<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2178-4612</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Conjectura: Filosofia e Educação]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Conjectura: filos. e edu.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2178-4612</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidade de Caxias do Sul]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2178-46122016000300496</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18226/21784612.v21.n3.03</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[A irredutibilidade do conceito de confiança na epistemologia do testemunho]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The irreducibility of the concept of trust in the epistemology of testimony]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[La irreductibilidad del concepto de confianza en la epistemología del testimonio]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ketzer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Patricia]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidade de Passo Fundo Programa de Pós-Graduação em Educação ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Passo Fundo RS]]></addr-line>
<country>Brazil</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>21</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<fpage>496</fpage>
<lpage>513</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://educa.fcc.org.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2178-46122016000300496&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://educa.fcc.org.br/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2178-46122016000300496&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://educa.fcc.org.br/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2178-46122016000300496&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[Resumo:  Confian&#231;a &#233; um conceito indispens&#225;vel quando pensamos o ser humano interagindo com outros sujeitos, pois nos auxilia a pensar a ordem pol&#237;tica e a coopera&#231;&#227;o social, mas est&#225; longe de ter uma defini&#231;&#227;o &#250;nica. A procura por uma defini&#231;&#227;o mostrou ser necess&#225;rio retornar &#224;s origens do conceito, na busca de compreender seu uso em epistemologia. Na filosofia moral estabelece-se uma distin&#231;&#227;o entre duas formas de confiar: 1) a confian&#231;a [trust], que se caracteriza por ser uma rela&#231;&#227;o interpessoal mais profunda, a qual envolve boa-vontade e vulnerabilidade; 2) a fiabilidade, um tipo de confian&#231;a mais b&#225;sica no funcionamento do mundo e das coisas. O conceito de confian&#231;a torna-se relevante em epistemologia quando passamos a considerar a transmiss&#227;o de conhecimento por testemunho. A principal quest&#227;o &#233; quando podemos confiar em outras pessoas para adquirir conhecimento com base em seus atos de fala. A fim de compreender a sua utiliza&#231;&#227;o em epistemologia, precisamos analisar o uso do conceito na filosofia moral. Sendo assim, expomos o conceito de confian&#231;a moral e avaliamos a possibilidade de uma redu&#231;&#227;o em epistemologia. Entretanto, notamos que os aspectos morais n&#227;o contribuem para o cen&#225;rio epist&#234;mico. A redu&#231;&#227;o n&#227;o &#233; poss&#237;vel, pois confian&#231;a moral pressup&#245;e aceita&#231;&#227;o do risco, a tentativa de eliminar os riscos atrav&#233;s de reflex&#227;o racional enfraquece a atitude de confian&#231;a. Al&#233;m do mais, confian&#231;a nos faz resistentes a evid&#234;ncias e, em epistemologia, &#233; errado negligenciar evid&#234;ncias. Defendemos que, por parcim&#244;nia, deve-se utilizar apenas fiar-se, um conceito j&#225; estabelecido na literatura epistemol&#243;gica. A considera&#231;&#227;o dos aspectos morais da confian&#231;a se faz importante justamente para a identifica&#231;&#227;o do problema. O conceito de confian&#231;a n&#227;o pode contribuir para o debate, pois n&#227;o desempenha um papel epist&#234;mico. J&#225; o conceito de fiar-se pode ser utilizado em epistemologia do testemunho, assim como vem sendo utilizado em outros debates epistemol&#243;gicos.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract:  Trust is an indispensable concept whenever we think of human beings interacting with other individuals because it helps us to think about the political order and social cooperation, however, it is far from having a single definition. The search for a definition has proved that it is necessary to come back to the origins of the concept in order to seek for understanding its use in epistemology. In moral philosophy, it is established a distinction between two ways of trusting: 1) trust, which is characterized by a deeper interpersonal relationship that involves good will and vulnerability; 2) rely, which is a kind of trust but more basic in how the world and the things work. The concept of trust becomes relevant in epistemology when we start to consider the transmission of knowledge by testimony. The main issue is when we can trust other people to acquire knowledge based on their acts of speech. In order to seek for understanding its use in epistemology we need analyze the use concept in moral philosophy. Therefore, we exposed the concept of moral trust and evaluated the possibility of a reduction in epistemology. However, the reduction is not possible because moral trust presupposes risk acceptance, the attempt of eliminating risks through rational thought weakens the act of trusting. Besides, trust makes us resistant to evidences and, in epistemology, it is wrong to neglect evidences. We defend that, only rely should be, prudently, used. It is a concept that has already been established in epistemology literature. Considering moral aspects of trust is important for identifying the problem. The concept of trust cannot contribute to the debate because it does not play an epistemic role. As for the concept of rely, it can be used in epistemology of testimony, just as it has been used in other epistemological debates.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen:  La confianza es un concepto esencial cuando pensamos el ser humano en interact&#250;an con otros sujetos, ya que nos ayuda a pensar en el orden pol&#237;tico y en la cooperaci&#243;n social. Pero est&#225; lejos de tener una sola definici&#243;n. La b&#250;squeda de una definici&#243;n nos mostr&#243; ser necessario volver a los or&#237;genes del concepto, al tratar de comprender su uso en epistemolog&#237;a. En filosof&#237;a moral se establece una distinci&#243;n entre dos formas de confianza: 1) confianza [trust], que se caracteriza por ser una relaci&#243;n interpersonal m&#225;s profunda, que consiste en la buena voluntad y la vulnerabilidad; 2) la fiabilidad, una especie de confianza m&#225;s b&#225;sica en el funcionamiento del mundo y de las cosas. El concepto de confianza se vuelve relevante en epistemolog&#237;a cuando llegamos a considerar la transmisi&#243;n del conocimiento por testimonio. El principal problema es cuando podemos confiar en otras personas para adquirir conocimientos sobre la base de sus actos de habla. Con el fin de entender su uso en epistemolog&#237;a es necesario analizar el uso del concepto en la filosof&#237;a moral. As&#237;, se explica el concepto de confianza moral y evaluamos la posibilidad de una reducci&#243;n en epistemologia. Sin embargo, observamos que los aspectos morales no contribuyen a la situaci&#243;n epist&#233;mica. La reducci&#243;n no es posible, porque las expectativas morales presuponen la aceptaci&#243;n de riesgos, el intento de eliminar riesgos a trav&#233;s de la reflexi&#243;n racional debilita la actitud de confianza. Por otra parte, la confianza nos hace resistentes a las pruebas, y en epistemolog&#237;a est&#225; mal pasar por alto la evidencia. Se argumenta que, por parsimonia, se debe utilizar s&#243;lo confiarse, un concepto ya establecido en la literatura epistemol&#243;gica. La consideraci&#243;n de los aspectos morales de la confianza llega a ser importante precisamente para identificar el problema. El concepto de confianza no puede contribuir al debate, que no juega un papel epist&#233;mico. Pero el concepto de confiarse puede ser utilizado en epistemolog&#237;a del testimonio, y se han utilizado en otros debates epistemol&#243;gicos.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Confiança Epistêmica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Confiança Moral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Fiabilidade]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Relações Interpessoais]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Testemunho]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Epistemic Trust]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Moral Trust]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Rely]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Interpersonal Relationships]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Testimony]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Confianza Epistémica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Confianza Moral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Fiabilidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Relaciones Interpersonales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Testimonio]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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</back>
</article>
