhizomatically, as do concepts, memories and sensations; the brain is constituted of heterogeneous relations not gathered into a transcendent unity; the brain is not differentiated from grass, it becomes grass, it expands as grass; it plunges back into Nature, it becomes inhuman, it returns to immanence. To believe in Zourabichvili would be, therefore, to perceive "thought as heterogeneity” (^{ORLANDI, 2011}, p. 150).

Zourabichvili affirms that every experience refers to a relation, to a set of relations from which the understanding is constituted. Here lies the crux of Deleuze's ontological question, which Zourabichvili says is misunderstood, and which Peter ^{Pelbart (2005}, p. 1329) says he has misunderstood in his colleague's text. Ontology, in Deleuze's philosophy, consists of the study of the way in which simple relations add to each other forming complex sets which, in turn, constitute machines that go on to process and produce elements in articulated heterogeneous chains. In this sense, ontology is confused with rhizome (^{DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1995a}), a way of understanding nature exclusively through the connections between heterogeneous elements. Based on these reflections we now propose a brief problematisation of traditional theories of teaching.

The understanding produces itself in the relations established by thought, which add and aggregate to each other, constituting collective assemblages that, in turn, trace a wider plan. In this way, the conditions of understanding are always mobile and provisional, since they are constituted on the basis of real relations and of concrete and singular experiences. These relations are linked together in assemblages or machines that acquire autonomy, these machines construct, without metaphor, a set of buildings in a kind of unplanned city, from the combination of fixed structures and provisional structures, scaffolding, which are assembled and disassembled as the structure grows and expands in all directions, through precarious connections and underground links. An individual's horizon of experience is conditioned by his or her personal experiences encoded by accumulated social experiences in the form of language, the symbolic field and the different historically determined forms of knowledge. Learning is not a strictly psychological process, it is not constructed in an individual process. The subject occupies a secondary position in learning, insofar as the subject form itself is a social construction that reorganises subjective functions. Of course the concrete subjects learn, but learning itself refers to social and cognitive systems that are in constant building and rebuilding.

According to the philosophy of difference, the centre of the learning process is not the subjects but the fields of problematisation. It follows that, "the affirmation of these relations, as they organise experience, structures a certain problematic field, and receives the name of belief" (^{ZOURABICHVILI, 2005}, p. 1316). This does not mean, of course, that psychology and biology do not play a determining role in the construction of thought, but that they, because they constitute dimensions outside the planes of immanence of thought, must be codified, transformed by the social machines in order to enter the series and machines that make up the learning process. The sociologist Niklas ^{Luhmann (2016}) thinks of society as an independent system in which psychology and biology would be like a context, a background that only enters the system when translated and transformed into elements codified by the social system, in other words, they would only enter and influence the social system to the extent that they are transformed into elements proper to the social system, elements that are reconstituted according to the isomorphic patterns of social relations. Thought and learning, for Deleuze, are also systems (machines) that function autonomously. However, they draw their elements from higher (society, culture, language) and lower (biology, geology, unconscious) strata, which are codified and translated into terms inherent in the plane of immanence of thought. The major difference between the two positions lies in the weight given to the heterogeneity and homogeneity of the elements. While Niklas Luhmann favours the homogeneity of the elements and the autonomy of the system, Deleuze favours the heterogeneity of the parts and the composite, local and fragmentary character of the system (field of immanence).

According to Zourabichvili e Silva, the immanence of Deleuzian thought is achieved through the linguistic procedure that takes language and the world as a set of relations. Literality would be one of the philosophical artifices capable of engaging in this set without differentiating from it, that is, bathing in its immanence. Deleuze says: the world is a set of multiple relations that compose and connect on a plane of immanence; believing in it means taking its language as a set of relations between heterogeneous terms that inscribe themselves in a field of problematisation that, in turn, constitutes a small territory of a much wider field of immanence, the Earth. Deleuze's conceptual character, the author and teacher, articulates thought and teaching on the same plane of immanence through which thought extends its own limits.

If the field of pure experience, the field of immanence, is the set of the totality of material relations, for a thought to inscribe itself in this plane, it is necessary that it engenders new relations, capable of disarticulating the existing terms and opening a new horizon of experience. Thought only returns to immanence when it expands the number of possible total relations (^{ZOURABICHVILI, 2005}, p. 1319). Thus, literality is in the immediate association of the divergent elements in a perception, in a belief that breaks and unfolds the meaning. Zourabichvili shows the germinal relationship between writing and learning in philosophy. Regarding the gestures of the Deleuze-teacher, Schérer states that the philosopher teaches not only by what he says, but also by the way he does it. Thinking and teaching are empirical and practical, ethical and aesthetic experiences.

Education constitutes a machine that is associated with much larger and more complex assemblies, which act on a great diversity of other apparatuses. Learning is a process by which different individuals, machines, disciplines and groups produce, reproduce, transform and multiply the field of immanence of thought and society. It should be remembered that, for ^{Deleuze and Guattari (2010}), the social machines are like old cars, they operate dysfunctionally, have defects, need constant maintenance and intervention. The thought-learning machines, following the logic of the desiring machines "(...) produce connections according to which they themselves function, and function by improvising these connections, inventing them, forming them.” (^{DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 2010}, p. 240). Education is a machine that never stops producing noise, contradictions, blockages, disjunctions and problems. It is always in motion. The provocations and tensions between the philosophy of difference and the theory of learning do not form a closed conceptual system, although they may offer critical perspectives capable of identifying the efficient cause of such blockages, thus allowing the emergence of new connections. In this sense, the philosophy of difference invites us to think of a learning that is not exclusively centred on the subject and the individual, a learning that takes place in a field of immanence, which relates heterogeneous elements in provisional and precarious systems, the subject itself simultaneously occupying the position of product and producer within this system.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Here it is the pedagogical constructivism of the Deleuze-Guattarian philosophy: it maps out a territory, organizing and recomposing the forces of chaos in order to protect itself from those same forces. The brain, which, as seen in this article, is not to be confused with the organ or with individual consciousness, is also constructed and conditioned in/by the concrete experiences of individuals, groups and other collective assemblages. The individual, collective experiences and language form the scaffolding through which thought is built and, thus, they condition all future experiences. However, as other parts are added to thought, the scaffolding is dismantled, expanding the field of immanence everywhere from a-centred connections. In other words, thought is constructed through the empirical experiences of subjects, social systems, languages, cultural and scientific formations that are occupied by the same experiences, in such a way that the brain becomes the projection of an impersonal and collective plane of consistency of experiences in which subjects inscribe themselves. Such constructivism differs from traditional pedagogical theory in that (1) it is not limited to the individual psychic subjective process, comprising a wide range of interconnected machines and systems, in which the subject occupies only a secondary function; (2) it does not constitute a generalizable and universal theory of learning, only a set of problems and affections that offers new analytical possibilities, without the pretension of forming a universal theoretical system.

Returning to the central problem of the article, that of the existence and possibility of a Deleuzian pedagogy, we are convinced that this fluid and heterogeneous matter that receives the name of Deleuzian work or corpus does not support a pedagogical model. In the first place, the concepts of the philosophy of difference resist substantiation, they do not allow themselves to be fixed in universal and totalizing propositions, they do not offer problems with ready-made answers. Secondly, Deleuze's concepts do not offer sufficiently elaborated material for the establishment of a pedagogical model. Nevertheless, the value of some of Deleuze's propositions for a learning theory is undeniable. The philosopher's teachings are full of pedagogical implications and undoubtedly open new horizons of meaning in the field of education.