Introduction

Dialoguing with a thinker like Hannah Arendt, thinking from her categories of analysis on topics and problems that she never thought of is a delicate task. What Arendt guides us is to rethink, for example, the concept of politics, which has long been re-signified and taken the strictly legal forms. The thinker rescues the essence of the term, which refers to Greek thinkers, for whom politics is identical to action. So, “[...] in politics, action, by expressing the free condition of men, is not guided by predetermined intentions, it is spontaneous and expresses the human capacity to create and found new political realities” (^{Nascimento, 2008}, p. 60). We then try to describe some of the concepts of Hannah Arendt, which we consider fundamental to compose this article, such as: politics, public space and authority, in order to analyze the current conjecture and the status of the discipline of philosophy in high school. The telos of the article aims to describe the discipline of philosophy as an important part in the formation of the subject who, in their Becoming (in power), will act in the world that is left to them as an inheritance.

Therefore, it is worth noting that, in Educational Policy Research, normative documents are commonly used to do the analysis in the field and, thus, we used them for the analysis and construction of this study. These documents used are of the following orders: federal laws such as Law No. 9,394 that establishes the basic guidelines of education - Laws of Guidelines and Bases of Education (LDB), the reports of the National Education Plan (PNE) from 2014 to 2018, Law No. 13,415 of the High School counter-reform, the National curricular parameters for High School (PCNs) and the National Common Curricular Base (BNCC).

As the statutory and constitutional changes are modified, added, and excluded several times and very quickly, it is necessary to constantly update the content, and special attention to the historical context in which the document is produced, because this tends to reveal much more than the signs presented in the documents. Hence, another methodological dimension adopted in this research is the historical perspective of the present time.

We as researchers have the responsibility to dialogue, inquire, question and claim any and all changes that affect the public space and everyone's access to it. Thus, our research seeks to approach normative documents with a critical look, understanding that that historical data can express more of the social tensions that they could show in signs.

We seek to understand the socio-historical context in which the document was prepared in order to obtain clues of the relationships in which the discipline of philosophy was removed from the curricula (LDB, BNCC, PNE) and within Arendt's perspective, what this relationship can mean.

We start from the arendtian assumption that “[…] the world is the artificial space interposed between man and nature, as well as the intermediate scope of relationship and distinction established between men through their interactions and common interests” (^{Alves Neto, 2009}, p. 76-77). Artificial space, since it differs from the natural world, that is, from the immutable nature that has its life cycle perpetuated harmonically. We humans, on the contrary, have the need to violate this constancy, for we are not a unison, homogeneous chorus. The human species breaks the closed and immortal cycle of nature. Because we are individual and have possibilities to surrender to the infinity of nature, we need to ‘create’ a common world to share with other men.

It is in this ‘artificial space’ that institutions and other human achievements are contemplated and shared with their equals. The public school is one of these human institutions, it is a pre-political space par excellence. We must preserve it from external attacks that defend its limitation of content, because with the denial of a place open to dialogue, the plurality of ideas is also extinguished and the school loses its function as a pre-political space.

Arendtian concepts: crisis of tradition, public space and authority

All the events that occurred after the Second World War are described by Hannah Arendt as a “[…] radical experience” (^{Telles, 1990}, p. 24). She says that these facts are “[…] fragility of human business” (^{Telles, 1990}, p. 24), occurred because there were no more criteria required to make a correct decision about what is good or bad, right or wrong. According to an arendtian reading, it is a crisis in tradition, a crisis of authority that led to moral dissociations.

This is because, when entering modernity - a moment in which this phenomenon is evident - certain customs are no longer guaranteed as they once were, namely, having support in large institutions (whether physical or symbolic, such as religion), which guaranteed tradition and gained authority in certain moral aspects. These crises become a major problem when and because the subject no longer guarantees meaning to the world in which they live, they do not see themself immersed in a common society; they no longer recognize the world in which they live, because they lack the security that certain institutions once guaranteed. This subject of the beginning of modernity fears the unknown and changeable and, losing (or not receiving) the structuring foundation of society (religious and traditional authority), it is not familiar to them.

The problem, points out ^{Arendt (2011}), is that we ourselves are not able to erect rigid criteria, because we are, in general, contingent. How, then, to give credibility that we are able to construct rigid criteria and references that “[…] have an intersubjective validity generating common sense?”(^{Telles, 1990}, p. 24). It is exactly this ability that is tested, questioned by Hannah Arendt.

For Arendt, this is a task that lies in the faculty of discernment, which derives from the intersubjective experience of the world and, in practice, forms common sense. The great worrying fact in Hannah Arendt's readings is that when looking at society in the context of the Second World War, this common sense presents itself as authoritarian and indifferent towards human life. With a naturalized evil thinking, plus a lack of discernment, we have catastrophic episodes like this war that led to the deaths of 6 million people.

For Hannah Arendt, modern society has a specific trait: it is in it that the dissolution of public space takes place. In addition, it is also marked by depoliticization and individualism, which bring as a consequence the lack of political action. The individual no longer shows themself in previously open spaces to receive the plurality of thoughts and personas. With few people interacting in this space, it ceases to be shared with other voices, its public sense empties and, alongside in the collapse, the notion of ‘Common Sense’ also becomes diffuse. Public space, for Arendt, is “[…] significant space in which the action and the discourse of each can gain meaning in the construction of a ‘common world’”(^{Telles, 1990}, p. 28, author's emphasis).

The experience in the public space is the creator of common sense. Sharing a place where we hear, see and speak the same language, educated with the same tales and songs, we follow the same laws: it is this narrative that guarantees the truthfulness of our perceptions, we know those of others and others of ours by publicization, by word and by acting in public space. Short of this shared space, only the subjectivity itself remains that “[…] they will tend to make their private interests and feelings the measure of all things” (^{Telles, 2006}, p. 47).

The second conception of public space for Hannah Arendt is that of a place of visibility, of appearance, it is the space in which the unrecognizable character of the uniqueness of each one begins to be recognized. But this uniqueness is not the one that manifests itself in the private sphere, but rather the one built through action and discourse in a public space. With the loss of this space, “[…] men have become entirely deprived, that is, deprived of seeing and hearing [...], they are all prisoners of the very subjectivity of their own singular experience” (^{Arendt, 2007}, p. 67).

For Hannah Arendt, public space can only be built by action and discourse, apparatuses that start from the singular and individual and must be externalized so that we can be seen and heard. For the outsourcing of these needs, an “[…] ‘appearance space’, needs the testimony of others so that it gains meaning in the construction of a fully human world” (^{Telles, 1990}, p. 35, author's emphasis). Action, for Hannah, is something intrinsic to the human being:

To act, in the most general sense of the term, means to take initiative, to initiate (as the Greek word indicates archein, ‘to start’, ‘to be the first’ and in some cases, ‘to govern’), impress movement to something (which is the original meaning of the Latin term agere). By constituting an initium, because they are newcomers and initiators by virtue of the fact that they were born, men take initiatives, are impelled to act (^{Arendt, 2007}, p. 190, author's emphasis).

Politics and public space - and the symbolic power they possess-are not sentenced to a single place, nor tangible: they disappear as the gathering of men dissipates or they are unwilling to listen to each other. It is understood that there is only power as long as there is a group of people who endorse it, as Vera Telles describes:

[...] power is not external to action and speech. It arises from the association between men and the exchange of opinions [...]. In this register, the public space qualifies as a space for joint deliberation, through which men, to the extent that they are capable of action and opinion, become interested and responsible for the issues that concern a common destiny (^{Telles, 1990}, p. 37).

This symbolic power is conferred only as long as a group of people ensure its validity; this consent is not given once and becomes perennial: it is necessary to actively participate in public life, helping to build new ‘wills’ for the future. This also applies to the legal practice of society. If the latter is unsatisfactory, order, laws, governments must be changed by nonviolent means and through collective action. This form of intermediary is guaranteed by the authority. In turn, authority is ceded by the subject, through the recognition of the power of the other, but always highlighting that authority in Hannah Arendt has nothing to do with violent coercion.

It is emphasized that the first Authority is seized still at school, in the form of the transmission of knowledge, as respect for that human who is already and acts in the world that will become the responsibility of the newcomer. So,

In education, this responsibility for the world takes the form of authority. The authority of the educator and the qualifications of the teacher are not the same thing. Although a certain qualification is indispensable for authority, qualification, however great, never engenders authority by itself. Teacher's qualification is to know the world and be able to instruct others about it, but their authority is based on the responsibility they assume for this world. In the face of the child, it is as if they were a representative of all the adult inhabitants, pointing out details and saying to the child: - this is our world (^{Arendt, 2011}, p. 239).

Education is a fundamental piece for human formation of the subject. For Pablo Gentili, “[…] education constitutes a good that opens, builds and potentiates and affirms other rights [...], education is a human right, a public and social good” (^{Gentili, 2009}, p. 1072). But the role of education in our liberal societal organization loses all the richness of meaning about human emancipation; the education of this society today is relegated to transmitting content and 'manufacturing human capital', which becomes another factor to be counted in the economy. An education that aims to educate new men having education even as an end is an increasingly scarce practice, this is where lies the core of the problem of the education crisis.

The reasoning incorporated by this model of society minimizes education as another step to be fulfilled in a great gear that moves the financial market. The mercantilist logic begins to teach us that more education generates more development of primary technology that generates more employment. The discourse of identifying education with citizenship is lost in the tangle of educational economicism.

To think of education as a mediator from the pre-political world (School) to the political world, aiming at a “[…] civic culture capable of transforming the relationship between state and civil society […]” (^{Nascimento, 2008}, p. 56), we will deal here with one of these mediations within the scope of education, namely the school subject of Philosophy, which we note as a participant in the formation of the student, giving judgment criteria that they will later use for operations in the world. This subject is relevant if we think that in high school the student is closer to the concrete operation (action) in the world than, for example, in early childhood education.

Next, we analyze the trajectory of the philosophy discipline in high school in Brazil; we seek to exemplify how its instability in the normative documents for public education characterizes what ^{Arendt (2007}; 2011) calls the education crisis. In possession of these concepts of Hannah Arendt, we intend to make a defense of the school subject of Philosophy in high school, because we understand it as one of the mediations in the school from the pre-political world to the world of action, because philosophy is born together with politics, with the need to create a common world for us humans to relate.

History of the school subject of Philosophy in high school: the politics denied

The beginning of the history of the teaching of philosophy in Brazil is dated in the sixteenth century, and the school subject arrived together with the Jesuits of the Society of Jesus. It is the merit of the Jesuits to enter formal education in Brazil, because they were responsible not only for catechesis, but also for the education of the settlers, in order to propagate Christianity. Philosophy used to be instrumentalized in order to indoctrinate. Teaching the letters, was the second plan; soon, we can conclude that studies in philosophy were also directed towards a single thought (^{Costa, 1960}).

The monopoly of schooling by the Jesuits ended when they were expelled by the Marquis of Pombal. A renewal at the university becomes possible: breathing new air, inspired by the arrival of Dom João VI in 1808, and with it the opening to world trade, new ideas and ideals, new books and management modes. Philosophy takes up the position of knowing that it enlightens and is treated, from then on, as part of vocational training. Only 26 years later, the first higher and professionalizing courses are created. In 1838, philosophy became mandatory in the curricula of secondary colleges. Cartolano announces that “[…] in the provinces, philosophy was already compulsorily included in the curriculum of lyceums and gymnasiums of the secondary course, since the beginning of the century” (^{Cartolano, 1985}, p. 28).

Without any intervention, the school subject of philosophy was taught in high schools in an exegetical and professorial way, its critical aspect was little or not practiced. At least, after the expulsion of the Jesuits, space was opened for the study of more authors, besides Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle who satisfied the Catholic tradition. So,

Among the rising philosophical currents, in the last decades of the nineteenth century, around 1870, positivism was the one that had the most repercussion in the Brazilian thought and in the education that was ministered here. The fundamental reason for this fact lies in the pre-existing scientific tradition that began with the Pombaline reforms, in the light of which the entire higher education system was structured, on bases that favored applied sciences and strictly professional instruction. (^{Mazai & Ribas, 2001}, p. 6).

In 1915, the discipline of philosophy was reintegrated into school curricula and became optional, under Decree n° 11.530. Since the significance of High School was a tool for the next stage, only as access to higher education, there was little concern with the critical character that Philosophy aspires. A decade later, there was the Rocha Vaz reform of 1925 which “[…] established the importance of secondary education being more geared towards a preparation for life” (^{Dutra & Del Pino, 2010}, p. 88). In 1931, there was also a change to the treatment of the school subject in the same sense that aimed “[…] an integral formation that allowed them to make clear and safe decisions in any situation of their existence” (^{Mazai & Ribas, 2001}, p. 8).

The 1960s were not favorable to the stabilization of the discipline of Philosophy in the curriculum of Brazilian basic education, which ceased to be a mandatory discipline, as soon as 1961, when law Lei n° 4.024/61, the first Law of Guidelines and Bases of Education (LDB) was instituted: “[…] from this moment on, the teaching of this discipline began its process of decline as to its appreciation and inclusion in the curricular grades of schools” (^{Dutra & Del Pino, 2010}, p. 89).

In the year 1964, during the military coup, the school subject of Philosophy was already optional. In 1966, the Brazilian state, through the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC), signed an agreement with theUnited States Agency for International Development' (Usaid) which consisted of technical and financial assistance from the United States, based on three pillars:

[…] - education and development: training of professionals to meet the urgent needs of specialized labor in an expanding market.

- education and security: formation of the conscious citizen. Hence the disciplines on civism and Brazilian problems (Moral and Civic Education, Social and Political Organization of Brazil and Studies of Brazilian Problems).

- education and community: to establish the relationship between school and community, creating councils of entrepreneurs and teachers (^{Aranha, 2001}, p. 213).

Philosophy did not immediately meet the economic-market interest. Therefore,

The teaching of Philosophy did not meet these technoburocratic and political - ideological requests, no longer served the objectives of the reforms that were intended to institute in the structure of Brazilian education. Its extinction as a discipline, already optional in the curriculum, in 1968, was thoughtfully prepared through a series of laws and decrees, opinions and resolutions of the Federal Council of Education and the State Council of São Paulo, which, in this case, centralized the decisions of the educational area (^{Cartolano, 1985}, p. 72).

In 1969, the discipline of ‘Moral and Civic Education’ became mandatory, which later came to be called ‘Brazilian Social and Political Organization’ in the stages of basic education and higher level was called ‘Studies of Brazilian Problems’ (^{Aranha, 2001}). Soon after, in 1971, with the promulgation of law Lei No. 5,692 / 71, the school subject of Philosophy was removed from the high school curriculum (at that time, 2nd grade). This change in the LDB pushed the education system to a technicist and productivist model. Disciplines such as philosophy were suppressed to, in their place, prevail others that indoctrinated students on supposed blessings of military government.

In normative terms, this prohibition of Philosophy in the school curriculum was only overcome in 2008, in the second management of the then President of the Republic Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Therefore, 23 years after the redemocratization of the country. However, in less than a decade, this achievement was usurped with a secondary school reform cloth, in a context of advancing reactionary forces in the country after the coup against President Dilma Rousseff in August 2016.

The law Lei n° 13.415: the Counter-Reform² and its private interests

When dealing with laws, we often observe the particular interest being maximized for public life. For Hannah Arendt, the sphere of personal ‘interest' must remain in the private. When proposing and elucidating public laws, they must be in the public interest. Thus, “[…] interest is only important in politics as a way of connecting men, but it does not give meaning to public action” (^{Nascimento, 2008}, p. 60). In other words, private interests should in no case interfere in political decision-making.

If the public space that is configured here as the school (pre-politics) must be free of private interests, we must argue in favor of the permanence of the school subject of Philosophy in high school, since, this is historically recognized for opening and proposing places of dialogue, which is extremely important for the formation of the student.

In the text of law Lei No. 13,415/2017, we identified the drastic change of posture in the wording and intentions of the counter-reform, compared to the LDB of 1996. In the latter, an integral formation of the student in fact was valued. In some moments, the new law also states that the curricula be more comprehensive: “§ 7 The high school curricula should consider the integral formation of the student, in order to adopt a work aimed at the construction of their life project and for their formation in the physical, cognitive and socio-emotional aspects” (Brasil, 2017, s/p.). In later articles, however, it is observed:

Art. 36. The high school curriculum will be composed of the Common National Curricular Base and training itineraries, which should be organized through the offer of different curricular arrangements, according to the relevance to the local context and the possibility of education systems, namely:

I - languages and their technologies;

II - mathematics and its technologies;

III - natural sciences and their technologies;

IV - applied human and social sciences;

V - technical and professional training (^{Brazil, 2017}, s/p.).

While pointing to an integral formation, the letter of the law affirms the appreciation of some disciplines to the detriment of others. Let us observe again Article 35-A, of law Lei No. 13.415 / 2017 of the new wording:

[...] § 8º the contents, methodologies and forms of procedural and formative evaluation will be organized in the teaching networks through theoretical and practical activities, oral and written tests, seminars, projects and online activities, in such a way that at the end of the High School the educant demonstrates:

I - mastery of the scientific and technological principles that preside modern production;

II - knowledge of contemporary forms of language (^{Brazil, 2017}, s/p.).

If, in the previous paragraph, the wording guaranteed the integral formation of the student, in paragraph 8, it is said that the student must demonstrate mastery in the scientific, technological and language fields. The contradiction in the wording of this law is visible to the naked eye. How can a training be 'integral' if the student must demonstrate proficiency in only two fields of knowledge? This is because, the principles that govern modern capitalist production are quantitativist. From this angle, we can therefore see the appreciation not only of the teaching of Portuguese, but also of Mathematics. This means giving primacy to some fields of knowledge and relegating all other areas. The problem is not to value Mathematics and Portuguese, but to devalue the Arts, Physical Education, Sociology and Philosophy, which are essential knowledge for human formation.

The new law implemented provides a service to the instrumentalization of knowledge. For an illustration, see Article 36, paragraph IV. In place of: “IV - Philosophy and Sociology will be included as compulsory subjects in all high school grades” (included by Law No. 11,684, of 2008; Brazil, 2008, s/p.), now it is: “Article 35-A: § 2 The National Common Curriculum Base regarding high school will necessarily include studies and practices of physical education, art, sociology and philosophy” (^{Brazil, 2017}, s/p.).

The wording of the text does not make it clear how such ‘studies and practices’ of the aforementioned areas will take place, leaving doubt as to its proposal. When it comes to the subjects of Portuguese and Mathematics, the text makes clear the obligation as a school subjects, not the emptiness of’studies and practices'. After all, how would this law be enforced and how would the assessment be made? Also in §7º of Art. 2º, which amends Art. 26 of Law No. 9,394/1996 (^{Brazil, 1996}), presenting the following wording: “[…] curricular integration may include, at the discretion of education systems, projects and research involving the cross-cutting themes of caput” (^{Brazil, 2017}, s/p.).

Configuring itself as a pre-political space, the school should not only teach the contenudist school subject - which are important for the student to absorb history and its tradition - but also to build a space of dialogue and plurality. As an 'essay' for the world that these subjects will act, they must know how to dissociate private life from the public sphere. This specificity is given to us, for “[…] only man can express otherness and individuality, only they can distinguish themself and communicate to themself and not merely communicate something - thirst or hunger, affection, hostility or fear” (^{Arendt, Correa, & Magalhães, 2019}, p. 190).

Removing the obligation of teaching Philosophy in high school, one more theoretical apparatus present in the school is lost that aims at apprehending concepts that enable the assertion of a new shared space, because the student who is the newcomer to the world will not have the capacity of discernment and will not recognize the common space of men, the space proper to politics. Political Action for Arendt is given by the word (speech, logo) and action. Legislating laws was not considered a political function, but pre-political, laws would be the final products and politics itself was made when there was “[…] audience of their fellow men” (^{Arendt, 2007}, p. 247). The next section situates the convergence of the birth of philosophy with politics in the Polish Greek which, according to Arendt, was a genuinely political activity.

Philosophical knowledge and the birth of politics: an approximation to the Greek solution

As it is known, philosophy was born in the Greek colonies of Asia Minor at the end of the VII century BC and early VI century. There were many reasons for its emergence. ^{Vernant (2009}) highlights one of them: philosophy is born hand in hand with the development of polis, this decisive event between the VIII and VII centuries BC that inaugurates a new form of social life and relations between men. As the author states, in the system of polis, the word became the political instrument par excellence (persuasion, contradictory debate, argumentation): “Between politics and logos, there is thus close relationship, reciprocal bond. Political art is essentially the exercise of language; and logos, at the origin, it becomes aware of itself, of its rules, of its effectiveness, through its political function” (Vernant, 2009, p. 54).

As discussed, man tries to overcome their mortality by creating institutions that should be immortal, then creating a world to which one can show themself through deeds and works. In Greek antiquity, this experience occurred first with the experience of democracy in polis. “It is an unprecedented way of coexistence, of immortalization of the human world within immortal nature, that is, a means of safeguarding the genuinely political dimension of the world and man, preserving the ‘public side of the world’” (^{Alves Neto, 2009}, p. 86, author's emphasis).

Another feature of polis is its publicity, that is, the establishment of a public domain of common interest in counterpoint to the private sphere and open practices, opposed to sects. The drafting of laws was also a crucial element of the life of polis for it has given justice a rule common to all. Thus, the ground was established on which the rational exercise of open and argumentative dialogue would be possible and without which Philosophy could not be born. Therefore,

Advent of Polis, birth of philosophy: between the two orders of phenomena the links are too close so that rational thought does not appear, in its origins, in solidarity with the social and mental structures proper to the Greek city. [...] The School of Miletus did not see Reason born; it built ‘a’ Reason, a first form of rationality. [...] reason itself, in its essence, is political (^{Vernant, 2009}, p. 141, author's emphasis).

With the weakening of the figure of basileus (which unified religious, military and justice power), the decay of Gentile communities (which were organized by bonds of consanguinity) and the emergence of an aristocratic land-owning class, the Greeks faced many social clashes. From there emerged crucial questions:

[...] how can order arise from the conflict between rival groups, the clash of prerogatives and opposing functions? How can an ordinary life be supported by conflicting elements? Or [...] how, in the social plane, can one come out of multiple and multiple of one? (^{Vernant, 2009}, p. 48).

The social organization based on polis it offered an answer to these challenges. It abandons the relations of gene and inbreeding; its organizational base is geographical. Thus, the city gathers inhabitants in the same territory, not necessarily of the same bond of kinship. Therefore, each polis consists of a multiplicity of population, customs, rites, social classes, etc. Therefore, facing the problem: “[…] what law should order the City so that it is one in the multiplicity of its fellow citizens, so that they are equal in their necessary diversity?” (^{Vernant, 2009}, p. 104). Thus, “[…] lived implicitly in social practice, this problem of the one and the multiple, which is expressed in certain religious currents, will be formulated with all rigor at the level of philosophical thought” (^{Vernant, 2009}, p. 48). The city forms a cosmos and it is from its functioning that the first philosophers drew inspiration to think about the world, the generating element of the cosmos from which all multiple things originate. Therefore, in the words of ^{Chauí (2002}), philosophy is a child of polis.

A politically organized world presented itself in the form of democratic polis, where each man could fit independently of religion, family, territory. It was enough to show oneself in the public sphere, through action and discourse. Political activity was designed to “[…] elevate action to the top of the hierarchy of ‘active life' and to see in the discourse the fundamental element of distinction between human life and animal life” (^{Arendt, 2007}, p. 217, author's emphasis).

Therefore, the teaching of philosophy updates this heritage that links the exercise of reason to politics, to the common space of polis. In the school curriculum, by the force of its specificity, philosophy puts the dialogue on common life under focus. It is configured as a school subject that par excellence refers to the passage of private, family, consanguineous life, to the common and plural world. Its presence in high school collaborates, therefore, to reaffirm school education as a bridge between the private world and the public sphere. It operates as a relevant impetus at the end of Basic Education in preparation for the world of politics. In this regard, their withdrawal can weaken the school function.

Final considerations

We can point out with the help of the concepts established by Hannah Arendt, that the biggest problem of the withdrawal of the discipline of philosophy in the high school curriculum, occurs by the emptying of the school as a pre-political world, ceasing to transmit themes of the tradition of human thought, which also impoverishes the entire content, affecting the integral education of the student, and may impair their ability to discern.

Denying the education of philosophy is conducive to some sectors, because thus, they can only instruct the student without any criticality, and then, this individual will be deprived of their capacities of discernment. If the person cannot discern their choices, right and wrong, they are not able to choose (^{Arendt, 2011}). This is how politics is limited in its basic form: not providing the necessary tools for a sober reading of the world and the context in which one lives and his belonging.

The discipline of philosophy in the school curriculum can be read as one of the most powerful mediations present in the school, mediation that occurs between the pre-political world (School) to the political, which is when these subjects take possession and responsibility for the world, in order to ensure its continuity.

If philosophy loses this formative space and that by itself challenges politics, as understood by Arendt, its withdrawal has characteristics that lead to another kind of authoritarianism, since other discourses divergent from the normative begin to be curtailed. For Arendt, politics occurs in plurality, and if this space is extinguished, there is no longer a guaranteed place for action. That is, citizenship is terminated, as the subject loses his place of dialogue and political dispute. In times of a weakened democracy, fighting for a space that guarantees from birth the right to speech and expression, is the purest political action that we, still responsible for the world, can guarantee to newcomers. The exclusion of this space also directly hurts our political power.