Introduction

Although history has always registered the existence of collectives that identify with right-wing ideological thinking, the performance of these groups has received little attention in academic research on youth in Brazil throughout the 20^th and early 21^st centuries. According to Soares (¹⁹⁶⁸, p. 243), the end of the World War II and the downfall of Nazism led the far-right to lose "its conceptualization in academic circles"^[1], which can be interpreted as a possible reason for the lack of research on the subject. In Brazil, there was a gap in the field of studies on youth between the 1970s and 1980s, which only began to be filled in the 1990s (Sposito, ²⁰¹⁸). In this new era that began in the late 1980s and extends to the first decade of the 21^st century, youth cultures associated with musical styles, such as punk, rock and rap (Groppo, ¹⁹⁹⁶; Herschmann, ²⁰⁰⁰; Dayrell, ²⁰⁰⁵) or with the use of violence, such as gangs, carecas ^[2] and organized crews (Costa, ¹⁹⁹²; Diógenes, ¹⁹⁹⁸), attracted more attention from academic researchers than studies on the ideology and political participation of young people. Another field that began to be established in the 1990s, creates a connection between the Sociology of Youth and the Sociology of Education, focusing on the relations between youth, school, work and access to higher education (Sposito, ²⁰¹⁸). Also in this field, the construction of right-wing thinking among young people did not become a research topic.

Over the past decade, with the advance of communication technologies and mobile internet, an intense process of connectivity that changed the forms of social interaction, especially for younger generations, emerged. Through access to cyberspace, a new type of interaction is built, where ideas, opinions and positions are shared by many young people who use the language of social networks (Weller & Bassalo, ²⁰²⁰). In this wave, right-wing youth groups also found space to put their political and ideological protests in evidence, creating forms of action, management and participation that do not submit to the traditional media mechanisms and their selection and ranking criteria.

This article folows other studies other studies that seek to understand the emergence of these groups as well as social markers of young people who identify with right-wing thinking (Fuks, ²⁰¹²; Melo, ²⁰¹⁸; Nascimento, ²⁰¹⁹; Pinheiro-Machado & Scalco, ²⁰¹⁸). Therefore, the authors are based on the conceptual definition of conservatism as a style of thought (Mannheim, ¹⁹⁸¹; ¹⁹⁸⁶). In this sense, a style of thought is expressed in a specific political culture as an intentional and purposeful movement in relation to the circumstances of a given period, i.e., as a style of thinking that is not static, thus assuming new appropriations and characteristics every new generation (Mannheim, ¹⁹⁹³). In this sense, we also assume the Mannheimian premise that the generation units develop different perspectives, reactions and political positions in relation to a similar problem that, to its turn, is materialized in actions and in the adoption or creation of distinct lifestyles and thoughts within the same generational connection, even between individuals who belong to the same social environment and attend, for example, the same school. From this perspective, right-wing youths can be taken as a generational unit, or, in other words, as a more concrete adherence in relation to the one established with coevals belonging to the same generational connection (Weller & Bassalo, ²⁰²⁰).

We also emphasize, based on the above assumptions, that the conceptualization of the right and the far right is a complex task, since there is no universal concept that might explain different realities. We temporarily adopt the definition offered by Bobbio (²⁰¹¹), who perceives the naturalization of differences as a fundamental feature of the right. However, it is also necessary to consider differences that can be observed between right-wing and far-right political groups: the first is characterized by its proximity to neoliberal values and its acceptance of liberal democratic norms; whereas the second identifies with authoritarian values and rejects democratically established norms (Severo & Campos, ²⁰²⁰). In contemporary Brazil, far-right groups, especially throughout K-12 education are also characterized by the rejection of discussions on human rights, diversity, difference and sexuality within the school, usually presenting religious reasons as justification. Another characteristic of these far-right groups, that operate in extreme situations, but which are not rare, is the persecution of education professionals (Severo & Gonçalves & Estrada, ²⁰¹⁹). These considerations help us to establish a theoretical approach to what are right-wing and the far-right. The discussion of the Brazilian context in the next section of the article helps us to understand this phenomenon nowadays. We emphasize, however, that in this article we do not seek to define what it means to be right-wing or far-right, but who the young people in this spectrum are.

From an empirical point of view, we seek to reconstruct the social markers related to the production of right-wing and far-right thinking of the young people who participated in the research. We understand the participants can be taken as possible producers of social experiences that are related to the school life period, and more specifically to high school. We have adopted self-identification in an ideological scale (from the far-left to the far-right) as a means of approximation with the generational units in Mannheim's thought. We believe that the analysis of the ways of thinking of these generational units based on the self-identification in an ideological scale can help understand their political behavior beyond the vote decision (Fuks & Marques, ²⁰²⁰; Singer, ²⁰⁰⁰).

Brazilian socio-historical context and conservative reorganization

The analysis of a given generation requires apprehending the socio-historical aspects that describe which the relevant elements to produce experiences of the subjects who participate in it are (Woodman & Wyn, ²⁰¹³). It is not only necessary to identify the elements, but also to verify how they enable, retain or determine the possible ways for producing these experiences, which will culminate in styles of thinking linked to different generational units.

Based on this assumption, it is necessary to understand how a given situation, which is presented in "economic, social, historical, cultural and demographic happenings or events" (Miranda, ²⁰¹⁶, p. 133), affects people's lives and social groups, especially the younger generations and their styles of thinking. This way, the configuration of political culture, understood as a “set of subjective orientations of a social group, which could be a national population or its subgroup, about its political system” (Nishimura, ²⁰⁰⁹, p. 12), is associated with hegemonically established forms of such events or happenings, as well as the state and economic model of the country.

The construction of Brazilian society was predominantly authoritarian in all its historical periods (Chauí, ²⁰¹⁹). From our enslaving past, throughout several dictatorships and even in democratic periods, the country has maintained segregation forms that are based on ethnic-racial, class and gender belonging (Souza, ²⁰¹⁷; ²⁰¹⁸). Nevertheless, these characteristics are not static and they depend on conjunctural arrangements, which end up constituting a "pendular movement" between democratic and counter democratic periods (Avritzer, ²⁰¹⁹). Considering these characteristics and having spent a period of 21 years of military dictatorship, during the redemocratization, and, even in the present, conservatism appears as a “shameful” element of Brazilian political culture (Pierucci, ¹⁹⁸⁷), not assuming itself as such, but persisting as a dominant practice. In this context:

The traditional, authoritarian right-wing would start coexisting with the contemporary, more democratic right-wing. Both would see democracy as a strategic commitment that could ensure their survival in that political scenario […]. Although a New Right has not been developed in Brazil considering the existing organizations or political parties in the United States and Europe, it was possible to notice similarities in the discourses, demands and in the way politicians, parties and governments take action since the 1990s. (Nishimura, ²⁰⁰⁹, p. 40)

Thus, still in an incipient importation process, neoliberalism begins to emerge as a proposal for state management. It appears as a modernizing discourse that begins to be implemented during the government of former president Collor (from 1990 to 1992) and becomes one of the main positions of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government (from 1994 to 2001), especially after privatization and reduction of state investment in public services. At the beginning of the first decade of the 21^st century, this political economic cycle, added to the straining of FHC's second term and the mobilization of popular movements, comes to an end. In 2002 Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (from 2002 to 2011) was elected, starting a new political cycle that can be denominated as social-liberalism or weak reform movement (Singer, ²⁰¹²).

Such definitions considers that there was, on the one hand, the maintenance of economic agreements with economic elites, enabling the high profitability of the financial sector and the maintenance of primary surpluses; on the other hand, the implementation of social policies to low-income population, such as the “Bolsa-família”, “Minha casa, minha vida” (“My Home, My Life”) programs, and investment on infrastructure, besides the creation of new public universities and vocational institutes. This arrangement was possible due to an international economic moment that enabled national economic growth and the maintenance of a regime called “coalition presidentialism” (Limongi & Figueiredo, ¹⁹⁹⁸), which is represented by an effort to keep center and right-wing parties close to Lula's government base. This cycle remained stable until approximately 2012, and the government managed to maintain the country's economic stability as a result of income transfer policy, thus avoiding the internal contamination of local markets due to the international crisis of 2008.

The Dilma Rousseff's government (from 2012 to 2016) managed, to some extent, to continue the institutional design started during Lula’s government, inheriting, however, the straining of two successive governments of the same party, an economic crisis that finally arrives in Brazil and the chauvinist attacks she receives from the opposing parties, which is based on the national authoritarian culture. At this circumstances, new contextualization of the ideological disputes that result from the cycle of Lula's public policies starts being presented.

In summary, the rise of the poorest class, made possible by economic growth, generated an increase in the consumption capacity of this population, access to public services and also reduced the labor supply that was previously absorbed by household services (Singer, ²⁰¹⁸; Tomizaki & Daniliauskas, ²⁰¹⁸). This generated, on the one hand, a reactionary resentment of the “middle classes” that sought to differentiate themselves by keeping a social distance from the lower-income classes especially through a type of economic apartheid that is expressed by the search for exclusivity in services (Souza, ²⁰¹⁸).

On the other hand, the characteristics of Brazilian developmentalism enabled a restricted social mobility to jobs that were considerably better paid than the previous situation, but which did not place them in a position of a "new middle class", a term that has become common both in the media and in the government. Therefore, when this sector, which experienced an improvement in their living conditions for approximately a decade, noticed the stagnation of their condition (even if ideally perceived), they began to feel the limitations and the decline of this ascension model.

Added to these elements, the demonstrations in 2013, that began with the demand for improvements in public transportation, turned to be controlled by right-wing forces that started dominating the agenda and chose the Dilma government as a target. Still, President Dilma, by seeking to establish more republican relations with the parliament (Singer, ²⁰¹⁸), in an attempt to abandon “coalition presidentialism”, lost a significant portion of her base support in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. In institutional terms, the non-recognition of the electoral defeat by Aécio Neves (PSDB) in 2014 is also an important marker for the production of a feeling of insecurity and fragilization of the president's second term, generating new public demonstrations in 2015, this time fully captained by an already shameless and reorganized right-wing, which resulted in the 2016 coup and in PEC 95, both of which culminated in the election of Jair Bolsonaro as president of the country (Avritzer, ²⁰¹⁹). In an ascendant movement since 2013, therefore, right-wing groups have developed and started dominating political mobilizations and took over public and virtual spaces, having social media as one of their most powerful tools to form public opinion. It is possible to perceive a common style of thinking (Mannheim, ¹⁹⁸¹; ¹⁹⁸⁶) based on their demands and their ways of acting. An anti-communism posture resurges as a way of determining its antagonists, identifying as such all individuals or groups that are favorable to human rights, LGBT movements, feminists, etc., and, in extreme cases, the label as communist was used by center-right politicians. In summary, these individuals rely on a moral definition of what communism would be, and understand their oponents as subjects who put the notions of “family” at risk. One of the most important groups that carry these banners out both in the civil society and in the House of the Representatives are the “neo-Pentecostals”. This group, of which the current president was a member, has a significant number of Deputies and their central questions are concerned with moral issues (Lacerda, ²⁰¹⁹).

The young people who are the object of analysis of this article were high school students in the year 2019 and are in direct or indirect contact with political demonstrations, having also taken a more active participation in politics since 2018 and because of the presidential elections. However, even though they did not participate in mobilizations and debates in the years of 2013, 2015 and 2016, they are heirs of “collective orientations” (Mannheim, 1982), that were outlined in this period and that marked the transition of these young people from middle school to high school.

The analytical path of this research^[3] considered the observations of Tomizaki & Daniliauskas that:

The study of the relations between youth and politics requires a focus on the effects of different educational processes and groups (family, school, church, network associations, workplace), in order to understand what would be their weight on the development of political positions and actions of young people (²⁰¹⁸, p. 217).

In doing so, we sought to identify and analyze the social markers of those who identify with the right-wing thinking that has become expressive in the current political situation, considering the forms of sociability of these young people.

About the research and sample profile

The field research was carried out from September until November 2019^[4]. The first step of the research consisted in a survey in printed format, applied to a representative sample of students enrolled in regular high schools (private and public institutions run by the State or by the Federal Government). The investigations were concentrated in the cities of Pelotas (which has 10,309 high school students), Caxias do Sul (14,745 students), and Porto Alegre (38,979 students), an amount of 64,033 students, according to the school census of the Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Anísio Teixeira (Inep, ²⁰¹⁸). Considering this universe and the need of a confidence level of 95% and a margin of error of 2 percentage points, the number of questionnaires designed for application was 2,315. Due to the cancellation of visits to two state schools, we reached the number of 2,169 questionnaires, applied in 19 schools. The distribution of the questionnaires among the municipalities was 441 for Pelotas, 538 for Caxias do Sul, and 1,190 for Porto Alegre, considering the proportion of enrollments in state, federal and private schools (1,464, 281, and 423 questionnaires^[5], respectively). The selection of these cities was made in search of greater representation in the distribution of Rio Grande do Sul, besides the capital, in municipalities with a population greater than 200,000 inhabitants. The schools were randomly selected, and we sought to keep the proportionality in the three different education environments, but discretely increasing the number of students from the federal schools in order to provide statistical relevance within the sample.

General aspects of the sample

Considering the general data of the sample, the average age of the interviewees was 16.7 years, with a little more than half of the sample composed by women (50.8%). Seven out of ten students declared their skin color to be white. Two thirds of young people (65.4%) declared that they only study and do not work, and more than half live with parents (52.4%). Three out of ten declared having no religion (35.7%); Catholic (30.4%) and Evangelical (17%) were the most cited religions. They also declared to be children of parents who are formally employed (35.9% and 38.3% for father and mother, respectively). WhatsApp was the most used social network by almost half of young people (48.5%), and the most frequently reported reasons for accessing the internet were chatting on WhatsApp/Messenger or accessing profiles on social networks (26.2% and 29, 1%, respectively). For 34.1% of young people, family members are the most reliable source of information and social networks were reported as the less reliable source of information for 69.3% of respondents.

Analysis by ideology outcome: right-wing and far-right

Based on the sources we studied (Mannheim, ¹⁹⁸¹; ¹⁹⁸⁶; Singer, ²⁰⁰⁰), ideology is an important characteristic for the understanding and identification of political behaviors, which are based on social experiences that, on the other hand, are related to the social spaces of the subjects. These social spaces are also shaped by social markers such as class, race, gender, generation, religion, among others. The outcome of this study, focused on understanding the political identification and ideological disposition of young people, was constituted from the answer to question 20 of the questionnaire applied to students: "How do you identify yourself politically, considering that on the scale below, 1 would be the far-left and 10 is the far-right?” Besides the numerical scale, respondents could also choose the alternative “I do not identify with any” or “I do not know how to reply”. For differentiation, based on question 20, the answers were grouped into: far-left (1 and 2), left-wing (3 and 4), center (5 and 6), right-wing (7 and 8) and far-right (9 and 10). Within this scale, we obtained 1,567 (72.25%) respondents and they constitute the outcome of this study.

Students who said that they didn't know the answer or didn't answer (27.75%) were excluded from the analysis. The ideological distribution of those who remained in the analysis, i.e., 72.25%, has the following configuration: 8.8% on the far-left, 21.4% on the left-wing, 21.5% on the center, 15.8% on the right-wing, 5.5% on the far-right, and, finally, 27% who do not identify themselves at any point within the scale. For this article, we elect the right-wing and far-right groups, considering the sociodemographic profile, the questions related to information consumption and, finally, aspects regarding sociability and political culture based on the statistical analysis model used, as detailed below.

It might be easier to understand the analysis and results presented here if we explain some basic concepts. The p-value, represented by the letter "p" that appears at the beginning of each crude or adjusted analysis cell, refers to the probability of the result being randomly given. It is agreed that a p<0.05 demonstrates that a result is statistically significant, i.e., that the values were not random and that the outcome and the analyzed characteristic are associated. When p>0.05, it is not possible to mathematically state that the outcome is associated with the variable. Crude and adjusted analyses refer to the study of the outcome in relation to each of the characteristics, also called variables. Crude analysis shows the relation between variable and outcome without considering the other variables studied; the adjusted analysis shows whether the relation between variable and outcome remains when analyzed together with the other variables. These analyses are possible with the use of specific statistical tools, in this case the Poisson Regression. Poisson Regression results show the probability of the outcome occurring in relation to the comparison group and its effect measure is the prevalence ratio. The number 1.00 indicates the comparison category, and the values presented in the other(s) demonstrate or not a higher or lower probability of occurrence of the outcome when compared to the comparison group, with the numbers in parentheses being the confidence interval of the obtained measure.

For example, in Table 1, we will take as an example the gender characteristic (which will be presented below). In the last column, adjusted analysis, the effect measure presented was 3.56 (2.50-4.52) for male gender, with the female gender as reference category and p<0.001. The information can be read as following: males presented 3.56 times greater probability of political identification with right-wing, or even 256% (3.56-1.00) greater probability of the outcome when compared to females.

The association, expressed by the p<0.05 value and by the value of the confidence interval that does not pass through the unit, may exist in the crude analysis and disappear in the adjusted analysis. In this case, it is understood that the effect of the variable on the outcome was confounded or mediated by another variable, which was expressed with the adjustment. We consider factors associated with the outcome those that remain with significant values after the adjusted analysis, and these are the results we will discuss in this article.

The initial analysis consisted in verifying the frequency of all variables included in the hierarchical analysis model. Bivariate analysis was performed using the chi-square test and crude and adjusted multivariate analysis was performed through Poisson Regression with robust variance adjustment. The hierarchical model used was of three levels, in order to control for possible confounding factors. At the distal level, sociodemographic variables were included, at the intermediate level questions related to information consumption and the use of networks, and at the proximal level, questions related to students' sociability, culture and education. All variables that, adjusted for those of the same and previous levels, presented a p value ≤ 0.20 remained in the model. The measure of effect used was the prevalence ratio (PR). All analyses were performed using STATA 14.0 software (StataCorp, College Station, TX, USA). We will present in each of the following sections, in order, the most significant characteristics and the adjusted analysis, also bringing the absolute values when pertinent.

Right-wing students

Considering the number of students who declared some political identification (1567), 15.8% of students (247) placed themselves in number 7 or 8 on the scale of question 20, which we characterize as right-wing. In the adjusted analysis^[6], the variables gender, race/color, type of school, religion, participation in sports, musical, performing arts, dance or CTG (Centro de Tradições Gaúchas)^[7] group were significantly associated with the outcome. The indicator that all issues should be discussed at school^[8], highlights the acceptance for debates about politics in school. At the same time, they pointed to the relevance of other spaces of sociability, besides family and school, as relevant for talking about politics^[9].

At the distal level, multivariate analysis showed that male students were 3.56 times more likely to have political identification with the right-wing than female students^[10]. Black students were 61% less likely to identify politically with the right-wing when compared to white students^[11]. Private school students, when compared to state school students^[12], presented 77% higher probability of the outcome and students who declared to be Catholic and Evangelical^[13] presented greater probability of identification with right-wing positions when compared to agnostic or non-religious students (57% in both cases).

The predominance of this identification in the right-wing spectrum was higher among young people who said that the most used social media were YouTube, Instagram and WhatsApp (22.8%, 19.4% and 15.6%, respectively), however the adjusted analysis presented no statistically significant difference for the occurrence of the outcome.

Regarding political culture, students who said they never talk about politics were 56% less likely to identify with the right-wing when compared to those who said they always talk about politics.

Concerning the question about participation in political organization, considering the absolute values, 240 declare that they do not participate and 7 participate. In the question about participation in demonstrations, 170 declared they had not participated in demonstrations and 75 have already participated in demonstrations. Regarding the participation of the family in political activities, 100 declared that they did not participate in political activities and 147 that participated in political activities.

When asked about what they intend to do after finishing high school, in the adjusted analysis, it was not possible to notice significant differences about their life projects, with the highest incidence in absolute values being the options to work and go to college (N=95) and go to college (N= 67).

Far-right students

In this segment, considering the students who seek to identify themselves in numbers 9 and 10 (far right), there are 5.5% of the sample (87 students). In the adjusted analysis, the variables gender, type of school, religion, more reliable source of information, less reliable source of information and talking about politics were significantly associated with the outcome.

At the distal level of analysis, male students presented 3.73 times greater probability of political identification with far-right when compared to female students. Studying at a private school was associated with the outcome, with these students being 1.62 times more likely to have the outcome when compared to studying at a public state school. Also at the first level of analysis, students who claimed to be Catholic, Spiritist, or Evangelical were more likely to identify with the far-right when compared to those who were agnostic or had no religion (127%, 183% and 262% higher, respectively).

At the intermediate level of analysis, the social network most used by students was not associated with identification with the far-right. Respondents who said teachers, friends or colleagues, or news websites were the most reliable source of information had lower prevalence ratios for political identification with the far-right when compared to those who considered family members the most reliable source of information. When asked about the less reliable source of information, students who said TV or radio as the less reliable source presented greater probability of identification with the far-right when compared to those who claimed that news websites were the less reliable source of news (PR=5.28 IC95%=2.37-11.78).

It discreetly differs, however, from the habit of talking about politics in relation to right-wing students. While among young people identified as right-wing the majority always talk about politics, among those on the far-right the habit is to talk sometimes (N=40), followed by rarely (N=19) and always (N=19).

In the question about participation in demonstrations, in absolute values, 63 declared they had not participated and 24 had already participated. Regarding family members having already participated in some political activity, in absolute numbers, 43 declared no and 44 said yes.

Concerning the question of what they intend to do after finishing high school, considering absolute values, the highest incidence is those who intend to study and go to college (N=41). It is also noteworthy, in the adjusted analysis, those who intend to do military service (83%).

Discussion

Based on the data analysis, between right-wing students (7 and 8) and far-right students (9 and 10) there is a greater probability that they are men, white, and private school students. Having a religion is a significant element for this identification, especially for Catholics and Evangelicals. These characteristics are accentuated the more to the right they are located on the scale. This way, it is possible to affirm that the ideological cut and the characterization of this generational unit as right-wing and far-right, predominantly comprises white and elite (if we consider the type of school), male, and mostly evangelical young people. This last data supports the analyses about the role of neo-pentecostals groups in the current conservative era we are living in (Avritzer, ²⁰¹⁹; Lacerda, ²⁰¹⁹). Regarding male predominance in contemporary conservative groups, Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco (²⁰¹⁸), in an ethnographic research conducted in the outskirts of Porto Alegre, emphasize a dominant type of masculinity associated with the spread of Bolsonaro’s voters. Considering the differences in the methodological design and in the analysis of the social spaces between the authors' research and this study, this type of masculinity is similar to the profile identified as right-wing and far-right. Our results are also close to the research conducted by Klüppel (²⁰²⁰), who also observed the male predominance in self-identification as right-wing and far-right^[14].

Another relevant aspect common to the right-wing and far-right profiles concerns the fact that families are considered the most reliable source of information. Researches with young people emphasize the importance of socialization agencies in youth politicization processes, such as the family and the school (Fuks, ²⁰¹¹; ²⁰¹²; Setton & Bozzetto, ²⁰²⁰). Here the data shows that there is a positive correlation between family and right-wing ideology, which is more prominent among those who identified themselves as being far-right.

Social media networks appear as the less reliable source, with the exception that for far-right students, in the adjusted analysis, the internet is the most used tool to talk about politics. Such data is relevant if we consider that social media was a central tool for publicizing and organizing social mobilizations in the period from 2013 to 2018. It is also possible to observe the change of the preferred platform, with YouTube becoming more relevant, especially for the far-right. A similar trend was also observed in researches on the popularity of right-wing channels (Córdova, ²⁰¹⁹; Silva, ²⁰¹⁸).

Extremely low engagement in political organizations, as well as little participation in political activities in both segments was also verified. The difference between the two groups can be seen in the habit of talking about politics, which we can also relate to Klüppel's (²⁰²⁰) article on the low interest in politics. While right-wing students mostly declare that they always talk, with little relevance for those who never talk, among those far-right students the rule is to talk sometimes or rarely.

Regarding future projects, in both segments, the desire to enroll in higher education only or go to college and work simultaneously are the most mentioned options. In the far-right segment, the desire to join the military service stands out, which may be related both to the male predominance in this stratum and to the current political situation that increased the value of the military career and its link to the right-wing or far-right ideology.

Conclusion

As pointed out in the article, we sought to analyze the social markers related to the right-wing and far-right thinking of young people who are in high schools in three municipalities in Rio Grande do Sul. Based on Karl Mannheim, we start from the understanding that this style of thinking, identified in this research as right-wing and far-right, is representative for a generational unit that achieved greater visibility in the last decade in comparison to previous generations, who have not yet taken advantage of the new communication technologies and the mobile internet. This way, the cyberspace and the political conjuncture provided these groups with the possibility of building a more concrete adherence, which began to compete with other styles of thinking developed by other young people of the same generation and, in the case of this research, by colleagues who attend the same school.

This study showed that the identification as right-wing or far-right does not represent a majority position among young people who are in high school. On the scale of distribution of ideological positions, there is an average of 21.3%, with the highest percentage defined as right-wing (15.8%) and, to a lesser extent, as far-right (5.5%). This observation does not exclude, however, the need to dedicate more attention to these groups, both in terms of the current political conjuncture, and the need to understand the spaces of experience in which these young people develop their orientations and their political practices, with implications aside from the sphere of these groups.

Another important aspect to be deepened and that can help in the understanding of the genesis of this style of thinking is related to the role attributed to the family as the most reliable source of information for the debate about politics and as social space where right-wing young people talk more about politics. In doing so, the study revealed the need to incorporate intergenerational relations, especially within the family. Other markers that proved to be significant in the ideological development of these young people, such as, belonging to a religious community, for example, demand more attention and analysis trough other research instruments that can encompass specificities of these important social institutions.

Finally, young people's ways of communicating in relation to politics also require more attention, especially regarding the use of social media. We noticed, among both right-wing and far-right young people, a preference for non-traditional media such as the YouTube Channel, which offers a more direct and less hierarchical relation between the producer and consumer. Is there a direct influence of these social media in the construction of the style of thinking of these young people? How do these same social media networks influence the construction of different styles of thinking and distinct worldviews? These are some questions that point to the need for further studies about the political positions of these young people and their forms of participation.