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Revista Eletrônica de Educação

versión impresa ISSN 1982-7199

Rev. Elet. Educ. vol.14  São Carlos ene./dic 2020  Epub 29-Oct-2020

https://doi.org/10.14244/198271994533 

Dossier Consequences of the Bolsonarism on human rights, higher education and scientific production in Brazil

Bolsonarism: Brazilian necropolitics as pact between fascists and neoliberals

João dos Reis Silva JúniorIII 
http://orcid.org//0000-0003-2667-0371

Everton Henrique Eleutério FargoniIV 
http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7536-9126

IIIUniversidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCar), São Carlos-SP, Brazil - Professor at the Department of Education of the Federal University of São Carlos. ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2667-0371 E-mail: joaodosreissilvajr@gmail.com

IVUniversidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCar), São Carlos-SP, Brazil - Master and Researcher at the Federal University of São Carlos. ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7536-9126 E-mail: evertonfargoni@gmail.com


Abstract

The text analyzes the changes and crises in the Brazilian political system and its consequences in civil society and scientific production with the victory of Bolsonaro in the 2018 elections. Based on the discussion of historical and recent elements, this article seeks to understand and debate the reasons and transformations in Brazilian society that formed the electoral intent that characterized Bolsonarism. It is shown that this movement is also responsible for one of the most dramatic periods in the country's political history. It ends by analyzing the rupture of Brazilian political stability, attacks on institutions, economic crisis and politicization of science under ideological attack through the pendulum narrowing of Bolsonarism with fascism.

Keywords: Bolsonarism; Science; Necropolitic; Neoliberalism.

Resumo

O texto analisa as mudanças e crises no sistema político brasileiro e suas consequências na sociedade civil e produção científica com a vitória de Bolsonaro nas eleições [presidenciais] de 2018. A partir da discussão de elementos históricos e recentes, este artigo busca compreender e debater as razões e transformações na sociedade brasileira que formaram o intento eleitoral que caracterizaram o Bolsonarismo. Mostra que este movimento é também responsável por um dos períodos mais dramáticos para a história política do país. Finaliza analisando a ruptura da estabilidade política brasileira, ataques às instituições, crise econômica e politização da ciência sob ataque ideológico por meio do pendular estreitamento do Bolsonarismo com o fascismo.

Palavras-chave: Bolsonarismo; Ciência; Necropolítica; Neoliberalismo.

Resumen

El texto analiza los cambios y las crisis en el sistema político brasileño y sus consecuencias en la sociedad civil y la producción científica con la victoria de Bolsonaro en las elecciones de 2018. Basado en la discusión de elementos históricos y recientes, este artículo busca comprender y debatir las razones y transformaciones en la sociedad brasileña que formó la intención electoral que caracterizó al Bolsonarismo. Muestra que este movimiento también es responsable de uno de los períodos más dramáticos en la historia política del país. Termina analizando la ruptura de la estabilidad política brasileña, los ataques a las instituciones, la crisis económica y la politización de la ciencia bajo un ataque ideológico a través del estrechamiento pendular del Bolsonarismo con el fascismo.

Palabras claves: Bolsonarismo; Ciencias; Necropolítica; Neoliberalismo

Introduction

The permanence of historical problems from authoritarian periods with centuries of social inequality, suffocate daily the structural form of the politics of any country. This is evident in the social, economic, cultural and scientific reality of today's century due to the excessive ballasts and wounds of other centuries. In other words, impasses and conflicts in history become homelands in amalgamations of crises and disorders constituting nations at permanent risk of collapse and/or coups d'état. In the words of Crochík (2006, p. 12) they are "propitious substrates" for the rescue of fascism.

The realization of Brazilian politics is seen in this context in a Freudian cycle of reprising and rebirth of adverse conditions for democracy, with uncertainties and insecurities in a complex society of continental dimensions. The political and social order in which Brazil has maintained itself in recent decades is symbolized by the intermittence of the democratic rule of law. That is, democratic advances have occurred, the main example being the enactment of the Federal Constitution in 1988. On the other hand, anti-democracy appears in the habit of authoritarian governments with representations all over the planet, with President Jair Messias Bolsonaro currently the leading figure in Brazil.

Bolsonaro is a former personality in the Brazilian political scene, working in politics since 1989, having as his first position in Rio de Janeiro. He migrated to Brasília in 1991 as a federal deputy and remained elected in the same position until 2014. He became a "celebrity" and gained notoriety on TV during the Dilma and Temer governments, appearing frequently in entertainment programs. Ex-military and rigid, his speeches were objects of audience by many channels, which were assets instrumented by his campaign team as a constant means of electoral propaganda.

It was in the socialization of his appearances on TV and video clippings of his speeches that Bolsonaro gained fame in the social networks. The Bolsonarista narrative took shape and with the broad picture of functional illiteracy48 in Brazil the Bolsonarism was introduced in Brazilian society without any fuss and in the adhesion of the conservative populist language, which, resumed direct flirtation with speeches characteristic of universal fascism.

The way Bolsonarism has established itself in society is very similar to the fascism of the 20th century. It pervaded the minds of the unorganized masses and became imperative in the heterogeneous crowds in order to sediment a narrative whose values are classic arguments: discipline, family and religious values while acting on the basis of negationism49, militarism and anti-intellectualism. Again, as Adorno (2006) said, the "centrifugal desire" of the people. To the abstract notion of Brazil, one of the basic principles of fascist leadership is "to maintain primary libidinal energy at an unconscious level" (ADORNO, 2006, p. 171), so that people are manipulated for political ends through the objective idea of religious salvation. An ancient method that plays a role in the formation of the masses by manipulating them and modeling them by repression in order to have their obedience.

It can therefore be said that Bolsonarism is a facet of Brazilian authoritarianism or an authentic right-wing populism that articulates with neoliberalism, because its characteristics are witnessed in Brazil's social daily life, producing a daily pedagogy of right-wing populism. The elements and intentions are explicit, an example of this is in the speech of Jair Bolsonaro in the interview he gave to the Open Chamber50 program in 1999:

"I'm sorry, but through the vote, you won't change anything in this country. It will only change, unfortunately, when we move to a civil war here. And doing a job that the military regime did not do. By killing about 30,000. Starting with FHC. Are some innocent people going to die? Fine!" (BOLSONARO, 1999)

Thus, this article intends to seek the understanding of what happened and what is happening to the Brazilian nation through evidence and theories in the political, economic, scientific and social dimensions, especially in the extreme right more antidemocratic represented by the thinking of the President of the Republic Jair Messias Bolsonaro. In the first part we will discuss the rupture of the Brazilian population with the New Republic by showing how the collective dissatisfaction and indignation that resulted in the coup51 was due. Next, we will return briefly to the history of fascism articulating with the Bolsonarism to characterize it. Afterwards, we will polemize the current democratic crisis and the consequences of the governmental decisions of the Bolsonarism in the spheres of Brazilian science and civil society.

Brazilian civil disobedience and the end of the New Republic pact

All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse obedience to the government, and to resist it, when its tyranny or inefficiency are great and intolerable (THOREAU, 2012, p. 11).

To understand how authoritarianism resurfaces in the figure of Bolsonarism in Brazil it is necessary to understand part of its recent history in the design of its reality and what concretely ordered the Brazilian political form that, in 2020, frightens leaders and societies around the world. Preliminarily, we will seek consistency as we reflect on the political cataclysm that prevails over Brazil. Unlike the semantics of the daily pedagogy of fascism that adopts simple and superficial discourse as a narrative trick. This is a notorious fact in the messages of the Italian fascism propaganda and in Nazism, which through the repetition of easy expressions such as "Unidos Venceremos" (United We Will Win) made and makes people absorb the information without having to think too much. This was and still is done to reduce the chances of questioning or criticizing governments.

Not to return to the origins of philosophy, but to start from the basis of thought - the Socratic debate about knowing and knowing, described in Plato's Teeteto, helps us to understand the rationality of the human being beyond the dictionary form reduction of thought. That is what we have in mind when reflecting about the purpose of knowing something and understanding things. To do so, we will use thought as a device to grasp the Brazilian political and economic situation of 2020 through facts and governmental aspects of the recent past in the presidential administrations of Lula, Dilma, Temer and Bolsonaro.

In the popular imagination, many sociological elements are instruments for political candidates in the search for votes, but many other components of daily life alienate citizens more in the continuous process of socialization. The fear of unemployment and not having money to pay rents, medical plans, financing, higher education tuition, food purchases, among other factors, are countless examples that daily absorb the thoughts of Brazilians conditioned to a life of scarcity that is caught up in daily life and living in the daily sphere that, leads to introversion and disregards the human race.

Abusing the unequal socioeconomic reality, the financial market uses social media to modify in the mind of the subject the conception of what is necessary for what is desirable, that is, the citizen is induced to indebtedness by consumption. Fact that Marx (2010, p. 80) called "valuing the world of things" when he said that people are placed under social reproduction fetishized by consumption. For this reason, the above elements are notorious in the reality of Brazilian families, since they are part of the political structure that has been developing in Brazil since the 1990s, especially since the Master Plan for Reform of the State System52 that stimulated the neoliberal advance in the country.

For these facts, we understand that the economy is an important issue to consider for the understanding of political changes in Brazil since its re-democratization. According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), in 2010, the Brazilian economy grew 7.5%. In current values, adding all the wealth produced by the economy in the year, there was reach of R$ 3.675 trillion, having as per capita GDP the value of R$ 19,016.00. Brazil was at that time one of the protagonists of the global economic scenario, surpassing in 2011, for example, the United Kingdom, by assuming the sixth position as the world's largest economy. The Minister of Economy that year, Guido Mantega53 , used to say that due to good projections the country was becoming "respected and coveted".

However, unlike 2010 and 2011, the year 2012 closed with economic growth below 1%, being the worst number in the last 5 years, a performance below 2011, a year that was up 2.7% even with positive projections. At this time, Brazil is once again feeling the impacts of the global economic crisis and financial market turbulence. In 2013, former President Dilma Rousseff, realizing the wave of crises and the possibility of economic collapse, tried to reduce the high interest rates that hovered over public debt and individuals and companies, which caused several conflicts. One of them, direct with the financial market plus the rentiers, who reacted in block in a multifaceted movement and reused by much legal and political opportunism.

Before this crisis, former President Lula (2003-2010) carried out a populist government of conciliation, raising the popular base of family consumption through a set of programs of income distribution, productive inclusion, raising the minimum wage, among other measures, which enabled tens of millions of people to escape poverty and, consequently, hunger. However, the public fund executed there meant crumbs when compared to the repatriation of profits and the payment of internal and external public debt.

The result of this conjuncture provided the economic growth that allowed the financing of social programs. However, in the biennium 2012-2013, the successful period of the petitioner's administration collapsed and the dissatisfaction of the people with Dilma Rousseff's government increased every day. One example was the banks and other financial institutes that slowly began to drain the purchasing capacity of the poorest classes (those that in the recent past had emerged from poverty) sterilizing consumption, part of the great redistribution process that caused the growth dynamic.

For Dowbor (2017), this sterilization reduced the country's resources through the financial intermediation system by draining voluminous funds that would serve as a productive stimulus for economic growth. As a consequence, the use of the public fund for the "rescue" of companies was derived in high interests and reduced purchasing power, a fact that weighed for all social levels. In the same period, families spent more, as a result of the increased purchasing power of society's largest base, but interest rates did not allow the country's economic capacity to increase, causing setbacks in the economy. And although Dilma imposed strong competition from public banks for private banks to reduce bank spreads54, the President's action was seen as a threat to the quantity and profitability of commercial banks' lending operations, a situation similar to that of the end of Lula's second government.

At that juncture, Dilma's management was beginning to weaken even with support from Lula's populism. His political-parliamentary inability led to several political impasses, motivating sectors of the opposition, especially the financial and wealthy sectors, which, according to Bresser-Pereira (2015, p. 36), structured the "violently negative judgment of the government.

Dilma's puzzle did not stop and was intensified in the combination of detailed cases in the states. Traumas of the Brazilian political drama that collaborated in the political thought of the June 2013 Days, an event marked by protests throughout Brazilian territory with no party-political connotation, not just against the president of the republic. However, taken advantage of by the sectors dissatisfied with Dilma's economic leadership that, protesting for a radical change in Brazilian politics, it was never a specific claim. Few politicians or intellectuals realized what moved society's discontent.

The rationality of the 2013 demonstrations in Brazil resembled the movements of other countries, like the Arab Spring55. The collective indignation of the Brazilian population had as one of the driving sources the increase in public transportation tariffs by 20 cents. Singer (2013) called the events a Brazilian seismic tremor, an event that even in a diffuse way gathered different social classes and "ended up generating a deep social unease" (ANTUNES, 2015, p. 6). The "apex" of the events occurred when millions of Brazilians rebelled against the excess of public spending on major sports events such as the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro in 2016, as well as the poor quality of public services and corruption in general. The image of the entrance of the Dawn Palace on fire "turned" the world through news and symbolized the repulsion of the population against the political form and Brazilian politicians. The first extract of the June Days was the fall in popularity of Dilma and the ineffectiveness of the five measures as responses to the demonstrations. In 2013 the decadence of the petitioner gestures had begun.

The genesis of Bolsonarism in the economy

The years 2014 and 2015 were crucial for the organization of the 2020 policy framework. The reasoning and political engagement of the population was undergoing a major metamorphosis, based on the technology of communication that had advanced rapidly through the social media. Even so, Dilma was reelected for the second term with little difference from second place Aécio Neves (PSDB), but her management practices quickly displeased politicians and workers, including part of her constituency for not keeping campaign promises.

Dilma's second term marked many crises until the impeachment in August 2016, such as the shrinking of more than 9% of GDP per capita in just two years. Another unpopular political choice with supporters and leaders of convergence was Joaquim Levy's appointment as Minister of Economy. Experienced in the capital market, coming from private banks, his main goal was to establish a primary surplus target in three years, which would be 1.2% of GDP in 2015 and at least 2% in 2016 and 2017, through deep budget cuts.

Again, even with the "neoliberal" reaction in the economy, Rousseff did not hold on to power. The reforms desired by the national and foreign bourgeoisie were not carried out by the president (which were carried out with Temer and Bolsonaro) and the political reaction of the opposition had as main allies a large part of the population and businessmen. Their impeachment was and always will be an important feature in the history of Brazil. One can therefore say that in 2016 was explicit the division of the country as we know it today, a nation that had its political configuration redefined through an articulation between those who said it was a coup and those who say it was the fault of ineptitude management that resulted in tax rides.

Division that remains and became an instrument of political campaign, since, unlike the manifestos of 2014, 2015 and 2016, which were composed of the opposition of politics to the Brazilian political apparatus, the June Days, for example, was a mixed mix of securandist students, public and private higher education graduates, shareholders, the metropolitan middle class, black blocs and more the opposition political representatives.

The segmentation of the population in the new manifestos from 2015 has been intensified by social networks. The application of WhatsApp messages became popular and became one of the main sources of meetings and proliferation of personal manifests against the government. A new era of digital thinkers was dawning, people who once did not discuss politics and were not interested in the subject began to engage daily with news, criticism and debates on daily Brazilian politics. In this way, the power of fake news grew, a very socialized way with the democratization of internet consumption and played an important role in the organization of protests against Dilma. As in several elections around the world56.

The way of thinking of the connected Brazilian, motivated by participation and feeling of belonging to the political scene, proved to be fruitful in herd behavior, allowing the manipulation of public opinion through false news and political analysis. Precisely, it made it possible to change the psychic elements of the citizen who now "believes" and does not reflect, his dogmatic feelings take the place of the debate. For example, the speeches of ideologically politicized digital influencers were reproduced by citizens who supported reforms that at other times, as in petitioner governments, there were no advanced discussions. Popular support well contracted by the opposition and Dilma's successor after her impeachment.

Involved in several cases of corruption57, Michel Temer assumed the presidency in August 2016 and resumed the cycle of anti-democratic reforms. He rescued the State apparatus reform movement begun two decades ago, continuing and intensifying several changes in the Brazilian political sphere, while the 2018 electoral race, begun with the coup against Dilma Rousseff, was inflamed behind the scenes. The political thinking of the population was deformed in ideologies, many in identity agendas, other reformers and most in the logic of political renewal. However, the simplistic form of rationality about facts and the reproduction of thoughts originating from non-academic influences rescued the practice of revisionism from national history while, at the same time, strengthening the flirtation with fascism and militarism, to ensure that the reduction of the public sphere took place and to strengthen the Accumulation Regime "Economic growth based on social indebtedness.

Even with low popularity among the two ideological poles (left and right), Michel Temer took advantage of the new conservative, reactionary, and indignant wave that reigned among the demonstrators against Dilma to reconcile with the opposition politicians of the Petite administration and the representatives of the bourgeoisie, operating new reforms. Thus, some were the central reasons: 1) the demand of the productive sector through entrepreneurship in order to resume the economic surplus; 2) popular support for the "rescue" of the bankrupt economy of the country. Pochmann (2017) highlighted two more conditionalities that characterized the political cycle of the New Republic in the transition phase from Temer to Bolsonaro: 1) realignment with the old global dynamic center and commitment to national sovereignty, and 2) redefinition of the public fund to finance wealth and distance the project of society from the subjective and inalienable rights of citizens.

Fears have reacted to impeachment politicians with reforms that have reduced workers' rights and accentuated the reduction of the public sphere. The first change took place in November 2016, when Fearer sanctioned the end of Petrobras' obligation in the pre-salt [does not include the use of italics], a project that ended one of the "dreams" of Brazilian education, since part of the profits would be destined to develop health and education, as well as guaranteeing other rights for the Brazilian people. Senator José Serra's (PSDB) bill was approved in November 2016, months after Dilma Rousseff left and determined the end of Petrobras as the sole operator of the pre-salt. As a result, in 2018 the last "Fear Age" auctions took place, with foreign oil companies taking over six of the 13 bidding areas.

One month after the change in the pre-salt exploration, the PEC of the Expense Ceiling (PEC 241 or EC55) was approved, a constitutional amendment that limited for 20 years the growth of public spending to the percentage of inflation in the previous twelve months. Entitled "PEC of Death," the measure brought about serious changes such as the withdrawal of rights, as an analogous case, this PEC, according to Amaral (2016), decreed the "death" of the National Education Plan (PNE), since the tax reductions implied the unfeasibility of achieving the goals for the period (2014/2024). Brazil goes from servility to financial predominance (SILVA Júnior, 2017) to enter the economic growth based on social indebtedness.

Even with a warning from the Federal Audit Court (TCU) reporting the projected paralysis of public accounts in 2024, Temer followed with the saga of reforms and carried out in the first half of 2017 three others of great impact. Starting with the High School Reform, which stood out for three main changes: 1) change in the school workload, through a provisional measure increasing from 800 hours per year to 1,000 hours; 2) School Curriculum, making only mathematics, Portuguese, and English subjects mandatory; and 3) Teacher Training, in view of the proposal, teachers with the so-called "notorious knowledge" will be able to teach in technical and professional education even without graduation.

The other two reforms of 2017 were the March Irrestricted Outsourcing and the July Labor Reform, which, very similar to the European neoliberal takeover, through the rapid destruction of subjective and inalienable rights of citizens. The first reform allowed for the outsourcing of all the employees of a company, while the Labor Reform brought an intense change in the labor market. Through it, bargaining between companies and trade unions can override the law, allowing, for example, the fragmentation of vacations throughout the year, the intermittent hiring of employees, an end to union taxes and greater rigidity in the opening of labor actions. As a result, it offered greater freedom to companies and decision making in the processes, a fact that Paulani (2008) already warned about the advance of "corporate neoliberalism" in Brazil marked by the exacerbation of financial valuation in the centralization of capital. The worker buys his thirteenth, his vacation and his retirement by entering the labor market and assuming these debts saves the public fund to sustain the financial capital.

Despite the "neoliberal enthusiasm" there has been a slow recovery of jobs and, consequently, of the economy. The numbers were not favorable. When the reforms were approved, according to IBGE, Brazil had 13.3 million unemployed and an unemployment rate of 12.8%. The new law was sold by Temer’s Government Program called “Ponte para o Futuro” (Bridge to the Future)58 as a solution against unemployment and informality, creating, according to the General Registry of Employees and Unemployed (CAGED), only 298,312 vacancies with a signed portfolio. It was a scenario with a better horizon than from 2014 to 2017, a period in which the country lost millions of jobs and the numbers showed a development far behind the years before the economic crisis, when Brazil registered more than 2 million vacancies with a portfolio per year. This is no surprise, since the realignment that produced the new authoritarian cycle is imposed from outside and, due to the new regime of ultraliberal accumulation, the coup and the election of Bolsonaro are organically articulated.

Temer ended his mandate with 62% disapproval. In the 31 months of his administration, the president sent 142 provisional measures to the legislature, 39% more than Dilma in the same period, concluding his work as president with an average of a provisional measure edited every 6 and a half days, the highest number since 1995. There were numerous protests against him during his two and a half years in office. The opposition regularly took to the streets while parliamentarians tried unsuccessfully to suppress the reforms. Weakened after Dilma's impeachment and the advance of neo-conservatism in the country, the national progressive front presented itself disoriented with the naturalization of great popular support for the measures that affected it. Finally, before his departure, Temer left another mark of what was indicated to be triggered by Brazil - the intervention of the Federal Government in Security in Rio de Janeiro by military troops59.

The necropolitics of Bolsonarism

In the process led by Dilma and Temer, a political force was reborn and gained visibility through the television spotlights and social networks, nourished by collective indignation against the economic decay of the country and the "nostalgic" time of oppression, repression and death of the military regime. Jair Messias Bolsonaro was the desire of a confused decade for the fruit of years without notable political leadership or renewal. As a result, the new conservative wave, or new right, showed strong signs of a resumption of presence in politics and the public sphere in the early 2020s, in timid marches for the return of the military dictatorship or in pro-Bolsonaro "civic acts" with the participation of neo-Nazis60.

Strengthened by the crisis of the populist leftists, especially by the misconceptions of the Workers' Party governments, and by the populist advance of the right around the world, with the U.S. presidential election in 2016 as the main inspiration, conservative groups reorganized themselves during and after Dilma Rousseff's impeachment process, making Brazil experience one of its greatest political and social dramas. The political anomie (a new pedagogy of daily life) established in the daily life of Brazilian society quickly dehydrated the conciliations of the petitioner governments. The population began to demand a new political establishment, but instead of basing itself on ideas and examples, it sought again in the popular imagination "heroes" or "saviors of the homeland," reinforcing the movement that was unleashed in Bolsonarism. More consistently Adorno (1995) advocates that "The authoritarian personality: that authoritarianism maintains deep relations with the "general cultural climate" of societies erected under the capitalist form of production, so that its extreme manifestation in the Nazi horror in Germany should not be considered an isolated event, but a latent possibility in other societies and other political contexts. This is authoritarianism at the root of the civilizing process of capitalism. The authoritarian personality of the civilization process in a peripheral country has emerged as in other events of the 20th century.

Bolsonarism has a matrix from outside society, since it does not belong to it and revives attributes of political ideologies such as fascism and Nazism for mass domination and a new subjectivity of the citizen. The characteristics of Bolsonarism are amalgamated with specific aspects of classical fascism in various spheres and senses. In a brief historical review, we understand that fascism is a political ideology that originated in Italy after the First World War, empowered by dictator Benito Mussolini. The fear of the universal myth of "communism" gave rise to fascism in Italian society as a solution against a possible communist revolution in the country. In fascism there is no place for equality, it aims at meritocracy and the state exercises total authority over the population. In fascism there is no democracy, because it is exhausted from the social situation.

Fascist ideology has spread to other countries, the greatest example in world history is Hitler's German Nazism, but it has also had representation in countries like Portugal and Spain. Fascism is considered to be a historical event located in Mussolini's regime, but fascism as an ideological and political current was and is alive and can be observed in governments that do not call themselves fascists, but that adopt some or all of the same practices.

The concept of Bolsonarism holds the peculiarities of European fascism and maintains an organic relationship with Brazilian neo-liberals, but in a country of peripheral capitalism. Understanding the categories of the movement implied considering the relationship of dependence between Brazil and the nations of the world economic center. We present here the categories of Bolsonarism that not only came out of theories, but above all from our effort to read reality through the different media in Brazil and elsewhere. The effort was greater at the time of the decision to choose the most relevant ones. In the following text, we have used footnotes to show what guided us, besides the readings of theories on Totalitarianism and Authoritarianism, to produce a categorical complex of Bolsonarism.

They cultivate ancient traditions, using ideas and their symbols to create their own interpretations without an epistemological basis. They cultivate negationism. This can be observed as a trait of Bolsonarism in the president's remarkable presence of supporters in demonstrations, using symbols inspired by Nazism61 or the use of the Brazilian monarchy's flag62 referring to the desire for the return of the political monarchy regime that ended in 1889 with the Proclamation of the Brazilian Republic. Fascist governments do this to create the narrative that they are the true heirs of these traditions and that this must be the destiny of their nations. In addition, it is worth noting that for neoliberals, stock markets have become fertile territory to finalize structural reforms and consolidate economic growth based on social indebtedness [does not include the use of italics].

Reactionism: Fascists venerate past cultures abhorring modern thinking or as in Bolsonarism, they have antipathy with progressive thinkers and conceptions. Philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists and all other critics (mainly knowledge producing intellectuals in Brazilian universities) are considered in the Bolsonarism the same as the Illuminists were (and are) for the fascists: the subversives of society. For in the Illuminism ideological freedom, the secular state and scientific thought were defended. Therefore, the reactionary Bolsonarist holders are against any kind of social change63. A classic example is found in General Franco's fascist Spain where religious plurality was forbidden and Catholicism became the official religion of the Spanish state. It is worth mentioning that for the consolidation of any totalitarian regime, irrationalism is the best way to shape the subjectivity of citizens.

Anti-intellectualism: in the same way that fascists are not adepts of the scientific knowledge, in the Bolsonarism there is aversion to the deep thought or of reflection. There is strategy, exercise of control and ideas in the summit of the fellowship politicians for mass domination, but the Bolsonarism in practice, absorbed by the voter, in the way of acting, is in the rapid action by physical or verbal violence. Most fascist decisions are made by instinct and not by study or research. In ideological fascism, scientific planning is considered a "weakness". The repulsion64 of the intellectual world is typical of fascism and Bolsonarism, as can be seen in the uninterrupted attack65 by Bolsonarist holders on public universities, which we will see in more detail below. However, this does not proceed for the neo-liberals who are embraced by the president, nor for the elite of the Armed Forces.

Authoritarianism and prepotency: anyone who opposes him is considered an enemy of the government, especially when there are critical public manifestos. A common characteristic of fascism and other dictatorial regimes, people who opposed the government were persecuted. In our times, to mask the authoritarian form, artists and other intellectuals, such as academics, are being harassed by police and digital militias compacting with the government in order to pulverize the opposition's speech. For fascists and Nazis, those who think differently break with the government's "unity" and are more than just an enemy, are considered traitors to the homeland and must be suppressed to serve as an example to others. Reason of Italian fascism and much seen in the practical Bolsonarism in the acts66 of the electorate of Bolsonaro: believe, obey and fight. Again, here, irrationalism is of interest.

Aversion to plurality: one of the most common operating modes of fascism is the treatment and tact of fascists with the people through fear of what is different. This characteristic is seen in Bolsonarism in the way the government acts and in the behavior of its supporters, at least in the contempt for minorities or in the relativization of daily machismo. It is understood as contempt for the dissembling, for example, of President Jair Bolsonaro himself, as he declared in a "tone of joking" that he would shoot "petralhada"67 (PT membership) in Acre or during the visit in Paraiba68 in February 2017 when he said "God above all. There's no such thing as a secular state story. The State is Christian and the minority is against change. Minorities have to bow down to the majorities.

Pact with the elites (bourgeoisie and neo-liberals): Fascist discourse feeds on the frustration of the middle class, while in Bolsonarism, it reaches all social classes, but further intensifies societal power in the hands of the neo-liberal bourgeoisie. The Brazilian economic crisis, as outlined above, has made the people of the bourgeoisie feel abandoned by the government and threatened by those who make up the classes "below". This is where the fear of the universal myth of a "communist revolution" in Brazil and its threatened "privileges" resumes. In Nazi Germany, Adolf Hitler, for example, gave maximum benefits to large landowners, businessmen and bankers. Governments of fascist ideology promise69 advantages for the middle class, but it is the bourgeoisie that receives the benefits. That is why in the political sphere of the Brazilian stock market elitism is very present, whether by the indication of businessmen or financial market intermediaries in government functions or by ideological adherence to the government. A strong dialectic embrace between fascists and neo-liberals.

Servile Nationalism: the driving force behind fascism, nationalism is the fanatical form of the conception of a country's history, values and culture as sovereignty above other nations. However, in Bolsonarism, nationalism occurs in reverse, it considers itself ultra-national, uses the colors of the nation - green and yellow - but adopts discourses, examples and idolizes other models of homeland, having in the United States its object70 of glimpse. Just as in Nazi propaganda, the government's intention for its people to adopt the "strong national pride" is repeated. In the economic sphere it is exactly the goal not only of the United States, but of all the countries of the world economic center.

Necropolitics and necro-statehood: in fascist ideology and Bolsonarism the discourses are ambiguous and always loaded with much hatred, but they are precise because they make the population feel threatened at the same time as they sell themselves as solutions against their enemy. Enemy created by the fascist narrative itself. In history, many were the speeches of public figures, like Mussolini and Hitler, when they preached the "communist threat", a fact verbalized by the Nazi leader in the fight against "Marxism". Bolsonaro repeats to the four winds the theory that there is, in Brazil, a communist plan to destroy the nation, and incessantly disagrees with public bodies and people like the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations (UN) among other scientific institutions that warn71 about Brazil's social, environmental and educational problems, in addition to treating human life with disdain when he says in the middle of the OVID-19 pandemic that the disease is "a little flu" or when asked about the deaths he answered: "So what! Once again negationism appears as a central axis of Bolsonarism.

Bellicosity: Bolsonarism is influenced by fascism in the perennial idea of searching for the enemy and confrontations. Without "a threat" fascism does not exist, so neither does Bolsonarism. This is because Bolsonarism comes from outside and sets itself against society. This ideological form is also a political form because it leaves human lives adrift because of the warlike content of the model of government. It is from this segment that the obsession with armamentism and militarism, typical of Francoism, appears, the "Spanish Fascism" that forced children to wear military uniforms and in the case of Hitlerist youth, a fact emblematically addressed by the award-winning film Jojo Rabbit de Taika Waititi (2019). In Brazil72, with the triumph of Jair Bolsonaro in the elections, armamentism is present through measures73 that make possession and carrying of weapons more flexible and in the symbolic gestures of the president and his followers with "little guns" in their hands.

Militarism and "militia": the basis of fascist authoritarian force and predominance in governance. In his administration, Bolsonaro has more military in the first rank than in the government of General Castelo Branco (1964-1967), who inaugurated the military regime in the 1964 coup. There is "militia" as a practice74. It is a tactic of authoritarian and intimidatory movements with contempt for democratic institutions (even though they claim to guarantee it) and social equipment via paramilitary force. It uses the boasting of the supporters to expand neo-totalitarianism against those who oppose it combined with ultraliberal political culture - an amalgam of the stock market DNA with the economic primer of Paulo Guedes.

Meritocracy: in fascist society the people are educated to compete with each other from a very young age, that is, fanaticism for ideology is found in all social classes and ages, because the "homeland" is above their life. The destructiveness and cynicism of Bolsonarism make the meritocracy one of the greatest weights in the unequal situation of the country, because it criticizes the system of affirmative actions, with constant attempts to eliminate them75.

Intolerance and Prejudices (machismo, racism, homophobia and xenophobia): Fascists take pride in being machismo, homophobic and xenophobic. In history they proclaim themselves as good men in the figure of "working man" and "family man", while the role of women in society is merely reproductive. Fascists are opposed to any form of sexual orientation other than heterosexual and claim that such abnormality goes against the "good manners" model of the traditional family. In the time of Nazi Germany, approximately one hundred thousand men were arrested for being considered homosexual, being executed in about 60% of these lives because of their sexual orientation. The stereotypes that come from the Bolsonarism contain the four elements and are totally present in the Brazilian daily life. Machismo as contempt for women is a daily fact and observed in the president's own speeches. For example, in the interview76 to the Gaucho’s newspaper Zero Hora in 2015, Bolsonaro said that women are problems for companies because they get pregnant and generate expenses to contractors for using maternity leave. Homophobia is explicit throughout Brazilian society, with Brazil being the world leader77 in murders of transsexuals and having in Bolsonarism the maximum representation of the verbalization78 of the inability to love a gay son. In the same social sphere racism is represented by indifference to black lives, having as a fact79 the speech of Bolsonaro in April 2017 when he expressed that "the lightest afro-descendant there weighed seven arrobas".

Propaganda: if nationalism is the flagship of fascism, on the Bolsonarism the form of national dialogue rises to daily mockery. This element is noticeable in the forces of ideas and in emblematic digital campaigns, a major source of alienating everyday life through false news and the caricature of using social networks with converging politicians80 to use digital cartoons and assemblies to defame opponents, while their voters believe and share insults.

There are many other factors that concatenate with the characteristics detailed above. In the years before and after the 2018 elections, one of the aspects that prevailed and predominates in daily life in Brazil is the relativization of truth, a similar fact in the election that elected Donald Trump in the United States, with the manipulation of information about reality as a modus operandi of the neo-conservative electorate (a result of negationism). As a consequence, there were clashes and insults against those who thought differently in a dynamic of destruction of reputations, strengthening the picture of dehumanization of daily life. In this aspect, we turned to Nietzsche (2009) who said that we must take into account that every truth in the condition of knowledge is individually constructed, that is, there are no absolute truths, but interpretations of the reality in which one lives. We began to live again with the fascist political weapon forged in the word and of high destructive power, adopted by anti-progressive political forces as a way to resignify facts and command alienated minds in daily life.

Bolsonaro was democratically elected, but his way of conducting politics, much relativized by supporters, began to be questioned daily. The traits of authoritarianism were explicit in the campaign and in the political trajectory as a deputy for almost three decades. The oligopolized and hegemonic press, which pamphled and relativized Jair Bolsonaro's speeches and attitudes during the elections, began to receive constant attacks due to criticism of government measures, making Year One of Bolsonaro the stage for his controversial speeches. Still, it cannot be denied that Bolsonaro and his advertising team worked very efficiently on his campaign and, consequently, his election, but used inhumane strategies through a network of spreading lies. Quoting Hannah Arendt, Feitosa (2017) called attention to the issue of lies as commonplace acts in a century composed of post-truths, while Arendt herself (1989) said that the devaluation of facts is a powerful method for attracting personal benefits. In addition, if we consider that authoritarianism is at the origin of the civilization process of capitalism in a country of peripheral capitalism like Brazil, we can conclude that its recent democracy would not endure and would perish.

Daily Bolsonarism

Everyone who goes against the will of the Duce becomes a victim of the universal myth. It reaches the absurdity of being in a position to interfere with the other powers and agencies of security as happened in a ministerial meeting on April 22, 2020, when Bolsonaro promised to interfere with the Federal Police. He collected the signature of former Justice Minister Sérgio Moro to authorize himself (Bolsonaro) to control the choice of Superintendency in Rio de Janeiro. The meeting was also marked by the president to defend (as many other times) the arming of the population. Together, having as guardian in the armed forces through General Braga Netto and as can be seen in General Heleno's note and in the draft of an alleged AI-6 published by Vice President General Mourão81. When we wrote this text, we read the news that the Haia Tribunal82 is analyzing whether the Bolsonaro committed crimes against humanity83, such shame no Brazilian deserves.

The Bolsonarism, as has been said too much, comes from outside society and does not identify with it. The president is opposed to society, to scientific demonstrations of reality, and causes daily uneasiness in the population by the irrational administration, which has as a drastic example in less than two years of office, in the middle of the world pandemic of COVID-19, more than 30 requests for impeachment84 and various possible crimes of responsibility85. Among them, the practices resulting from the ideological mode of government - the negation of science.

With the world in outbreak because of the most fatal virus of the century, the president participated in demonstrations of supporters causing crowds exposing large numbers of people to the disease. It seems a madness, a delirium as the cause of each act. This seems to be the reason for the expansion of negationism. For coming against society, it sustains its narrative based on what we call here a universal myth. The captain's madness seems incomprehensible. But we read in Hamlet one of Freud's favorite phrases "There is method in every madness.

To unveil the method is the challenge put to the researchers. The Bolsonarism is based on the evangelical religious foundation and seeks to exterminate part of the society that bothers him, from which follows the expansion of prejudices and groups excluded by him: racism, homophobia, indigenous people, blacks, mediums brown, people with disabilities, refugees and low-income citizens, seeking a foundation in the narratives created by the Bolsonarist group with the orientation of Universal Communism, creating a negationism of what is solid, of what comes from a fragmented society. Only another external agent could contain the president. This produces a huge problem for the country.

The Bolsonarism has an entrenched hatred, in the president and his followers, against everything that is civilized, exposing its other face: violence. This hatred originates in the beginning of the civilizing process of capitalism. The movement arms itself and wants to arm society in a religious crusade against any social pact, besides establishing the logic of militia organization. All the military police act with "autonomy" from the governors, and are the blindest to follow the captain. The Military Police in Brazil has approximately 0.6 million policemen. He dominates this army and part of it is in militias all over Brazil, following the president. The military police has its origin in the Military Dictatorship of 1964 and is state-owned, the detached from society intends, according to Eliane Brum86 in El País, to produce a decree, turning the PM from state to national. With this he would have a parallel army plus the militias.

The structure of Bolsonarism goes beyond the speeches of a guru or the simplified form that there are resentments through the lies. Totalitarianism and proto-fascism, for example, appear constantly in confrontation with the scientific community, especially the universities and federal institutes (IFES), which are constantly targets of the Bolsonarist necropolitics. The Ministry of Education, since Bolsonaro assumed the presidency, has had IFES as its main enemies in society. It has formed a new kind of relationship beyond austerity policies by opposing academia. And from the cut in research funding begun with Temer, Bolsonaro projected the blame on universities for problems of political origin, appealing to the exception, the emergency and a fictional notion of enemy (MBEMBE, 2016).

Brazilian science under attack

The level of heat that Bolsonarism has introduced into the Brazilian public sphere with the unprecedented public health crisis in the coronavirus pandemic and the economic crisis without rationalizing them, are marks that are due to a reason - the panic and aversion that Bolsonaro has for science and higher education. Areas that should be the protagonists of a nation's development are intensely neglected in budgeting and, therefore, with difficulties in distancing research practices and the production of scientific knowledge.

Bolsonarism has maintained the contradiction of Brazil's scientific progress; Constitutional Amendment 55 (EC-55 also known as PEC da Morte). With constitutional status that is unprecedented nowhere on the planet, this EC-55 prohibited investment for twenty years in education, health, safety, science, culture, housing, roads, airports, ports, railroads, among other societal components that are part of the Brazilian popular agenda. What has been seen in practice and continues in 2020 is the worsening of this measure that has opened space to accelerate the precariousness of basic education, public higher education and science in Brazil, all toward privatization.

Instead of working on the repeal of the EC-55, so that, together with intellectuals and experts from various fields could design a new framework and project for Brazilian education and science, actually showed its condition antagonistic to this process. In its year one, Bolsonaro and his allies appropriated, for example, the discourse that education was bankrupt not because of lack of investment, but because of the contingent of politically ideologicalized teachers and servants in schools and universities. They projected the blame on the social actors who are most engaged and charge for satisfactory measures for educational growth in the country. Going beyond this, they insult and upset those who oppose them, in an inhumane disaffection to annihilate reputations by superimposing religious and esoteric discourse over science.

Stanley (2018), in his work How Fascism Works: the politics of us and them, alludes to world reality in an articulation whose objective is the extermination of human rights with the reinvigoration of anti-intellectualism, when he says that diverse are the forms of fascist politics and their strategies to consolidate narratives of authoritarian posture to seize citizens in a context of political anomie. In this context, Brazil has become the unfortunate example for the world. The political practices of Bolsonarism use anti-intellectualism while promoting constant attacks on universities and institutions.

In this logic, the purpose of the anti-intellectualism of the Bolsonarism is to depreciate science and critical education in order to remove any refutation that threatens the execution of the ultranationalist, conservative, reactionary and neoliberal guidelines of the government. For Laclau (2005), many scholars have long warned about this kind of government authoritarianism amalgamated with populism, arguing contexts, conjunctures of crisis and disorder as prerequisites for a successful conservative populist irruption. This neo-fascist mobilization compares with the historical fascism of other contemporary political figures like Donald Trump in the United States, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, Volodymyr Zelenski in Ukraine, and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines.

Science, the production of knowledge, critical studies, and research work in this tyrannical setting represent awe in the way these leaders govern and their political agendas. There is an articulation between economic ultra-liberalism with misogynistic, homophobic, xenophobic, racist, and militaristic proclivities that provoke restlessness in critical spaces that are cushioned by political authoritarianism and, above all, by unpopular economic measures that agonize the daily life of civil society. For this, the sources of Bolsonarism's anti-intellectualism are many and substantially antagonistic, as in the courage of speech and expression, fetishized by the need for contemporary authenticity, in the constant offensive of the "politically incorrect" and empty discourses, but of great impact on popular psychism in the use of jargons as "citizens of good" and in the continuous clash against the "gender ideology" (BUTLER, 2019).

The double face of the Bolsonarism is very much in the memetics (formal study of memes), concept created by Dawkins in the work "The selfish gene" due to controversies and contradictions of human culture, mainly for fusing religious ideals with the political systems that allowed the Bolsonaro, when candidate for the presidency, to use slogans like "Human Rights: manure of vagrancy" and "Brazil above all and god above all", sayings that refer to the same campaign text87 as Hitler's Nazi Germany, Deutschland über alles, which means "Germany above all". This was the conduct and political ingenuity that produced the Bolsonaro trampoline for the Central Plateau.

As a plan of government and, consequently, an affront to public universities and human rights, Bolsonaro rigorously does not detach himself from anti-intellectualism by using this device as a model operating alongside the ultraliberal economic practices of Paulo Guedes, in an undemocratic, despotic, and imposing amalgam. A recent example is the case88 of emergency aid for the population during the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, in which the government discussed the release of three installments worth R$ 200.00, but which were altered to R$ 600.00 each and approved by the Senate after pressure from opposition parties like PDT, PSB, REDE, PSOL and PT due to the growing number of deaths from the virus and the government's negligence in creating competent and functional measures against the proliferation of the disease in Brazil.

The previous fact, about the measures to prevent the spread and care for combating the new coronavirus, could (and are) dimensions in which universities89 can contribute more than they are collaborating if they were funding research and funding at the same (or higher) standard than the years 2014 and 2015 (biennium with the apex of investment in science, technology and innovation in Brazil). But it has been in uninterrupted decline since then. The greatest example of this logic is the volume of scientific production in the country, 95% of which is the responsibility of public universities, that is, the institutions that are most exposed to the attacks of the Bolsonaro government are also uniformly precarious while they hold the predominance of knowledge production in Brazil. This exposes them to the frequent greed of the world capitalist market to be privatized and become official providers of services as a means of mercantilizing knowledge. Thus, the dehumanization of Brazilian science is done, imposing professors, professor-researchers, researchers, undergraduates, postgraduates (all academic scientists) to the commercial logic of value production in the reasoning of entrepreneurial productivity and in the capitalist dialectics that science has to be a techno-scientific source.

In 2019 there were 84 thousand researchers threatened with not receiving their scholarship payments, a situation to which is added the blocking of another R$ 348 million in the Ministry of Education, the result of the budget reduction of R$ 6.1 billion - the biggest cut in the federal budget and which directly hurts the daily work and scientific production in the entire Brazilian education system, from undergraduate to graduate.

The attacks of Bolsonaro and Bolsonarist holders on universities interposed by negationism are prerogatives that appear all over the world. In 2018 in Hungary, Viktor Orbán also pressured the University of Central Europe (CEU) by forcing the institution to leave the country, which migrated its activities to Vienna, the capital of Austria, because it did not agree with "certain studies", such as gender studies, decreed as illegal in the country. In 2017, Donald Trump decided to drastically cut funding in science and research, giving priority to military and internal security funds. In India, right-wing movements like the Indian People's Party (BJP) have produced a great history of attacks on universities for "not prospering national pride" and being against focal measures for ethnic minority entry into universities. This is similar to the actions of representatives of Germany's extreme right party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland - Alternative for Germany), which since 2018 has been pressuring universities through friction with student collectives to stop the "poisoned left-wing discourse," while in neighboring Poland it has been proposed by extreme right-wing supporters that the Polish government stop mentioning the country's complicity with the holocaust on school menus.

This picture, globally, develops in Brazilian political form through two projects. Both are in progress in the federal government, and one of them is also being discussed in detail at state and municipal levels. The Escola Sem Partido (ESP) project is the most advanced, and only in the federal congress, the Future-se program (SILVA JÚNIOR; FARGONI, 2019a; SILVA JÚNIOR; FARGONI, 2020).

The ESP originated long before the Bolsonaro government, but it gains strength in the impetus of the anti-intellectual governance bolsonarist through allies inserted mainly in the evangelical bench. They try to impose a mix of Macarthism or inquisition on the autonomy of the pedagogical work of the teachers of basic education with the intention of arriving at the execution of the teaching work in higher education. For Silva Júnior and Fargoni (2019b), the School Without a Party reinforces the uncritical horizon of people because it reduces or ceases the exploitation of classroom debates while dehumanizing human formation by distancing students from reflections on the reality and the world in which they live.

The strategy of silencing education incorporates the maintenance of a social system of exclusionary character, providing the poor majority mediated by the educational practice to supply the operational segments, without spreading criticism to the subjects, removing them from the debate on politics, economics and other themes in the educational process due to penalization of the educators. It is the censorship of emancipation by the ambition of capital control (...) in expelling the working class from politics from the school. (SILVA JÚNIOR; FARGONI, 2019b, p. 76).

In another degree, in higher education, is the project that deals with ESP, but with overwhelming power in different fields. The Institutes and Universities of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Program - Future-se is the largest project that begins the end of the state public university in Brazil. Presented as a "solution" for a Brazilian university through a futuristic aesthetic, the program has no commitment to the facts of the reality of higher education and scientific production in Brazil. All ordered by the political collusion of the stock market that antagonistically puts the country "as an excellent market for the merchandise of higher education, another attraction for the financial capital of the world" (SILVA JÚNIOR, 2017, p. 233). The rationality of Future-se has as a profound change in the form of the episteme of Brazilian science and leads the IFES to privatization. Exposing them to the model of financial autonomy and tightening with global corporations, resulting in the transformation of the IFES into Social Organizations (SO)90 dependent on the private sector selling services.

In the trajectory of the project, the former Minister of Education Abraham Weintraub, ideologically aligned with the form of Bolsonarism to govern, attacked public universities, teachers and servants, defaming them. Verbal aggressions and other provocations of a fascist nature contributed to his resignation for insulting the ministers of the Supreme Court when he said that: "For me I put all these bums in jail, starting with the STF.

In an attempt to undermine the credibility and quality of the IFES by verbally attacking democratic spaces, Weintraub - in other words, calling the academic experience "mess" - affirmed his fascist figure basing his position on the fact that the free form of expression and progressive discourses are "doctrinal. For the former minister, Future will enable the university to advance in modernity by appearing as a seller of overqualified knowledge, while other areas of study, historically focused on questioning the status quo, such as the humanities, will be de-legitimized by the anti-intellectualists through cutting back or persecuting professors.

Final Considerations

We began our reflection punctuating the Brazilian political conjuncture in the Dilma government until its impeachment. This discussion was necessary to understand what contributed in the popular intellect to the marked dissatisfactions of a people who, instead of rationalizing the political facts and the economic decline, sought support by approaching the delirium of fascist ideals. We spoke of Michel Temer's passage into the presidency of the republic, returning to ruinous reforms that dehydrated workers' rights and his transition to the Bolsonaro government that officially sealed the pact of Brazilian necropolitics as the pact between fascists and ultraliberals.

Here it is relevant to highlight those who defend neo-liberals. The end of the financial predominance regime (SILVA JÚNIOR, 2017) gave rise to capitalism based on social indebtedness. What is this regime of accumulation that succeeds financial predominance? It consists of making citizens indebted and committing their future life time to capital. This accumulation regime in Brazil is the result of all governments prior to Bolsonaro, without exception. A simple example. A dinner paid with a credit card imposes on the commensal to pledge a life time that he has not yet lived intended for work to pay for the dinner. But where does Paulo Guedes' despair of change lie? In the continuity of the reforms. This is where necropolitics develops as a pact between fascists and neo-liberals. The pension reform is an exemplary case. The new generations of workers and many of the current ones will pay a type of public or private pension for approximately 40 years to be able to enjoy, if not die, the well paid. When workers enter the labor market they already incur a long-term debt, without the corresponding capital of at least showing them the goods bought for their debt.

If tax and fiscal reforms continue like this, they will have the same rationality. Here Paulo Guedes embraces Bolsonaro in a death pact for workers, between fascists and neo-liberals. We also argue that this regime of accumulation, already unstable in its origin, does not admit protests in favor of life. And so it demands a fascist state on the periphery. At this point one can raise an explanatory hypothesis for the expansion of totalitarianism around the world, it is the deepest crisis of capitalism and it will make the devil to reduce the cost of living labor.

We also emphasize the configuration of Bolsonarism and the interference of the ideology of Bolsonarism in Brazilian society, producing an inhuman chain of pulverization of human rights and science in Brazil. We assumed the contradictions of the Bolsonarism against the democratic rule of law, in an empowerment that forged the Brazilian ultra-direct, joined in nostalgia for the oppression of the Brazilian military regime and in the spoiling neoliberalism of the United States. This regime legitimizes itself in the behavior of the "faithful" and Bolsonarist fanatics for the president's anti-rights speeches.

We speak of the desolation of Brazilian science, which a few years ago contained the hope of a promising future through pre-salt funds and the horizon for investments in research, technology, and innovation without nullifying the presence of the humanities. This picture was discontinued in 2016 with the departure of Dilma and is broken with the anti-intellectual policy of Bolsonaro. And in the face of so many obstacles, such as constitutional limits to the actions of the MEC, the government that has been waging a permanent war against universities announced Weintraub's resignation on June 18, 2020. A fact that could be considered a victory for Brazilian progressives, but knowing the ideological structure of fascism in Bolsonarism, the battle has only changed levels and educators in Brazil in the midst of a pandemic will continue the saga of "waiting"; of the vaccine for the virus that haunts the planet (COVID-19) and of the psychic resistance to maintain the ludic and lucid opposition in times of rapid destruction of rights.

The historical fact Bolsonarism is another form of authoritarianism in the history of Brazil. It is also another expression of the authoritarian personality91(ADORNO, 1995) that emerges in the face of the deep crisis of capitalism92 since 2008. Since it was once sustained by the various crises alluded to here, it has been manipulated by the sense of uncertainty and anti-democratic ideals. The spread of false news against political opponents and the partnership with the Brazilian bourgeoisie that found in Bolsonaro the opportunity to ideologically apparel the state mechanisms, making it the representative of the existing hierarchies.

We have concluded that Bolsonarism is another form of authoritarianism in a peripheral country and always caudatory to the world economic center. It has brought the nation and the population the fine line between hatred and fear by transfiguring Human Rights into the role of caring for human integrity as a rival of society. It has turned teachers into villains in Brazil's recent history and left the country further adrift from globalized financial capital. The concept of family, religion, discipline, authority and ethics are now confused with the standard of being in a multifaceted and diverse society. The flirtations of Bolsonarism with fascism and Nazism are no longer principles, they are a concrete symbiosis in different times.

But for hope to remain alive in times of confinement and social isolation under a proto-fascist regime, music, poetry, films and books are good alternatives and devices to preserve mental health. In an unequal country like Brazil not everyone reads classic works or scientific articles. Mobile devices make this possible, but popular entertainment acts more as alienator than emancipator. For this, we socialize hopes through the words of educators, sociologists and philosophers, professional intellectuals who for the former minister of education Weintraub do not deserve "his" (public fund) money. Therefore, as Carl Sagan (1995) said, not explaining science seems perverse to me. Because when someone is in love, they want to tell everyone.

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Received: July 10, 2020; Accepted: August 18, 2020

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