<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1984-5987</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Childhood & Philosophy]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Child.philo.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1984-5987</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1984-59872013000100129</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">110.12957/childphilo.2017.26129</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="de"><![CDATA[Wer verdient respekt? Deutsche kinder philosophieren in dialogen und zeichnungen über den begriff "respekt"]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Who deserves respect?" German children philosophize in dialogs and drawings their concept of respect]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[Quem merece respeito?" Crianças alemãs filosofam em diálogos e desenhos sobre seu conceito de respeito]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[¿quién merece respeto?" los niños alemanes filosofan en diálogos y dibujos sobre su concepto de respeto]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Marsal]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Eva]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dobashi]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Takara]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Pädagogische Hochschule Karlsruhe  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Germany</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Pädagogische Hochschule Karlsruhe  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Germany</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2013</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2013</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>9</volume>
<numero>17</numero>
<fpage>129</fpage>
<lpage>151</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://educa.fcc.org.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1984-59872013000100129&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://educa.fcc.org.br/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1984-59872013000100129&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://educa.fcc.org.br/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1984-59872013000100129&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="de"><p><![CDATA[Zusammenfassung: In unserem Beitrag m&#246;chten wir zun&#228;chst auf die kategoriale Einordnung des philosophischen Begriffs "Respekt" eingehen und danach zeigen, wie Kinder in der philosophischen Community of Inquiry mit Problemen umgehen, die mit dem Begriffsfeld "Respekt" verbunden sind. Aus dem breiten Angebot der dabei entwickelten Kategorie m&#246;chten wir auf der einen Seite die Kategorie "eine epistemische und moralische Tugend" herausgreifen und auf der anderen Seite die Kategorie "ein Gef&#252;hl" und zeigen, dass der philosophische Begriff "Respekt" als "Respekt vor jemand oder etwas", sich in seinem Anforderungsprofil mit der N&#228;he zum Gegenstand wandelt. Dadurch ergeben sich folgende Fragen: M&#252;...]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: In this paper we first discuss the categorical classification of the philosophical concept "respect," and then demonstrate how children (aged 6-14) in their dialogs and drawings work through problems associated with the conceptual field of "respect" in a philosophical community of inquiry. From among the philosophical categories we focus on the categories of "epistemic and moral virtue," on the one hand, and on the other, "feeling," to show that the philosophical concept "respect" as "respect for someone or something" alters its requirement profile as the proximity to its object changes. Men and women carry out the duties implied by their humanity or personhood in various ways, thereby evoking in the spectator various evaluative judgments accompanied by corresponding feelings covering the entire spectrum from horror, disgust, rejection, and disapproval all the way to admiration. The subjective feeling that arises leads to the formulation: "I don't respect X because...," or "I respect X because..."--in other words, we specify the reasons that cause us to feel respect. The sole condition that "the other is a human being, a person" seems insufficient to call forth deep emotional acceptance. Respect is now tied to a many-faceted conditional web of qualities. Because of these feelings, the previous premise that respect is owed to every human being and every person as such is mitigated by questions such as: Must persons always be respected? Who merits respect? Which actions merit respect? Can one earn respect? Can one buy respect? Must you respect yourself in order to be respected by others? Is there a false respect? These questions demonstrate that, depending on the context and category to which the referent belongs, "respect" has different connotations. The philosophical challenge is to bring this field of connotations into a logically and also emotionally satisfactory equilibrium. ]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[Resumo: Nesse artigo n&#243;s discutimos antes de tudo a classifica&#231;&#227;o categorial do conceito filos&#243;fico de "respeito", e depois demonstramos como as crian&#231;as (entre 6 e 14 anos), em seus di&#225;logos e desenhos trabalham os problemas associados com o campo conceitual do "respeito" numa comunidade filos&#243;fica de investiga&#231;&#227;o. Por entre as categorias filos&#243;ficas n&#243;s nos concentramos nas categorias de "virtude moral e epist&#234;mica", por um lado, e por outro sobre o "sentimento", para mostrar que o conceito filos&#243;fico de "respeito" como "respeito por algu&#233;m ou por algo" altera o seu perfil de exig&#234;ncias quando a proximidade do objeto muda. Homens e mulheres carregam os deveres implicados por sua humanidade ou personalidade em v&#225;rios sentidos, por isso evocando no espectador v&#225;rios ju&#237;zos avaliativos acompanhados de sentimentos correspondentes que cobrem o espectro inteiro do horror, desgosto, rejei&#231;&#227;o, e desaprova&#231;&#227;o, no longo caminho at&#233; a admira&#231;&#227;o. O sentimento subjetivo que emerge leva &#224;s formula&#231;&#245;es: "Eu n&#227;o respeito X porque..."ou "eu respeito X porque..." - em outros termos n&#243;s especificamos as raz&#245;es que causam em n&#243;s o sentimento de respeito. A &#250;nica condi&#231;&#227;o de que "o outro &#233; um ser humano, uma pessoa" parece insuficiente para invocar uma profunda aceita&#231;&#227;o emocional. O respeito &#233; agora ligado a uma teia condicional e multifacetada de qualidades. Por causa desses sentimentos, a precedente premissa de que o respeito &#233; devido a todo ser humano e a toda pessoa se encontra assim interrogada por quest&#245;es como: devem as pessoas ser sempre respeitadas? Quem merece respeito? Que a&#231;&#245;es merecem respeito? Algu&#233;m pode ganhar o respeito? Algu&#233;m pode comprar o respeito? Voc&#234; deve respeitar a voc&#234; mesmo para ser respeitado pelos outros? Existe um falso respeito? Essas quest&#245;es demostram que, dependendo do contexto e da categoria &#224; qual pertence o referente, "respeito" tem diferentes conota&#231;&#245;es. O desafio filos&#243;fico &#233; de trazer esse campo de conota&#231;&#245;es a um equil&#237;brio satisfat&#243;rio, tanto logicamente quanto emocionalmente. ]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: En este trabajo se discute la primera clasificaci&#243;n categ&#243;rica del concepto filos&#243;fico de "respeto", y luego se muestra c&#243;mo los ni&#241;os (6-14 a&#241;os) en sus di&#225;logos y dibujos trabajan a trav&#233;s de los problemas asociados con el campo conceptual de "respeto" en una comunidad filos&#243;fica de investigaci&#243;n. Entre las categor&#237;as filos&#243;ficas que nos centramos est&#225;n las de "virtud epist&#233;mica y moral", por un lado, y por otro, "sentimiento", para mostrar que el concepto filos&#243;fico de "respeto", como "respeto a alguien o algo" altera su perfil de requisitos a medida que se aproximan cambios en los objetos. Hombres y mujeres llevan a cabo los deberes que implica su humanidad o la personalidad de varias maneras, evocando as&#237; a los lectores varios juicios evaluativos acompa&#241;ados por sentimientos correspondientes que cubren todo el espectro desde el horror, asco, rechazo y desaprobaci&#243;n hasta la admiraci&#243;n. La sensaci&#243;n subjetiva que surge lleva a la formulaci&#243;n: "Yo no respeto a X porque ..." o "Yo respeto a X porque ..." - en otras palabras, se especifica las razones que nos hacen sentir respeto. La &#250;nica condici&#243;n de que "el otro es un ser humano, una persona" parece insuficiente para suscitar profunda aceptaci&#243;n emocional. El respeto est&#225; vinculado a una red condicional de muchas facetas y cualidades. Debido a estos sentimientos, la premisa anterior, que el respeto se debe a cada ser humano y a cada persona en cuanto tal se ve mitigado por preguntas como: &#191;debemos respetar siempre a las personas? &#191;Qui&#233;n merece respeto? &#191;Qu&#233; acciones merecen respeto? &#191;Se puede ganar el respeto? &#191;Se puede comprar el respeto? &#191;Tiene alguien que respetarse a s&#237; mismo para ser respetado por los dem&#225;s? &#191;Hay una relaci&#243;n de respeto falsa? Estas preguntas demuestran que, en funci&#243;n del contexto y la categor&#237;a a la que pertenece, el "respeto" tiene diferentes connotaciones. El desaf&#237;o filos&#243;fico es traer este campo de connotaciones a un equilibrio l&#243;gico y emocionalmente satisfactorio. ]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="de"><![CDATA[Respekt]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="de"><![CDATA[Philosophie]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="de"><![CDATA[Dialoge]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="de"><![CDATA[Community of Inquiry]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Respect]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Philosophy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Dialog]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Community of enquiry]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Respeito]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Filosofia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Diálogo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Comunidade de Investigação]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Respeto]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Filosofía]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Diálogo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Comunidad de investigación]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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