<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2178-4612</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Conjectura: Filosofia e Educação]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Conjectura: filos. e Educ.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2178-4612</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidade de Caxias do Sul]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2178-46122018000200325</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18226/21784612.v23.n2.6</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[Refutação do conceito de confiança de Richard Foley: a impossibilidade de um uso não analógico em Epistemologia do Testemunho]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The refutation of the Richard Foley&#8217;s concept of trust: the impossibility of a use not analog in Epistemology of Testimony]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ketzer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Patricia]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="A01">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidade de Passo Fundo  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>05</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>05</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>23</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<fpage>325</fpage>
<lpage>346</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://educa.fcc.org.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2178-46122018000200325&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://educa.fcc.org.br/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2178-46122018000200325&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://educa.fcc.org.br/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2178-46122018000200325&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[ Resumo Ainda que Richard Foley não apresente uma definição clara de confiança, não podemos negligenciar a relevância de seu trabalho às discussões posteriores sobre o tema. A característica peculiar da abordagem foleyana ante a outras é sua tentativa de oferecer uma contribuição exclusivamente epistêmica de confiança. Trata-se de uma proposta de uso não analógico do conceito, que desconsidera os aspectos morais envolvidos em confiar. Apresentamos os argumentos de Foley sobre autoconfiança (self-trust), bem como o argumento que deriva confiança (trust), nos outros de autoconfiança, e suas implicações. Para concluir, levantamos alguns problemas decorrentes dessa proposta, apontando as lacunas da teoria para os estudos em Epistemologia do Testemunho, explicitando sua inviabilidade.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[ Abstract Although Richard Foley does not present a clear definition of trust, we should not overlook the relevance of his work to further discussions on the subject. The peculiar feature of Foley&#8217;s approach compared to others is its attempt to offer an exclusively epistemic contribution of the concept of trust. This is a proposal for a non &#8211; analogic use of the concept that ignores the moral aspects involved in the act of trust. We will present Foley&#8217;s arguments about self-trust, as well as the argument that derives trust in others from self-trust, and their implications. Finally, we will arise some problems resulting from such proposal and we will point out the gaps in the theory for studies in Epistemology of Testimony, explaining its impracticability.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Confiança epistêmica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Confiança moral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Fiabilidade]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Testemunho]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Epistemic trust]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Moral trust]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Reliability]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Testimony]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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