<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1984-5987</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Childhood & Philosophy]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Child.philo.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1984-5987</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1984-59872017000200291</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.12957/childphilo.2017.26958</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Are children capable of collective intentionality?]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[¿son los niños capaces de una intencionalidad colectiva?]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[As crianças são capazes de uma intencionalidade coletiva?]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[kane]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[laura wildemann]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,city university of new york The graduate center ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>united states of America</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>05</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>05</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>13</volume>
<numero>27</numero>
<fpage>291</fpage>
<lpage>302</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://educa.fcc.org.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1984-59872017000200291&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://educa.fcc.org.br/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1984-59872017000200291&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://educa.fcc.org.br/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1984-59872017000200291&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: The family presents an interesting challenge to many conceptions of collective activity and the makeup of social groups. Social philosophers define social groups as being comprised of individuals who knowingly consent to their group membership or voluntarily act to continue their group membership. This notion of voluntarism that is built into the concept of a social group rests upon a narrow conception of agency that is difficult to extend beyond able-minded autonomous adults. Families, however, are often comprised of members who supposedly lack this developed sense of agency and are therefore considered incapable of consenting to join or remain in a group: infants and small children. So, the family seems to be an odd fit for the designation of social group, even though it is often heralded as a paradigm example of one. In this paper I argue that children and infants are in fact agents who are capable of collective intentionality, especially in the context of the family where they act cooperatively and reciprocally with their caretakers. In doing so, I present an understanding of the family as a social group that has degrees of voluntarism for all members in the forms of joint readiness and joint commitment. I argue for this in three steps. First, I employ Margaret Gilbert's concepts of joint commitment and joint readiness as a framework for collective intentionality. Second, echoing Carol Gould, I argue that we ought to expand our understanding of agency beyond the ideal case. Third, I draw upon recent research from Michael Tomasello that demonstrate a child's ability to act cooperatively and reciprocally. Together these steps provide a strong foundation for the claim that children and infants are agents capable of collective intentionality within families. ]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: La familia presenta un desaf&#237;o interesante a muchas concepciones sobre la actividad colectiva y el dise&#241;o de grupos sociales. Los fil&#243;sofos sociales definen grupos sociales como compuestos por individuos que conscientemente consienten ser miembros del grupo o voluntariamente act&#250;an para continuar siendo miembros del mismo. Esta noci&#243;n de voluntarismo, construida en el concepto de un grupo social, reposa sobre una estrecha concepci&#243;n de agencia que es dif&#237;cil de extender m&#225;s all&#225; de los adultos capacitados y aut&#243;nomos. Las familias, sin embargo, est&#225;n usualmente compuestas por miembros que supuestamente carecen de este sentido desarrollado de agencia y que, por lo tanto, son considerados incapaces de consentir en ingresar o permanecer en un grupo: infantes y ni&#241;os peque&#241;os. Entonces, la familia parece ser una adecuaci&#243;n extra&#241;a para la designaci&#243;n del grupo social aun cuando es frecuentemente anunciada como un ejemplo paradigm&#225;tico de &#233;ste. En este art&#237;culo sostengo que los ni&#241;os e infantes son, de hecho, agentes capaces de intencionalidad colectiva, especialmente en el contexto de la familia donde act&#250;an cooperativa y rec&#237;procamente con aquellos que los cuidan. De este modo, presento una comprensi&#243;n de la familia como un grupo social que tiene grados de voluntarismo para todos los miembros en las formas de aptitud y compromiso conjuntos. Sostengo esto en tres pasos. Primeramente, empleo los conceptos de Margaret Gilbert de compromiso y actitud conjuntos como un marco para la intencionalidad colectiva. En segundo lugar, haci&#233;ndonos eco de Carol Gould, sostengo que debemos expandir nuestra comprensi&#243;n de agencia m&#225;s all&#225; del caso ideal. Finalmente, me baso en una investigaci&#243;n reciente de Michael Tomasello que demuestra la habilidad del ni&#241;o para actuar cooperativa y rec&#237;procamente. Juntos, estos pasos proveen un fuerte fundamento a la afirmaci&#243;n de que los ni&#241;os e infantes son agentes capaces de intencionalidad colectiva dentro de las familias.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[Resumo: A fam&#237;lia apresenta um desafio interessante a muitas concep&#231;&#245;es sobre a atividade coletiva e a configura&#231;&#227;o de grupos sociais. Os fil&#243;sofos sociais definem grupos sociais como compostos por indiv&#237;duos que conscientemente consentem em ser membros do grupo ou que atuam voluntariamente para continuar sendo membros deste. Essa no&#231;&#227;o de voluntarismo, constru&#237;da no conceito de um grupo social, repousa sobre uma estreita concep&#231;&#227;o de ag&#234;ncia que &#233; dif&#237;cil de estender al&#233;m dos adultos capacitados e aut&#244;nomos. As fam&#237;lias, no entanto, comumente est&#227;o compostas por membros que supostamente carecem desse sentido desenvolvido de ag&#234;ncia e que, portanto, s&#227;o considerados incapazes de consentir em ingressar ou permanecer em um grupo: infantes e crian&#231;as pequenas. A fam&#237;lia, ent&#227;o, parece ser uma adequa&#231;&#227;o estranha para a designa&#231;&#227;o de grupo social ainda que seja frequentemente anunciada como um exemplo paradigm&#225;tico do mesmo. Neste artigo argumento que as crian&#231;as e infantes s&#227;o, de fato, agentes capazes de intencionalidade coletiva, especialmente no contexto da fam&#237;lia onde agem cooperativa e reciprocamente com aqueles que os cuidam. Deste modo, apresento uma compreens&#227;o de fam&#237;lia como um grupo social que tem graus de voluntarismo para todos os membros nas formas de boa vontade e compromisso conjuntos. Argumento isso em tr&#234;s etapas. Primeiro, emprego os conceitos de Margaret Gilbert de compromisso e atitude conjuntos como uma estrutura para a intencionalidade coletiva. Em segundo lugar, ecoando a Carol Gould, sustento que devemos expandir nossa concep&#231;&#227;o de ag&#234;ncia para al&#233;m do caso ideal. Por &#250;ltimo, me baseio em uma pesquisa recente de Michael Tomasello que demonstra a habilidade da crian&#231;a em agir cooperativa e reciprocamente. Juntas, essas etapas prov&#233;m um fundamento forte &#224; afirma&#231;&#227;o de que crian&#231;as e infantes s&#227;o agentes capazes de intencionalidade coletiva dentro das fam&#237;lias.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Collective Intentionality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Agency]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Cooperation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Family.]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Intencionalidad colectiva]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Agencia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Cooperación]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Familia.]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Intencionalidade Coletiva]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Agência]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Cooperação]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Família.]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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