Introduction

It is intended to reflect on the paths taken by pedagogical thinking, considering the process of internalization of moral values as fundamental in the educational path, justified as necessary to a supposed ‘human evolution’ and the legitimation of Western society. For this, we use the educational theories of four important authors for Pedagogy: Amos Comenius (1592-1670), Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827), Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) and Emile Durkheim (1858-1917).

Working as a counterpoint of these reflections, we sought in Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and in his immersion on the theme of morality, to understand the historical process of dissemination and legitimation of these values, based on the criticism he made to the type of thought established in Western society. We seek to understand how the definition of certain concepts and logic underlies contemporary education, highlighting the primacy that these authors safeguard the moral issue, basing it as a primary objective of the educational process.

We intend to highlight the selected theoretical and conceptual clipping comprising them as references for the various pedagogical theories that substantiate, legitimize and reaffirm the scientific paradigm established in Western society. This classic paradigm is established from some premises and, throughout history, has been legitimized by other theories. As a focus of this paper, we seek to think about the process of internalization of moral values in society, the predominance and primacy of these goals in pedagogical theories. It is important to emphasize, initially, discourses related to a religious morality, with values and premises related to divine order and family precepts.

Over time, we see the moral aspect seek ways of transformation in the scientific sphere and based on social discourses, collective thinking. It is understood as relevant, the discussion insofar as behaviors that are acquired and taken as ‘internal of the subject’, are effected, however, as an external imposition. As we discuss below, education for morality was accomplished with clear objectives, determined as artifices of constitution and production of subjectivities. There are a number of explanations in which man has been submerged during his history. Morality established as a model of rationality in the West has imprisoned us in only one possibility of explanation of things; explanation to which we must submit, almost always in the face of strategies of domination. Initially, we will seek to highlight the main characteristics of the chosen pedagogical theories, emphasizing the process of internalization of moral values and their importance for the given authors. Next, we will look at the reflections made by F. Nietzsche on the systems of reproduction and legitimation of moral values, in order to understand their real intentions and their main controversies.

Discussion: the western rationalist model, the pedagogical theory and the education for morality

The establishment of the rationalist model as the guiding principle of Western thought, linked moral values as fundamental instances of the education of the individual, not only as constituent elements, but as priorities and objectives of the educational process. It is intended to demonstrate here the constitution of this model through the clipping of some important pedagogical theories, considered as fundamental for Pedagogy. We can also see the transitions suffered in the speeches, their interlacing and refinements, from Comenius to Durkheim, and Pestalozzi and Herbart.

The exercise of power through the establishment of truths is evidenced initially in religious discourses and in the preaching of a supposed process of human ‘improvement/evolution’, which in its nature protects primitive, depraved, savage, and barbaric instincts. The school then appears with the function of regenerating, granting humanity, saving the species, regulating and framing deviant individuals.

With the delegitimation of the church as the ultimate authority of power, the concerns will turn to the guarantee of new truths - the scientific criteria, the perpetuation of the social model, the strengthening of capital. Christian values, however, remained present in all pedagogical discourses, being refined and dissolved in other logics and strategies over time. In this context, we question the moralizing use that the school intends to make since its conception, which evidences the imposition of clear interests and the need, in times of crisis of values, to review established models and evidence moral pluralization, which opposes the attempts of a universalization.

Comenius' didactica magna - education as a means of salvation

Iohannes Amos Comenius (1592/1670) is an important name in Pedagogy due to his attempts to initiate a didactic systematization, as well as to establish as a primary objective of his writings the elaboration of a universal method of teaching ‘everything to everyone’. While Protestant bishop has in his speech strong Biblical influence and of religious references, however, was considered integral of the movement that sought to break with the medieval education, being located in century XVII, beginning of Modernity.

The work ‘Didactica Magna’ (1627), marked by the pedagogical and didactic systematization, preserves the urgency of its time: the need to adapt to the emergence of the mercantile bourgeoisie in European cities and the free interpretation of religious texts. It also gains notoriety due to the innovative position of thinking about childhood and its pedagogisation, where children not only participate but define themselves as an opportunity for regeneration of society; “[...] little children have all the simplest and most apt faculties to receive the remedies which divine mercy offers for the healing of human things in such a deplorable state” (^{Comenius, 2001}, § 17).

It stands out in the writings of Comenius the idea of the childlike mind as edification, which starts from the construction of essential foundations. It will, therefore, be considered a pioneer also in the elaboration of theories of the infantile functioning, that would later be deepened by the Psychology of the Development. His emphasis is also on the importance of early study, in early childhood training, in an attempt to achieve greater and more agile satisfaction of the goals.

This feeling for childhood was a condition of possibility for a new understanding that emerged between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, progressing during the four centuries of Modern Pedagogy. It is inherent in him the projection of a supposed human salvation by the educational route, which would be realized from the formation of an infant apt to the obedience. Due to the deplorable state that man is immersed after years of contact with society, the infant body, sooner and later, would then need to be tamed so as to take care of its hygiene, food, expression, etc. (^{Nicolay, 2011}).

Moral education in Comenius has strong common features with Christian values and metaphysics, considering earthly life a ‘preparation for eternal life’. The great promise of this author is to make Christianity inseparable from Didactics, and education is an extension of this doctrine. The school, for him, is like a ‘workshop of humanity’ that needs a linearity, universality, continuity, from the maternal to the academic life. A man without education is considered barbaric, savage, not possessing the possibility of reaching the heavens.

The visible world, from every part that looks at itself, attests that it was not created for any other purpose than to serve for multiplication, for food, and for the education of mankind [...] that schools are reformed so as to minister to the spirits an exact and universal culture, so it is not surprising that with the radiance of the divine light, more easily those who can not be awakened by the sound of the divine trumpet [...] the greater the activity which in this life is expended for the sake of instruction, virtue, and piety, the closer we come to the ultimate end. Therefore, these three things are the essential work of our life; everything else is accessory, stumbling, misleading appearance. (^{Comenius, 2001}, §3, §7, §9).

Among these values prevails the understanding of sacrifice as a mean of salvation and the soul as a divine instance, which must always prevail to the detriment of the body. For him, the material world was created to serve as a school for men, who need to cross the ‘degrees of preparation for eternity’, which are: to know oneself, to govern oneself and to turn to God.

In this context, it is necessary to align three mental faculties: the intelligence to differentiate things, the will to choose things and the memory or consciousness for future use. At the same time, modern ideals are already being gestated and the first discoveries attributed to the scientist emerge. The beginning of anthropocentric ideas underlies the ideals of progress, of order and civility, and makes the transmission of culture necessary for all, including the poor, so that they can obey the government prudently. It is evident in the thought of Comenius the effort to reconcile science and faith, and scientific procedures are considered instruments of use to reach the divine plan. It is in the interest of this educational model to create a universal wisdom, which would be responsible for the general knowledge of sacred writings.

Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi: the universalization of education and the values of affection

The nineteenth century carried out profound changes in the foundations of Pedagogy, in view of those that are under a civilizational mission of educational universalization. The work chosen as a cut of this reflection is entitled ‘Letters on the education of children’, published between 1818 and 1819. His fame in the educational field was based on his concern for the education of the popular classes and his philanthropic effort, preaching the values of the Enlightenment as fundamental guiding principles. The influence of Kant and Rousseau and his philosophical eclecticism is also clear.

Throughout the literary work it is possible to identify the prominent place that Pestalozzi imposes on the maternal figure, seen as an irreplaceable supporting role. Childhood also has a prominent place in this work, and that childhood is what needs to be praised, developed, discovered, protected and observed. The development of the infant spirit brings a series of trials to the maternal figure, showing the moral character that safeguards this responsibility. A series of affections are required as constituents of this role, attributing to the female figure an uninterrupted dedication to this ideal of child.

Our great goal is the development of the infant spirit and, our great way, the performance of the mothers. A more important question then appears at the forefront of our investigation. Does the mother have the necessary qualities for the duties and exercises we impose? [...] every mother who is aware of her task, I presume she is willing to dedicate herself to it with zeal ... this natural goodness of disposition and her benevolent invariable attention, never fails to produce this appropriate effect: gently with other men obtained the secret of reaching the affection of all [...] God gave his son a spiritual nature; that is, he implanted the voice of conscience in it, and He did more: He gave him the power to hear that voice. He gave him some eyes whose natural direction is to heaven; only show him the elevation of his destiny, and that he will break with all affinity with the lower creatures, whose low gaze speaks expressively of the earth, the one which they incline to (^{Pestalozzi, 2006}, Letter II, III, IV).

Despite understanding the family as the primordial nucleus that makes possible the insertion of other social institutions in the life of the subject, the school is considered essential in the process of development of the infant spirit. Linked to the weight that the author imposes on motherhood, considering that mothers are the first ‘moral educators’, we reflect on the characteristics described as expected for the teaching function, and that until today, composes the stereotyped universe of the profession: the affection, the care, the warmth, the infantile treatment, the love.

Characteristics that once formed the private imaginary of the female gender were transposed to the teaching function, being collected discretion, modesty, submission of those who dared to enter the school space. There exists in Pestalozzi's pedagogy a subliminal catechetical function, which protects itself from being only a divine visualization, but which structures itself with the same moral values and previous models of legitimation. Values considered as ‘superior’, but that are part of a process of docilization of the subject, which strengthens the appearance of weak feelings, which weaken the power and strength of the singularity (^{Nietzsche, 1998}).

The child is obedient, active, loving and we could almost say discreet and pious, before being taught to understand the nature or the merit of these virtues [...] in the child it gives an anticipation of the feeling of tranquility and complacency that is the reward of a renunciation of our own desires, of a subordination of all our hopes and aspirations under the supreme principles of love and faith. This act of renunciation, no matter how insignificant its immediate goal, is the conscious and regulated exercise of self-denial (^{Pestalozzi, 2006}, Letter VI).

Again, the effect of these feelings is on the domestication of the subject, in view of the ‘supreme principles’ that need to be defined and preserved. The ideals of freedom present at the time seek to integrate the individual to a social function that was destined to him, according to the needs of industrial and liberal societies. This freedom must then be committed to the social world and made possible by the acquisition of a trade that is useful to society.

Pestalozzi is also deeply influenced by European Romanticism, centered on the ideas of culture, which is seen as the full realization of the potential of the human spirit. For Pestalozzi, the supreme end of education is a moral aim, which aims to unite the natural desire for collective law, and to transpose a libertarian feeling, but with internal meanings that impel the subject to act obligatory. It is the idea of the autonomy of the subject as the center of interest that enshrines the rational subject as a properly autonomous subject. The social state, therefore, will impose limitations on the natural state.

The educated subject will be moralized through discipline and the use of reason, until he can acquire his autonomous freedom. The function of the pedagogue, for Pestalozzi, is to produce the meeting of the sensible desire with the social reason, seeking to balance the three elements: heart (dominated by passions, nature wins only with work); the hands (where the man's doing is located); the head (where the true power is). This shows the metaphysical and rationalistic influences of the thought in which he was inserted, which makes him see the body and the mind in a fragmented way.

John Friedrich Herbart and the government of children

John Friedrich Herbart (1776-1784) was a follower of Pestalozzi, who exercised activities in Switzerland and Germany and stood out for the academic character he gave to Pedagogy. Clinging to psychological science he sought to systematize his pedagogical theories by relying on a practical philosophy. Reflecting on the work ‘General Pedagogy’ published in 1806, in the nineteenth century, one can see his dedication to understanding the mental functioning of subjects. Herbart was a pioneer in speaking about the representations, contained in all mental life, composed of energies and which may be associated, juxtaposed or disguised.

These are clues that would reverberate, after a time, in the ideas of Freud's unconscious. Herbart shares and legitimizes the thoughts discussed earlier, seeing morality as the ultimate goal of education. In this way, it establishes three aspects as central tasks in the educational process: the government of children, the constitution of a multiple interest and the development of the moral force of character. Moral judgments are, for him, particular aesthetic judgments, which are established on the basis of the approval or disapproval of the values of each situation or fact.

The educational intervention needs to inhabit the strength of the character of morality, therefore, the form of the will, the presentation of the desire. Again, the internalization of moral values will follow deeper and deeper degrees of instruction, which take the memory as a source for establishing a modeled behavioral ‘choice’. Children's government refers to a macro goal of making moral a wild, unwilling, wild, unruly nature of tendencies considered ‘rude’ (^{Santos & Alves, 2018}). It is necessary, then, to stifle the natural and primitive instincts, and it is necessary to focus increasingly early and prolonged, so that subjects do not orient their wills in a contrary sense to that of society.

[...] it is not possible to give a single class without holding, with firm but gentle hand, the reins of government [...] the child comes into the world devoid of will and therefore incapable of any moral relation […] first, the child does not develop an authentic will capable of making decisions, but only a wild impulse that drags it [...] which is a principle of disorder itself [...] this impetuosity must be subjugated [...] submission is through power and power has to be strong enough and repeated as often as necessary to be successful, before the traits of self-will manifest in the child (^{Herbart, 2003}, p. 29-30).

Increasingly precocious and lasting, the power that governs the government of children needs measures to keep it uninterrupted. The principles are regulated under the logic of rational supremacy and the maintenance of order, emphasizing the need for continuous work of internalization of values. The threat is the first measure described by Herbart, noting the difficulties contained in this mode of persuasion, which has an effect on some bodies, but finds resistance in infantile ‘recklessness’. A second measure is authority, opposed to singular decisions, and which, like morality, requires the control of instincts and rationalist primacy. Finally, love, which is based on the habit to build affective and social relationships, prioritizing the control and composure of emotions. As a follower of Pestalozzi, he uses affective questions and his psychological understandings to establish the places contained in these relationships and the subjects who can potentially exercise the measures: the father, as authority and the mother, as love.

The first measure of the entire government is the threat, and the whole government finds two difficulties here [...] there are strong natures that despise any threat by daring everything to be able to want everything [...] there is an even greater majority that is weak too much to memorize the threat, fear being overcome by desire [...] The spirit bows before authority, which opposes the singular movement of the spirit, and thus serves very well to master a forming will that could be erroneous [...] authority, however, is acquired only through the supremacy of the spirit. This supremacy, as we know, can not be reduced to regulations. It has to exist for itself, independently of education [...] Love is based on the harmony of feelings and habit, from which it is explained at once how difficult it is for a stranger to conquer it [...] Authority naturally belongs to the father, to whom all follow and to whom everyone turns ... love naturally belongs to the mother, who, with sacrifices of all kinds, learns as anyone to peer and understand the needs of the child (^{Herbart, 2003}, p. 34-36).

Herbart still distinguishes what he considers two spheres of educational action: instruction, which has the function of ordering and bringing together the fragmented knowledges of human experience in the world, conveying representations present in this reality and perfecting useful skills and capacities; and education, which is concerned more fully with the formation and improvement of human character. It defines character as a mode of decision, the “[…] form of the will […]” (^{Herbart, 2003}, p. 145), the decisive factor for choices, which need recourse to a memory of the will; “[…] where there is the memory of the will, the choice itself will be decided” (^{Herbart, 2003}, p. 149).

Ideas like ‘justice and good’ need to become, for the author, objects of the will, contents of the personality and the subjective character. To become ‘moral men’ it is necessary to form for activity and for property, developing in this process, a certain aesthetic sense. It also introduces in the educational discussion the concept of discipline. This appears as a direct and indirect action in the soul of the young, in the formation of character; is similar, but not equal to the government. Discipline causes or impedes feelings and establishes itself as a constant and coordinated exercise, with the intention of ‘forming’. Associated with discipline is, no longer force, but more subtle and subjective techniques, which also permeate the body, regulate the feeling, and which relate to subordination. Imposing control as a rule through threats, discourses, commandments, which acts directly under the soul, which provokes or impede feelings; this has proved to be much more effective in governing children.

To bear with indifference is named habit. The indifferent rejection of what was formerly customary is brought on by withdrawal [...] Discontent is brought on by pressure, which can be called an obligation, whenever it is opposed to any insubordination, even within. It is called a reward or punishment for a given act of stimulation or pressure, determined by a certain motivation on the part of the learner, and should be considered his response […] (^{Herbart, 2003}, p. 183-184).

Herbart is based on the scientific discourse, directly influenced by the Psychology and Positivism of the time and seeks to refine the process of internalization of moral values, with new strategies and new statements. The discipline as a constantly updated functional element, which is now internalized, becoming part of the subject reverberates in echo and inner censorship; “[...] only the force of inner censure feels the one who has attained respect for oneself and fears to lose something” (Herbart, 2003, p. 188).

Emile Durkheim and society's primacy of singularity

Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) is another theoretician who bases the educational bases and who understands education as an act of transmission of social morality. Durkheim writes in a context of war and the postwar period, where the expansion of industrial capitalism was in shock with the workers' awareness, which at that time reflected on socialist thesis and Marxism.

Durkheim's theories are better understood when considered historically and in accordance with his social-theoretical position of the French bourgeoisie. He reflected on the need to unite people and to value modern industrial ideals, thinking about the maintenance and functioning of the social structure. According to the liberal capitalist ideology, the Durkheim’s theory contains strong social determinism. Its importance, however, is undeniable as a mark of the Human and Social sciences.

As a percussion of Sociology and under the influence of Positivism, Durkheim seeks to apply his scientific vision to the facts of social reality. The social fact is defined by Durkheim as any phenomenon that is born in society and has an effect on the individual. The social fact is then, the primordial object of Sociology. Reflecting on his manuscripts of education, which are mainly contained in the book ‘^{Education and Pedagogy: Essays and Controversies’ (1998}), we see Durkheim's gaze on the coercive forces that determine the conduct of individuals. He is clearly interested in the mechanisms of social control and, on this, he invests and investigates.

Education is, for Durkheim, an eminently social thing, which has in the social its ultimate end and which corresponds the way used by society to realize in its members an ideal that is its own. From this, education is one of the priority instruments for society, in view of the need to assure its bases of existence and continuity. Society, for him, is a living organism, constituted of organs that are its structure and that seeks to realize in its members, its ideals. It understands the man in his natural state as a selfish being, who needs a process of extinguishing these feelings. This process would be an educational action, which reproduces values essential to society and also transmits different knowledge. The educational action in Durkheim has a normative form, which must be governed by a ‘social brain’ (state), in a work of colonization: from the individual self to the social self. For him, only the group could regulate the individual latent appetites, in order to ensure a common good. The goals set for the School comprise the social being as that formed in the learning of the spirit of the discipline, in the bonding of the groups and in the autonomy of the will. Again, the will is understood as the correspondent of the introjection of values external to the subject, requiring that the individual ‘wants the moral for himself’.

Education, therefore, places the child in the grip of his passions; infuses him with courage, by itself forces him to subordination ... while the child is an anarchist species, ignorant of all rewards, all restraint, all accompaniment, is a small traditionalist and routine. Was it caused to reproduce many times a movement? He will reproduce it eternally (^{Durkheim, 1998}, p. 20-27).

The formation of the subject needs to focus on the coordination of acts, on the regulation and domination of affections, on the fulfillment of social norms, on the taste for discipline and orderly conduct, and especially on the formation of habits; “Self-control, the power to restrain itself, to regulate itself, to retain itself, is one of the essential characteristics of the human being” (^{Durkheim, 1998}, p. 26). Although moral discourse is strongly present in this theory, Durkheim seeks to move away from a religious morality and the confusion created by this duality (moral/religion), understanding the need to make pedagogical and human environments more scientific.

Therefore, it emphasizes the importance of a ‘secular moral’, which seeks to satisfy the human essential brought in religions, but in other ways. The whole moral life of man is then governed by a system of rules, principles, maxims, which are generally related to technique, to the history of past and useful experiences. We submit to this system expecting advantageous results, because it was consecrated as an alternative that guaranteed its value of principle. For an act to be moral it is necessary that it be performed in a certain way, that the rule orders and that, necessarily, it feels ‘respect to the duty’. We emphasize the position of superiority in which ^{Durkheim (1998}) sees society in relation to the individual, making clear the movement of generations, but permanence of society as a human legislator, as something far superior to the individual. By acting morally, we leave in a certain way, to attend something that is not ours, something that dominates and overlaps us (^{Durkheim, 1998}, p. 40).

So if societies are mortal, it is no less true that their existence is extremely longer than that of the individual. Generations pass, society remains. His life is not counted for days, for weeks, for years; is counted for centuries. Consequently, over time, too, it surpasses the individual. It is also a moral power, because collectivity is the system formed by all individual consciousness in the present and the past. It surpasses the individual in space, but also exceeds it from the point of view of moral wealth. Therefore, there is less civilization in individual consciousness, less morality than in totality, and none of them are assimilated in their totality.

It centers on the adult figure - the rational and Cartesian subject - who will be the agent of moral formation. The function of the educator is, then, to form citizens capable of maintaining social harmony, always directing the class as a group. The so-called humanity characteristic is acquired only in contact with this society, with its morality and with the educational process, considering everything that forms our consciousness as ‘the recognized and accessible human part’ and citing as examples the language and the science.

For the teaching of morality to be possible, it is necessary to keep the notion of society intact, understanding it as a source of legislating and legitimating power, source of strength, which is why we must love it (^{Durkheim, 1998}). Considering the superior part of man as that which is external to him, but which surpasses it, superimposes it and dominates it, its uniqueness is something that must from an early age, be undermined, in favor of a structurally harmonious collective life.

Nietzsche and the critical of moral values: the resentment and morality of the weak

In order to think about the use of morality as a guiding principle, which throughout history has established itself as a fundamental objective of educational theory and practice, we have sought to question the bases, purposes, intentions of the internalization of moral culture. The traditional project of education was marked by discourses of universality, objectivity and authority, built on religious and then scientific bases, which aimed at a passive process of conformation of thought, subjection and convincing of young people, in which they lived. The senses and appreciation of childhood also differed during the four centuries of Modern Pedagogy. These arguments were legitimized by several theorists of Education, some of them mentioned in this brief reflection.

What is falling is not the logical rational model of discourse, but the value of truth attributed to it, or rather, that which falls, is the idea of truth as a guiding value of conduct [...] the interpretation of the world that revolves around an orbit capable of making thinking always follow the same ideas: identity, causality, non-contradiction, truth (^{Mosé, 2018}, p. 109).

We sought in Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) reflections on philosophical methods and their unconditional wills of truth, including the constitution of moral values as the primary basis for the constitution of the Human and Social sciences. In the book ‘Genealogy of Morals’ (1887), the philosopher seeks to make a genealogical reflection about the constitution of moral values in the West, its origin, its genesis. In his view, it is necessary to distinguish two types of constituted morality: the moral of the weak and the moral of the nobles. Types which clash of forces is constant and permanent and lie under an immanent plane of chaotic lines. These pathways alternate in their domains at every moment, but they are forms of life, which need to expand and become dominant to the others.

All naturalism in morality, that is, all healthy morals, is dominated by an instinct of life... The unnatural morality, that is, almost all morality hitherto taught, venerated and preached, turns, on the contrary, precisely against the instincts of life - is a condemnation, sometimes secret, sometimes noisy and insolent, of these instincts (^{Nietzsche, 2006}, p. 36).

For ^{Nietzsche (2006}), the moral of the weak is established predominantly in Western culture, which extrapolates the individual dimension and makes it social. Resentment is then a reactive feeling that imposes itself as a barrier and impediment to direct contact between man and life. It derives from a human attempt to overcome his impotence and physical weakness, creating for himself a transcendental and imaginary world. Within this metaphysical logic, we also create the values that are defined by the judgments of the time, but which are naturalized as essential: the good, the true, the good…

Moral, metaphysical and Christian doctrine become inseparable things, which generates psychic-physical phenomena that turn into great social problems: resentment, bad conscience/guilt and ascetic ideals of degeneration of life. There is, for ^{Nietzsche (1998}), a process of ‘self-diminution’ of man, which strips him of his instinctive nature, which internalizes guilt and resentment, using a social psychology that discourses on the control of affections, the materiality, the sacrifice, the chastity, etc. His critique of Modernity focuses precisely on the fundamental aspects that pervade the internalization of the values of this slave morality, related to the notions of will, justice, autonomy, free will, freedom.

Fruit of memory and language, consciousness is a database connected in network, moved by a being who feels excessively and wants even more. Consciousness is the internalization, through memory, of the communication network that begins to establish itself among humans [...] consciousness is, finally, a set of concepts, values, hierarchies [...] a misunderstanding, a machine of inversion of forces that starts to fight against itself [...] a process of self-punishment that originates in the attempt to deny oneself, the body, the instincts (^{Mosé, 2018}, p. 122-124).

The concepts of will and memory brought forward by the authors of Pedagogy must be problematized here: this will is not considered as something autonomous or experiential, but rather as something introjected into the subject, that after the internalization of moral values, will choose ‘by himself’ his subjection. ‘Governing oneself’ refers to this subjection, which will need to be so deep and ingrained, that from a certain point it will be given as a choice/option of the subject.

The conception of memory for ^{Nietzsche (1998}) arises from the need to make man a foreseeable animal, a being ‘trustworthy’ to the community, being directly bound to the obligation to keep promises, to give his word, and to obey moral norms and values. The spontaneous way of acting, where there was room for forgetfulness, gives place to the containment of the instincts and impulses that turn inwards like reactive force, which generates the resentment. The development of the ability to not forget is also correlated with the emergence of a bad conscience. Culture or the ‘morality of customs’ (^{Nietzsche, 1998}), in its formative task, performs a contractual relationship with man. In addition to morality, this bad conscience stems from the gregarious human need, which facilitated their living conditions as social groups were formed; “[...] individuality is unconscious, it is the obscure root from which our psychological presentiment judges to see the emergence of what manifests itself in man always differently, according to circumstances” (^{Herbart, 2003}, §27).

Gregariousness is understood as the tendency that leads men or animals to come together, being built up during the history of mankind. The ethics of manners is, therefore, the long period of human prehistory reserved for the sacrifice of individuality in the name of the collectivity, where there were no autonomous individuals, which still preserves deep resonances in our daily lives. Greyness is one of Nietzsche's characteristics responsible for the degeneration of culture in view of the intense domestication of the masses, who create for themselves illusions of autonomy and freedom, when in fact they remain trapped in the collectivity (^{Nicolay, 2011}).

It is noted in all authors ideas about the primacy of society over the singularity, relating the pedagogical process to a ‘evolution from the natural to the social’, in which the dissimilar, the different, the particular must become the similar, the common, the usual. It is in the discourse of equality and universality that, then, one gives off hatred and injury to everything that is different; it is in the so-called ‘autonomy of the will’ that fixed ideas resides that hypnotize and limit our action in the world.

To link truth, the Self identifies its creative drive, its individual differences, its singularity, to an evil, and to struggle against itself, while seeking to be common, to be herd, to be normal. Individual difference is an evil, thinks the modern human. Singularity is a deviation from normality, a disease (^{Mosé, 2018}, p. 127).

It is necessary to look at the primitive hatred, at the impulse of destruction that surrounds contemporary society, reviewing our foundations. Before us, the demands of the modern capitalist project are shattered, demonstrating the need for a new ethical discourse. The solution to the question of resentment and the other feelings internalized during schooling runs through a critical revision of disseminated morality and legitimized values, intending to create better conditions for the strengthening of the human condition and recognition of the present chaos in existence (^{Paschoal, 2008}). In times of ruptures with the metaphysical and pluralizing traditions of the world, it is necessary to think of a moral pluralization, opposing the universality of values and prioritizing their temporariness.

Conclusion

The objectives that justify the discussions here do not mean an opposition between education and moral values. Appraising corresponds to the process of relating to the world giving it meaning - a process of building values is an educational process. It is understood that subjectivities are constituted inside and outside the moral field and that this field is not alien or should be non-existent in school. It was intended to demonstrate, however, how the moral field has been reduced to a process of disciplining, ordering, restraint of bodies, according to predetermined models, virtues and values. This evidences the limited pedagogical perspective of the moral field, which from its conception responds to interests and prioritizes the maintenance of the status quo (^{Ponce, 2009}).

We seek to reflect on this temporal way that establish the universal and compulsory educational model in the West, based on the idea of education as a field responsible for human improvement, being initially guided by Christian morals, which, over time, restructures into a civilizing and then scientific moral. In Comenius, in the 17^th century, there was the beginning of didactic systematization and the foundation of the idea of childhood; in Pestallozi, the philanthropic evangelization effort and the formulation of the stereotypes that surround the teaching profession, including gender aspects. Herbart, already part of the 19^th century Enlightenment imaginary, is based on scientific discourses evoking the importance of controlling passions and the need to shape the will, through subjective discipline. Durkheim, on the other hand, understands that the means of sustaining the notion of an intact social structure runs through moral values transmission, prioritizing an education of the will and the establishment of habits.

In short, these authors share the understanding of education as an instrument of subjectification and internalization of current moral values and help to legitimized ideas that are mentioned here as those of a supposed elevation of the human spirit through the Education: of a mediocre spirit to the social ideal of subject. This process will take place through the submission of the instincts, the emotions and the body, linked to the moral values prevailing in society at a given time.

The correct act does not preexist in the form of prescriptions that education would have as a portfolio to transfer to the students. Education, therefore, can not generate in students a complete set of dispositions (virtues) aimed at justice, respect or solidarity. In other words, it is not through education that one becomes righteous. What education can do is open the students to the world of moral action through a pedagogical/ reflexive/ communicative process regarding the moral propositions that integrate the cultural environment. Yet the introduction of the student into the moral world and his acquaintance with culturally established expectations of behavior (norms) does not mean that he will actually behave in conformity therewith ... concrete action and behavior take place, in the context of multiple circumstances and determinations, which constantly reframe the general moral principles (^{Goergen, 2001}, p. 6-7).

The process of the internalization of moral values corresponds to a path towards the self-willed subject. ‘To love authority’ is to put oneself spontaneously as part of a great gear, which is directed to the formation of habits and the regulation of character. In the ascetic-religious view adopted at one point by Pedagogy, the world is the expression of ‘sin’ and transgression. Through a long process of defamation of the sensible world, we find ourselves estranged from our potency of life, which has generated us decaying feelings and weakening. We must carry out a countermovement, the problematization of the so-called sacred values and the strengthening of the singularity.