Introduction

Since the 1980s, state restructuring has become a central theme in the political debate in several countries, leading to policies that have altered the structure of public administration, including Education. These reforms were characterized by the adoption of a series of strategies present in the private sector and of market devices, from the valorization of system performance and modification of regulatory modes typical of public power on education. The foundation of the reforms was the supposed need to modernize the inefficient legacy of the bureaucratic public administration, with the purpose of overcoming traditional forms of management to guarantee greater efficiency and effectiveness of the educational services, implementing a new organization of the systems.

The various guidelines aimed at modernization brought the lexicon of educational policies a new set of concepts, permeating the administration’s restructuring talks and seeking to characterize a different functionality to the terms, and express new patterns of behavior and management. Even in the theoretical field production, expression school management has come to replace the traditional concept of school administration, like the so-called business management ( ^{ADRIÃO, 2006} ), a concept that presents itself as a way of adapting public administration to a new reality and guaranteeing higher quality, with the adoption of management techniques of the private sector.

This change in the form of locution is not a minor event, reveals a profound transformation in the rationality of the educational field. ^{Marcuse (2015)} , in the middle of the 20th century, when analyzing technologies of rationalization imposed by the administrative apparatus of late capitalism for control and domination of society, already presented the intrinsic operationalism to the new concepts as one of the powerful techniques of social control, by bringing in the denomination of objects an immediate identity to its application, identifying the concepts with their functions. By being reiterated, the concepts subsumed to operationalism are assimilated to the conscience of the people, that begin to develop a technological reasoning:

The characteristic of operationalism - to make the concept synonymous with the corresponding set of operations - occurs in the linguistic tendency “to consider the names of things as being indicative at the same time of their way of functioning, and the names of properties and processes as symbolic of the apparatus used to detect or produce them”. This is technological reasoning, which tends to “identify things to their functions”. ( ^{MARCUSE, 2015} , p. 109).

Among the recommendations issued for the establishment of a new model, more efficient management of the public sector, as a strategy to obtain higher quality and productivity in education, ADD policies are generated, justified as necessary to strengthen and enhance the career of teachers, and greater accountability for results. It will be possible to notice, throughout the text, how this discourse, based on a widely palatable motto of teacher appreciation, already contains in itself the operationalism relative to the set of actions implied in the ADD, that can be established on a large scale. This is an individual evaluation of some indicators, which disregards both the institutional working conditions and the complex and collective character and the perennial effects of the work carried out inside the schools, as duly pointed out by recent Brazilian studies ( ^{CASSETARI, 2010} ; ^{MINHOTO; PENNA, 2011} ; ^{AUGUSTO, 2012} ; ^{MARQUES, 2012} ; ^{SANTOS et al., 2012} ; ^{BAUER; SOUSA, 2013} ; ^{VICINO, 2013} ; ^{ZATTI, 2017} ).

Multilateral bodies and their recommendations for the adoption of ADD

Assuming the role of quality of educational services, agents such as the World Bank (WB), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have spread several recommendations with the aim of modernizing and bringing efficiency to the public basic education services, proposing management technologies to redirect the education systems. Concepts such as productivity, efficiency, effectiveness, quality and evaluation, before ruling in the business sector, become part of this lexicon on recommendations to public services and to influence the work management of individuals that make up these systems.

The WB was one of the global funding agencies that worked on the dissemination of policies for education in Latin American countries, with the motto of granting incentives allied to the ADD, publishing several documents with proposals for solutions to the problems of education ( ^{BANCO MUNDIAL, 1996} ; ^{DELANNOY; SEDLACEK, 2001} ; BRUNS, EVANS; LUQUE, 2012; ^{BRUNS; LUQUE, 2014} ). Just to mention one of the recently published documents ( ^{BRUNS; LUQUE, 2014} ), one notes the critique of the criterion of service-time promotion for education workers, typical of bureaucratic public administration systems, and the recommendation to give rewards to teachers with better performance, as a strategy to influence the improvement of teaching practices and the hiring of staff for the teaching profession:

Assessment systems also provide a more solid basis for long-term preparation of each teacher’s potential and a fairer basis for promotions. Instead of promoting teachers only on the basis of seniority - as most Latin American and Caribbean countries do - teachers can be promoted on the basis of recognized competence. A performance-aligned pay structure creates the right incentives for current teachers and makes the profession more attractive to talented candidates in the future. ( ^{BRUNS; LUQUE, 2014} , p. 36).

The measurement culture is promoted through the evaluation of teachers - considered the main responsible for the learning indicators - and the granting of incentives for their supposed individual competence, delegating to the category the main responsibility for the educational results of the education systems. For them, ADDs:

They provide the necessary information base for individual performance incentives and accountability measures. Provide teachers with individualized feedback perhaps more immediate or insightful than on the part of their direct supervisors and colleagues, and increase their motivation to seek professional qualification or improvement. ( ^{BRUNS; LUQUE, 2014} , p. 35).

With this, it is valued the individual merit of those that manage to show more efficiency, promoted the competition between the pairs and disclaimed the responsibility of the State for the negative results of the educational systems (cf. ^{MINHOTO; PENNA, 2011} ; ^{MOURA, 2016} ; ^{ZATTI, 2017} ).

With a prescriptive tone, the documents produced by the WB stimulate changes in the management of the teaching career as a condition to enable the insertion of the State in the new structure of the globalized market. The public school, as a place of preparation for new citizens, cannot do without reforms and the performance of teachers must be continuously scrutinized. However, it is necessary to ask, together with ^{Sousa (2008)} , if such so-called teaching valorization strategies do in fact contribute to career development or only develop the competitiveness and individualism within schools.

Unesco was also responsible for sponsoring strategic intervention initiatives in Latin American education, promoting projects and programs for the region. The Major Education Project for Latin America (PPE), which ran from 1981 to 2001, coordinated by the Regional Office for Education in Latin America and the Caribbean (OREALC), disseminated documents with proposals for educational restructuring policies and school management and conferred emphasis on teacher evaluation, proposing performance-based pay differentiation. In addition, the Educational Reform Program in Latin America (PREAL) also promoted articulation of educational policies around reforms that it deemed necessary, publishing documents that showed unsatisfactory results for Latin American education. As a solution, highlighted the need to adopt monetary incentives for teachers or other forms of human resources management to ensure a good professional performance, such as linking gratuities and promotions to teaching performance, and holding teachers accountable for educational outcomes, as seen below:

The management got worse. No one demands accountability from most public sector teachers - principals, society, or governments. Wages are not tied to performance in virtually any country. Dismissing a teacher for poor performance is almost impossible. Excellence in teaching is rarely rewarded, or even recognized. ( ^{PREAL, 2006} , p. 18).

The passage allows us to return to Castel’s warning (2012, p. 29) about the risks and uncertainties of progressive individualization of work relations:

A society that is becoming more and more an “individual society” is also a society in which uncertainty increases practically exponentially, because collective regulations are absent in order to dominate all the changes of existence. For this reason, the reference to risk becomes omnipresent and leads to a totalizing representation of contemporary society as a “risk society”.

The globalization of the market and the new capitalist development phase weakens the labor protection schemes built in the framework of the welfare state. The requirement for maximum profitability, minimization of labor costs and technological development, bring implications for wage condition, setting new forms of employment regulation. This situation also reaches public workers, starting with state reforms, adopting practices of management of the private sector.

With a prescriptive tone, the documents produced in recent decades by multilateral organizations indicate changes in career management, leading to individualism, accountability and meritocracy in the education systems of different countries as a condition - paradoxically - to improve the quality of education and appreciation of teachers, who, as evidenced including by recent Unesco Report (UNESCO, 2017), can only do a good job in a collaborative and shared way.

ADD and its relation with the remuneration in the public state educational networks

Several researchers have been developing analyzes on the implementation of ADD systems in the world ( ^{ISORÉ, 2010} ; TORRECCILLA, 2006; ^{VAILLANT, 2010} ). When taking Brazil as the focus, initiatives similar to international ones are observed, since most of the state education networks have implemented ADD policies, mainly since the middle of 1990, when legal provisions start to regulate this initiative, evidencing an adjustment of the national policies to the international reform proposals (cf. ^{MOURA, 2016} ; ^{ZATTI, 2017} ).

^{Morduchowicz (2003)} describes some of the ideas propagated internationally by the end of the 20th century in the reform movement of public administration:

During the 1980s, in the face of the lack of incentives and criticisms directly related to the professional careers and salary structures of teachers, there was a great theoretical and factual diffusion of the attempt to relate teachers’ salaries to their respective performances. According to the dominant theoretical paradigm in economics, all wages should be “paid for by merit” - or productivity. ( ^{MORDUCHOWICZ, 2003} , p. 22).

It is noteworthy that in the expression great theoretical and factual diffusion the principle of performance is reiterated, giving base for alteration in the management of the teaching work, associating remuneration with productivity and competence. ^{Marcuse (2013)} develops the concept of performance principle as a result of the analysis of modern forms of domination from the historical organization of human existence. He defends the thesis that, with a society in constant expansion and even before all the technical advance, that provided the satisfaction of many of the necessities of the people in a scale never before seen, emerged new forms of domination and control above those indispensable for the civilization - with more repression. They are restrictions required by social domination and no longer due to lack or scarcity, in the name of the intensified progress and the search for high productivity, developing the forms of control and maintenance of the order as it is:

The principle of performance, which is that of an acquisitive and antagonistic society in the process of constant expansion, presupposes a long development during which domination has been increasingly rationalized: social labor control now reproduces society on an enlarged scale and under progressive conditions. ( ^{MARCUSE, 2013} , p. 34).

Under the principle of performance domain, individuals exert fundamentally predetermined functions, the body and mind are diverted to socially useful performances and become working tools for gear that do not control, but which need to undergo to achieve predetermined results.

Among the justifications for those who propose the establishment of careers with remuneration systems based on performance and merit assessed in the evaluations, we have the following:

[...] reasoning that if teachers competitively remunerated by their respective performance will work harder, the more effective teachers will be rewarded monetarily. In addition, other reasons used in merit defense are: (a) teachers are motivated by monetary stimuli, and (b) the opportunity to obtain this kind of remuneration would encourage them to behave in a way that benefitted their professional careers. ( ^{MORDUCHOWICZ, 2003} p. 22).

It is established thus an intrinsic and predetermined relationship between financial incentives and better performance in which merits and monetary rewards become strategies for teaching practices regarded as effective.

Initially, the evidence of the operation of these policies in the country were present in the new educational regulations, which in the decade of 1990 legally established the ADD. Article 67 of the National Education Guidelines and Bases Law (Law nº 9.394/96) standardized the ADD for career development purposes, providing a legal basis for public networks to reformulate their legislation and adopt this tool as a criterion for functional progression, often linking pay to job performance.

In view of this new reality, it was sought to establish, through documentary research carried out in official sites and by correspondence to the state secretariats of the federative units of Brazil, the existence of regulations foreseen the ADD associated to the receiving of compensatory increments. The existence of this initiative in 24 states was verified, however, only in 14 the policy was effectively in force in 2015, according to information provided by the secretariats. This survey shows the national scope of the ADD. The data obtained are described in the table below. In addition to the states that implemented the ADD, their effects on teachers’ remuneration, divided in career progression, are evidenced in that the financial increases are incorporated into the teacher’s remuneration, and/or bonus, where monetary incentives are only punctual awards, not generating an effective remuneration increase.

Of the 14 states, eight relate the results of ADD to career development, 10 concede the payment of bonuses and in 4 effects are twofold: career advancement and bonus. These regulations bring changes to the career and to the teaching work, because with the possibility of salary differentiation based on performance, responsibility for professional development and for the receipt of increases or additional remuneration is conferred to the teacher.

According to ^{Castel (2012)} , changes in labor regulations before the new capitalist development phase reconfigure both the organization of work and the career. They institute individualization and competitiveness, demanding more and more individuals to become responsible for their career, even in the face of a universe that imposes and prescribes what should be done.

Whatever the effect on remuneration - progression or bonus - , these policies are supported by the discourse of valuing teachers. It is considered essential that the work of teachers be valued, including financially. However, the motivation for a good job is not just for monetary rewards or prizes that do not depend only on the good work of teachers. If merit remuneration had an impact in immediate teaching practice, teachers would restrict the quality of their work to the presence of rewards and good professionals in networks without ADD would not be seen, which does not reflect reality.

The valorization of the career goes beyond the granting of prizes or monetary incentives, being necessary to offer the possibility of professional development, decent working conditions, stimulation to the qualification and guarantee decent wages to training and the relevance of the profession, contrary to what gives rise to the simplistic thinking that teachers are motivated only by monetary incentives.

Main criteria evaluated in teacher performance

Besides the effects of the results of career evaluations and teacher remuneration, another factor that stands out in these incentive mechanisms are the criteria used to evaluate teachers’ performance. With this, education networks legitimize not only the conditioning of additional remuneration, but also the criteria and factors that represent a supposed efficient professional practice.

Considering the 14 states that implemented ADD, a national picture was drawn on the criteria used in these processes. Similar criteria, such as assiduity and frequency, were unified in the analysis. The data obtained are expressed in the graph below, with the identification of the number of networks that use them.

Source: elaborated by the authors based on the legislation of the 14 states ( ^{ACRE, 2013} ; ^{AMAZONAS, 2008} , ²⁰¹⁵ ; ^{BAHIA, 2008} , ²⁰¹⁰ ; ^{CEARÁ, 1993} , ²⁰⁰⁶ , ²⁰¹⁵ ; ^{ESPIRITO SANTO, 2009} , ²⁰¹¹ ; ^{GOIÁS, 2001} , 2007, ²⁰¹⁵ ; ^{MINAS GERAIS, 2003} , ²⁰⁰⁴ , ²⁰⁰⁹ ; ^{PARAÍBA, 2012} , ²⁰¹⁵ ; ^{PARANÁ, 2004} , ²⁰¹⁵ ; ^{PERNAMBUCO, 2008} ; ^{RIO DE JANEIRO, 2011} ; ^{RIO GRANDE DO SUL, 1974} , ²⁰¹¹ ; ^{SÃO PAULO, 2008} , ²⁰⁰⁹ , ²⁰¹⁴ , ²⁰¹⁵ ; ^{TOCANTINS, 2014} ).

Graph 1 – Criteria evaluated and number of public state education networks that use each criterion 

It shows the centrality of two criteria: student attendance and performance in external evaluations, translating the political, administrative and managerial fundamentals of the states that propose this policy. The logic underlying the policies assumes that the improvement of educational quality depends on the frequency of teachers and on the achievement by students of satisfactory results in external evaluations, which induces a direct relation between efficient practice and students’ results, not always true. The granting of financial incentives for these two criteria clearly serves as a stimulus to curb absenteeism and to induce teachers to train their students for better results in external evaluations, which, paradoxically, stands as an identity of good teaching quality and best practices.

Just as it is necessary to value the teachers, the relevance of their performance in the learning process, which passes through the presence in the classroom and professional quality performance, is indisputable. To think otherwise would be to transfigure the fundamental role of the teaching profession, which is to teach. However, teaching performance and teaching can not be reduced to simply preparing students for multiple choice exams, as Ravitch (2011) has already observed, students may even get good test scores, which does not mean they dominate the subject or have learned it. Therefore, these results should not be used as one given to making important decisions.

The multiple factors that interfere with learning cannot be disregarded, and responsibility for teaching is not limited to the performance of teachers. There are several factors used in the evaluation of networks that express the performance of teachers, go beyond the performance of students in proficiency tests and teaching frequency. Even if not in all ADD systems, professional performance criteria, student flow, compliance curriculum, plans, projects and improvement, training and education are present in good amount of reviews in state networks.

Based on these criteria, it is possible to notice the predominance of factors that express professional conduct such as attendance, curriculum compliance, training and professional performance, as well as criteria that express the educational results such as the students’ performance in large-scale assessments and the school flow.

Although it is only used in the state education network of Rio de Janeiro, the evaluation criteria for the structural preservation of the teaching unit and compliance with school registration and bureaucratic obligations, which expand the forms of accountability and control in the configuration contemporary work, already observed by ^{Castel (2012)} , in a study on the transformations in the salary society, and by ^{Sousa (2009)} , in an analysis on the policies of evaluation of teaching work.

Besides being responsible for the career, salary and results of the educational process, the intensification of the forms of control imposes the responsibility for the performance of the students, for the institutional performance and even for the structural, physical and administrative conditions of the schools. Faced with this logic in which the teacher must answer for almost everything, one inquires about the obligation that remains to the public institutions and to the state administration in the quality of the scholastic performance of their respective networks of education. The multiplicity of forms of control and accountability of teaching work and the breadth of the incentive policies based on the ADD authenticate the meritocratic direction of the management of teaching work within the country’s schools.

ADD for granting an increase in the remuneration of public state teaching networks

Throughout the research, it was verified that eight state networks had, in 2015, career development systems linked to performance, promoting an increase in remuneration. Financial subsidies are not considered here, only remuneratory raises. However, draws attention not only the networks that implemented this policy, but the number of states that have laws and instituted them even if they are not functioning in practice. With the exception of the networks in DF, RJ and SC, ADD policies for progression purposes are planned in all the other states, and therefore there are 24 states which sought to adopt them.

Researchers in the field present factors that create obstacles to the implementation of the ADD for the purpose of granting an increase in the remuneration in different education systems and countries ( ^{SCHULMEYER, 2002} ; ^{TORRECILLA, 2006} ; ^{ISORÉ, 2010} ; OFICINA..., 2013; 2015; ^{MORDUCHOWICZ, 2009} ). These are topics such as conflict of interest and opinions about this mechanism, difficulty in evaluating teachers’ work, and lack of empirical evidence about the relation of ADD with educational quality and professional development:

A few teachers are rewarded, but the general level of teaching does not rise. There is no evidence that the implementation of merit pay programs improves, neither student achievement performance nor teacher performance, both fundamental causes of this type of proposal. ( ^{MORDUCHOWICZ, 2009} , p. 26).

Studies such as that of Bresloni (2014), ^{Minhoto and Penna (2011)} and Rocha Jr. (2012) also present no immediate link between pay for performance and change in behavior of the teacher. According to ^{Minhoto and Penna (2011} , p. 157):

In addition to the complexity of the teacher’s relationship with their work, it has been difficult to establish criteria to define with precision, a good teacher, because of the complex nature of teaching. Even if salary advantages had an immediate effect on the teacher’s performance, the problem of measuring it was reiterated, since the “product” of teaching is also complex, imprecise and therefore difficult to classify.

Ratifying these claims, ^{Isoré (2010)} insists that there is little evidence on the direct correlation between ADD and student performance. These studies deconstruct the main argument in these educational policies: the supposed promotion of more quality of education. Even so, this tool constitutes a strong political tendency in the state networks of Brazil (2015), present in eight states. In these places, the ADD is based on mainly three factors: assiduity, present in six networks; professional performance, in six states; and training, in four networks.

Regarding the selection of the criteria to be evaluated, it is worth recalling that:

[...] the ratings are not neutral and when it comes to associating them with public policy, the philosophical perspective that is rooted in its form of design, its goals, objectives, its procedures, as well as behaviors and attitudes of managers and evaluators, determine their consequences and show the institutional, social and/or educational role assigned to them, to what ideology it is linked and what is expected of them. ( ^{GATTI, 2014} , p. 374).

Contrary to the objective character of the frequency and titration to prove the improvement and continuous training, the multiple factors of the professional performance evaluated, when determined institutionally without guaranteeing the collective reflection on the principles and mechanisms of the evaluation system implemented, can induce the mechanization of conducts that do not always represent a good teaching. By linking certain professional conduct to maturity impacts, evaluation tends to induce teachers to adjust their practices exclusively to institutional expectations. Thus, instead of ADD being a policy to improve educational quality, it can become a mere instrument of control.

ADD for the payment of financial subsidies in public state teaching networks

The practices of granting financial subsidies unrelated to teachers’ remuneration - one-off awards that are not included in the salary - were implemented in 10 states in 2015, representing more than 1/3 of the federation units. In the document published by WB in 2014, mentioned above, highlights itself to the importance of paying subsidies to the teaching profession, recognizing that this instrument is proliferating through Latin American countries, due to the fact that the subsidies are:

[...] politically and technically easier to implement than reforms in the career plan and have no long-term fiscal or retirement implications. Bonus programs usually offer a unique reward for teachers (or schools) for specific results obtained during the previous school year. ( ^{BRUNS; LUQUE, 2014} , p. 45).

However, even with the facilities mentioned in the document, there is a lack of evidence of the impact of these programs on school outcomes:

Our understanding of the mechanisms from which bonus payments improve student outcomes is small. The logic of incentive pay is to stimulate teacher behavior that helps improve student learning: either through increased effort or more effective teacher engagement. However, few evaluations have documented changes in teacher classroom practices. ( ^{BRUNS; LUQUE, 2014} , p. 46).

The main argument in the justifications for implementing financial reward programs for results as a tool for mobilizing better teaching practices is not proven. Still, this policy was implemented in 2015 in the following Brazilian states:

These policies are linked to four criteria, used by most states: assiduity; students’ performance in external assessments; school flow and curriculum compliance by the teacher.

Notably, the students’ performance in external evaluations, along with teaching attendance and school flow rates are the main criteria evaluated, present in eight of the ten state bonus programs. These criteria express individual behaviors and aptitudes and their adoption by the networks seems to address and seek to correct one of the criticisms present in documents of international organizations: the finding that there is a lack of incentives for individual factors and valorization of merit.

It is worth remembering that some authors point out the limits of the multiple choice tests that evaluate the school results and the quality of learning as a parameter for the ADD (see ^{SANTOS et al., 2012} ; ARAUJO, 2014; ^{AUGUSTO, 2012} ; ^{PERBONI, 2016} ; SOUSA, KOLINSKI, 2017). For Silva; Moriconi; Gimenes (2013, p. 97), there is a mistaken assumption that “it is possible to determine the quality of teaching delivered from what students demonstrate to know, especially within the restricted limits of what is actually measured in student performance assessments.” Just as the quality of teaching is not limited to what is charged in standardized assessments, the practice of teaching occurs in a variety of ways and sometimes cannot be expressed by tests, because:

[...] what is tested may ultimately be less important than what is not tested, such as a student’s ability to find alternative explanations, raise doubts, seek self-knowledge, and think differently. ( ^{RAVICHT, 2011} , p. 252).

For the author, we must consider that standardized tests are not precise instruments and the same student could produce different results by performing the test on different days.

The association of student performance in external evaluations to school approval and dropout rates to determine the payment of financial incentives to teachers is clearly a policy of accountability directed to teachers, despite the fact that such indexes tend to express institutional performance, dependent of the collective work and the context in which teaching takes place. As mentioned earlier, in addition to being limited, proficiency tests are not determinants of the quality of teaching and the pressure to hold teachers accountable for institutional results ends up becoming an instrument of control over their practice. As argued by ^{Ravicht (2011)} , the importance given to student proficiency can cause teachers to engender changes in their practices that have nothing to do with learning or quality teaching. These practices may constitute preparatory activities for the tests, which make the students master the methods of their realization, but not the school knowledge necessary for citizenship, reflection and conscious and responsible action in society.

FINAL THOUGHTS

The results presented in this article confirmed Brazil’s alignment with the trend of policy expansion that relates teacher compensation to the results of the ADD, already identified in some international studies. In the country, this initiative is not localized, it encompasses states in all regions of the country, mainly in the Southeast. According to current legislation, this tendency is based on the assumption that ADD policies value professionals in the teaching profession, improve the quality of teaching, and, in general, allied with the reform proposals for the modernization and efficiency of public educational services.

As seen so far, the criteria that overlook the conduct of education professionals predominate in ADD. It is a rationality that encourages the adaptation of individuals to previous definitions of what it is to be a good teacher. The fulfillment of obligations and goals defined exogenously is considered as a way to demonstrate efficiency and only through it the professional can be rewarded for its merit. According to Marcuse’s analysis (1999, p. 80), it is noted that “man learns that obedience to instructions is the only means of obtaining desired results. Being successful is the same as adapting to the device. There is no place for autonomy”.

In this process, while discourses favorable to ADD seek to convince their interlocutors that what is at stake is the maximization of individual potentialities what is actually observed is the transfer of responsibility for productivity and the construction of a valuable professional trajectory, not available to all. In addition, the exercise of autonomy, due to the standardization and mechanization of the conduits, is prescribed to teachers as required to achieve exogenous and previously established objectives and goals.

It is about deepening external control over conduct and behavior and inducing technological reasoning, which questions the means of better operationalizing useful performance and obtaining better results, without critical provision for analyzing the consequences imbricated in one’s own attitudes, which should be in favor of the training of students and the development of collective work. The teacher loses control and sense about the work itself, by compromising with performance indicators that exacerbate the relevance of what will be measured.

The teacher remains free to submit to the dictates of the apparatus, adjusting their practice to the goal of greater financial advantages, or to submit to low social recognition for the work developed, for not being efficient enough to achieve the indicators of work excellence, institutionally imposed, and continue to receive its meager remuneration.

Granting remuneration increases or payments of financial awards to some professionals over others does not seem to constitute a way of valuing the career and the teaching work, given that the conditions under which teaching takes place within schools are different, so that the results obtained in standardized assessments are also different. It is necessary that the public administration invest enough resources to provide good remuneration to all and structures appropriate to the development of quality education, and not only to a privileged stratum of the system.