INTRODUCTION

This article aims to analyze the privatization of higher education policy implemented in Brazil, since the 1990s, with the Bresser-Pereira State reform and, more recently, with the Administrative reform of the Bolsonaro government and its consequences for financing Federal Universities and Science & Technology.

We start from the hypothesis that with the rise of financial capital, “the style of accumulation is given by new forms of concentration of gigantic financial capital (mutual funds and pension funds) whose function is to bear fruit mainly within the financial sphere” (^{CHESNAIS, 1996}, p.14). With this “new international order of capital”, the social destiny of the capital of societies came to be commanded by the financial sphere, whose dynamics are fed by “fictitious capital” and “effective transfers of wealth”, mainly through the “servicing the public debt and the monetary policies associated with it” (^{CHESNAIS, 1996}, p. 15).

In this context, State reforms are intertwined with financial capital requirements, whose centrality consists of transferring specific functions of providing public services to the market. In the case of educational policies, especially for higher education, these reforms have the commodification of education as the main mechanism to meet the fiscal adjustment, required by international organizations such as the World Bank, to guarantee the use of resources from the public fund for the payment of the public debt.

This article uses bibliographical and documentary research as a methodological resource. It also employs the survey and analysis of aggregated data relevant to financing higher education, science, and technology in Brazil. Its primary source is data from the Chamber of Deputies and the Sistema Integrado de Orçamento e Planejamento (Integrated Budget and Planning System - SIOP).

The text is organized into three parts besides this introduction and the final considerations. The first part presents a reflection on the privatization of higher education in Brazil, having as an element of analysis the State Reform implemented between 1994 and 2016. The second part analyzes central elements of the Administrative Reform proposal by the Jair Bolsonaro government, which seeks to deepen the privatization of state activities and public services. The third part explains the repercussions of this process, highlighting the effects of the New Fiscal Regime, on the funding of Federal Universities and Science and Technology.

THE PRIVATIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN BRAZIL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATE REFORM FROM 1994 TO 2016

The adoption of neoliberal policies that advocate the market as a regulator of global society, expanded the private sphere to the detriment of the public. According to these policies, education is a public expense that needs to be reduced for the State to comply with the fiscal adjustment requirements imposed by world economic policy.

As part of this policy, the university institution is induced to launch itself into the competitive market, subordinating academic production to the demands and needs of capital and the market, imposed by funders, and harming its autonomy. The privatization of public education, however, is not reduced to exclusively an economic issue – the school institution is not privatized through a simple purchase and sale mechanism or in the same way as other productive activities carried out by state-owned or social enterprises provided by the State (health, pension, etc.). For ^{Gentili (1998}, p. 72), the implementation of the public education privatization process is one of the central characteristics of the educational adjustment and restructuring programs imposed on Latin American countries by international organizations. As a consequence, there is a reconfiguration of the public and private spheres, in which privatization “is supported as a way of reducing state spending and, at the same time, public debt, through the inflow of revenue from privatizations (fiscal balance)”. (^{LEHER, 2001}, p. 158).

It is understood that the privatization of higher education is not an isolated phenomenon within the dynamics of the capitalist social structure. It is part of a much more complex process and integrates a set of strategies adopted by the central countries of world capitalism, as a way of overcoming the deep crisis of accumulation, which began in the 1970s, in the 20th century, and which continues to the present day.

This crisis caused a reaction from the world ruling class, which culminated in the reconfiguration of the productive economic base and the incorporation of neoliberal principles to development projects and reforms in the State apparatus, to adapt it to the new international order of financial capital. The defense of the return to the general market laws, with the reduction of public expenses and social policy investments, assumes centrality in the implemented reforms. In this sense, it is only possible to understand the reforms that took place in the field of educational policies and their effects on the reconfiguration of higher education, through the analysis of the movement of capitalism and its crises, as they install a redefinition of the public and private spheres, by redesigning the relationships between state and society.

Thus, reforms in the capitalist state have been conducted through regulatory measures, aimed at increasing the concentration of capital, maximizing profits, and unburdening capital. The argument is that to solve the State’s crisis, it is necessary to reduce the deficit caused by excessive public spending on personnel and social policies. As a consequence, privatization has been used to reduce the presence of the State, both in the productive area and in the social sphere. These measures, however, have not been enough to reduce the public debt, which has grown significantly since the 1990s, as will be analyzed later.

In the Brazilian case, the basic assumptions of State reform are specified in the Plano Diretor da Reforma do Aparelho do Estado [Master Plan for the Reform of the State Apparatus], published in November 1995, which “defines objectives and establishes guidelines for the reform of the Brazilian public administration”. This plan defines the activities that must be under the direct responsibility of the State are defined, those that must be coordinated and/or supervised, and those that must be handed over to the private sector. According to it, the Brazilian State must be restructured into four sectors: 1) The strategic core of the State; 2) activities exclusive to the State; 3) non-exclusive or competitive services; 4) the production of goods and services for the market.

The most relevant non-exclusive State services in the Union are universities, technical schools, research centers, hospitals, and museums. The proposed reform is to transform them into a special type of non-state entity. The idea is to transform them into “social organizations”, that is, into entities that enter into a management contract with the Executive Branch and have parliamentary authorization to participate in the public budget (^{BRESSER-PEREIRA; SPINK, 1998}, 186)1.

In the specific case of the public university, the argument for the need to diversify funding sources, through the private sector, and to strengthen the expansion of private higher education, through the liberalization of educational services, gains strength. As part of the Reform proposal for Universities, the Ministry of Education defended that these institutions could increase their autonomy, as long as they attached to an “institutional development contract”. Such a contract would be related to compliance with Law No. 9637, of May 15, 1998, which “provides for social organizations”, demonstrating the government’s insistence on adherence to the managerial administration of public universities. Faced with protests from the academic community in general, the government canceled its proposal from the agenda.

Despite not having been able to enact a specific law that would regulate university autonomy, successive governments managed to approve several projects that configured the reform of Brazilian higher education. The model of the reform implemented, in the period from 1995 to 2002, in the two terms of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), was the Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional (Law of Guidelines and Bases of National Education - LDB), Law nº 9.394, of December 20, 1996, in which the State assumed a prominent role in the control and management of educational policies, with flexibility for the expansion of the private-mercantile sector.

Several other legal measures were approved for higher education during the FHC government, among which stand out Law nº 9,192, of December 21, 1995, which established norms for choosing directors of federal universities and several Decrees through which the government established the diversification of higher education institutions, changed the rules of organization of higher education and the evaluation of courses and institutions. Institutional differentiations were implemented on two fronts: a) one, which includes the classification of higher education institutions (HEIs) into three types – universities, university centers, and institutes, integrated faculties and faculties, being mandatory, only in universities, activities teaching, research, and extension; b) another, in which institutions are created by initiatives of multinational companies, called corporate universities, such as FIAT, FORD, IBM, the McDonald’s snack bar chain (Hamburger University) and others, which trade their shares on the stock exchanges².

In the National Education Plan, organized in 1998 and approved by Law nº 10,172, of January 9, 2001, the government recognized the need to expand higher education in the country but defended that this should be done with the “rationalization of expenses and diversification of the system” in addition, of course, to the valuable contribution of private institutions. The goal to be achieved, in ten years, was to serve 30% of the population, aged between 18 and 24 years, with the establishment that the public sector would have an expansion of vacancies that would remain at a proportion never lower than 40% of the total. This goal was vetoed by the President of the Republic, which confirms the hypothesis that the expansion of this level of education should occur mainly by the private sector.

According to this Plan, the expansion would depend on a rationalization, in the use of resources, that reduces the expense per student, in public establishments; the creation of establishments geared more towards teaching than towards research; the expansion of post-secondary education; and the establishment of partnerships between the union, states, and community institutions, to substantially expand existing vacancies.

This privatist policy continued in the governments of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (2003 to 2016), whose economic policy focused on the fiscal adjustment to guarantee the financial sector the payment of the public debt, increasing the appreciation of capital to the detriment of the working class. In the case of higher education, the allocation of public resources to large financial/ educational groups, through the Fundo de Financiamento Estudantil (Student Financing Fund - Fies), the Programa Universidade para Todos (University for All Program - Prouni), and the privatization of university hospitals, with the creation of the Empresa Brasileira de Serviços Hospitalares (Brazilian Company of Hospital Services - EBSERH), are examples of such a privatist policy.

State reform implemented during the governments of FHC governments (1995-2002), Lula (2003-2010), and Dilma (2011-2016) was not enough to meet the interests of financial capital that, in addition to financing the deposition of Dilma, in 2016, through the impeachment process, elected Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency of the country, as discussed below.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM OF THE BOLSONARO GOVERNMENT

Two years later, the events that led to the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, in 2016, and the election of Jair Bolsonaro combined macrostructural factors, due to the deepening of the capitalist crisis, with internal political-economic conditions. ^{Gentil and Hermann (2017)} point out that the first government of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014) took place in an unfavorable external macroeconomic context. This became evident with the drop in the growth of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP): an annual average of 2.1%, half of the registered in the Lula da Silva government; and below the world growth and of Latin America, 3.4% and 2.9%, respectively (^{CORSI, 2016}).

The deepening of the global capital crisis triggered in 2008, and its most intense manifestation in Brazil, put an end to the policy of conciliation of classes of the PT governments. Thus, in line with the rentier interests of capital, the government began to implement increasing fiscal austerity policies to expand the primary surplus and reduce social spending. This was explicitly evidenced at the beginning of Dilma’s second term, in 2015, with the designation of Joaquim Levy to the Ministry of Finance, as a direct representative of the market to “[...] implement a fiscal austerity policy to reduce the deficit in public policies and control the deterioration of the current account, which supposedly could only be done through cuts in public spending and contraction of the economy” (SAAD FILHO & MORAIS, 2018, p. 185).

This process deteriorated PT’s government, whose initial shocks were evident in June 2013 and by the narrow electoral victory in 2014 (^{MANCEBO, 2017}). On the one hand, the social foundations of the government revealed discontent with the austerity measures. On the other hand, the sectors representing capital stressed that the measures underway were insufficient to guarantee the recovery of profitability rates. The government’s instability was further aggravated by media attacks and maneuvers in the legal and parliamentary spheres that led to the impeachment process in 2016.

With the deposition of Dilma Rousseff, vice-president Michel Temer, of the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party - PMDB), assumed the Presidency of the Republic. From then on, measures to deepen neoliberalism were implemented in the country, which can be characterized as ultraliberalism³. The agenda of social setbacks, started by Dilma Rousseff, was expanded with counter-reforms that lowered the value of the workforce and drastically reduced public spending on social policies (^{REIS & MACÁRIO, 2020}). The main milestones of this process are consolidated in the Labor Reform and Constitutional Amendment (EC) n. 95/2016. These measures were not implemented without resistance and attrition from the government. As polls indicate, Michel Temer ended his government as the worst in history.

It is in this context that the presidential elections took place in 2018. The attacks led by the hegemonic media, associated with the legal maneuvers around the Lava-Jato Operation, led by the then judge Sérgio Moro, reinforced an anti- PT movement in the social imaginary and prevented Lula da Silva from running for election, with his condemnation and imprisonment without observing the law. This paved the way for the transformation of Bolsonaro, an ordinary man, into a “myth”, which led him to the presidency of Brazil.

With his far-right project, there is an apparently contradictory combination of conservative political principles with ultraliberalism. With a reactionary bias, generally based on religion, the guarantee of rights related to ethnic-racial, gender, and sexuality issues are severely attacked, as well as social movements and left-wing political organizations are criminalized. Defending the free market and the fiscal adjustment policy justifies the need to reduce the State’s role in guaranteeing social rights, expanding the market’s role.

Evidence that the Bolsonaro government would carry out the fiscal austerity measures was already indicated in his “Government Plan” presented in the 2018 elections. By highlighting its “values and commitments”, and defending its first axis “The fruit of life is sacred!”, It was emphasized that: “The material results of these choices, when generated honestly in a free enterprise economy, have a name: PRIVATE PROPERTY!” (^{BOLSONARO, 2018}, p. 4). The exaltation of liberal capitalist principles, present throughout the document, is highlighted in the section “Economic Liberalism”, according to which: “Market economies are historically the greatest instrument for generating income, employment, prosperity, and social inclusion. Thanks to Liberalism, billions of people are being saved from misery all over the world” (^{BOLSONARO, 2018}, p. 13). The consummation of such promises took place with the nomination of Paulo Guedes, defender of the free market along the lines of the Chicago School of Economics, to take over the Ministry of Economy.

In 2019, his first year of government, Bolsonaro advanced on the withdrawal of rights, getting the approval of the pension reform, with the Constitutional Amendment n. 103/2019 (^{SEZEZEM & CARTAXO, 2021}). In the wake of his ultraliberal purposes, he presented two other proposals for reforms: the tax and the administrative. Let us, then, consider the central elements of the Constitutional Amendment Proposal (PEC) n. 32/2020, the Administrative Reform project, forwarded in early September 2020 to the National Congress.

In the Chamber of Federal Deputies, the PEC n. 32/2020 was approved by the Comissão de Constituição e Justiça (Constitution and Justice Commission - CCJ) in May 2021. It was also approved, with some changes, in September of the same year by the Special Commission set up to evaluate the content of the proposal. It then was considered by the Plenary of the Chamber, remaining until at least February 2022, when this study was completed, awaiting a vote. As Deputy Arthur Lira, President of the Chamber of Deputies has already highlighted, the PEC is not expected to be approved in 2022, due to the difficulties in supporting guidelines like these in election years. We emphasize that this demonstrates the recognition of the attack on social rights and public policies that the reform entails. Considering the purpose of this study, we will highlight elements of PEC n. 32/2020 that seeks to expand the privatization of the Brazilian State, highlighting, in particular, the convergences between the original proposal and the text approved by the Special Commission.

The PEC forwarded in September 2020 was presented by the federal government as the first phase of the Administrative Reform. At this stage would be the bases and general principles of constitutional changes, and the regulations in specific legislation would be in actions 2 and 3. Somehow this demonstrates the absence of exact definitions on the operationalization of the proposed changes and, also, the indication of major powers to the federal executive power. Although some points have already been defined in the text approved by the Special Commission, such as the designation of exclusive state positions and salary reduction limits, others remain for later regulation.

In the text subscribed by the Minister of Economy, Paulo Guedes, it is possible to identify among the central points the need to reduce the state budget with public services and, especially, personnel expenses. For this purpose, studies developed by two international financial organizations are used: the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). As we will see, the central intention is to advance the privatization of the State, with the instability of work and public service.

The proposal includes, among the Union’s exclusive legislative competencies, the establishment of general norms on issues related to the creation/extinction of positions, forms of selection, career and salary, performance evaluation, disciplinary process, and staff assignment. In practice, this removes the explicit intention of establishing different forms of bonding and contracting in the public service – which was explicit in the text presented by the executive. Even so, the totality of the PEC approved by the Special Commission resumes the definition of exclusive State positions, being those that,

directly carry out final activities related to public security, maintenance of the tax and financial order, regulation, inspection, government management, budget preparation, control, State intelligence, the Brazilian foreign service, public advocacy, public defenders, public service, and the institutional performance of the Legislative Power, the Judiciary Power, including those exercised by bailiffs, and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. (^{BRASIL, 2021}, p. 10).

In the subsequent regulation, such positions received different treatment than the others. These elements demonstrate the opening of the way for the precarious hiring of civil servants in other state activities, such as education and health. This projection is also identified when we observe what is established for “contracting for a fixed period under administrative law”. This contracting modality was already foreseen in the government’s text, and the PEC approved in the Special Commission defined it: with a “temporary” character or “strictly transitory nature”, it cannot have a contractual relationship that exceeds ten years. This period does not seem suitable for characterizing a transitory service, and in practice should be the priority form of hiring, that is, the tendency is that it is not the exception, but the rule in activities with “non-exclusive” State positions.

Another point to be highlighted is the increased instability in public offices. In Paulo Guedes’ proposal, stability in the position was restricted to exclusive state positions, after compliance with a satisfactory evaluation in the experience link (which would be a stage of a public tender). The PEC of the Special Commission extended to all public servants and removed the experience link. However, it created the possibility of dismissal of the civil servant with stability, “due to an unsatisfactory result in the performance evaluation” or by the ending of office. Among the purposes of performance, evaluation is the assessment of the contribution “of the server to the achievement of the institutional results of the body or entity” (^{BRASIL, 2021}, p. 6). Thus, meeting the goals of the body/ entity becomes a condition for the individual evaluation of the servants, which will obligatorily serve for their promotion or institutional progression and, in the worst case, for their dismissal.

In the scope of the removal of rights and the precariousness of work, we must highlight two points. The first refers to the extinction of a series of benefits and advantages, as the text indicates the impediment for the government to grant annual leave for a period longer than 30 days; additional length of service; the retroactivity of increase in remuneration and indemnity installments; license-award or similar as a result of the length of service; and career progression or promotion based exclusively on length of service. Added to this is the possibility of reducing working hours and remuneration by up to 25%.

If approved, PEC 32/2020 will imply labor reform in the public service. The measures proposed to reduce public spending on social policies are also in line with EC n. 95/2016. And it also advances in the privatization and commodification of public service, an issue made explicit in the proposition of Art. 37-A in the constitutional text, which originated from the PEC forwarded by the executive and maintained in the wording approved by the Special Commission:

Art. 37-A. The Union, the States, the Federal District, and the Municipalities may, following the law, sign cooperation instruments with bodies and entities, public and private, for the execution of public services, including the sharing of the physical structure and the use of human resources from individuals, with or without financial compensation. (^{BRASIL, 2021}, p. 5)

The exception to this permissibility is only for the use of personnel who hold exclusive positions in the State. For all other functions, unrestricted privatization of the public service will be open, using the physical structure and human resources. Clearly, by the neoliberal logic, the execution of public-private partnerships will demand financial contributions from the state.

The ordeal of PEC n. 32/2020 will imply the deepening of the policy of budget cuts in financing public education. Particularly for federal universities, science, and technology, this will aggravate the chaotic picture that is already being implemented, as highlighted in the next section.

UNDERFUNDING OF FEDERAL UNIVERSITIES AND PUBLIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN BRAZIL (2015-2021)

To understand the financing of higher education and science and technology, one must establish links with the portion of the federal budget that has been dedicated to paying public debt. Public indebtedness has become a mechanism that enables the accumulation of capital, especially its rentier fraction, to the detriment of expanding resources for social policies, necessary for the reproduction of the working class.

For ^{Fattorelli (2013)}, public debt in Brazil has functioned as a “system” that, instead of providing resources to the national State, for the benefit of the majority of the population, has been used as a mechanism for transferring public resources to finance the private sector, especially the financial one.

The allocation of a significant part of the Union’s resources to holders of public debt securities persists as a mainstay of the pattern of capital accumulation in Brazil, since the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. For ^{Paulani (2008)}, from then on, Brazil became an “international platform for financial valuation” and became a space in which the greatest gains in the world in the purchase and sale of financial assets became possible. For Gomes (2007), starting with the Fernando Henrique government, the hegemony of financial capital over the most important decision-making centers at the state level (Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, and National Treasury Secretariat) is definitively consolidated, which are now occupied by people closely linked to the financial market. Even during the Workers’ Party governments (2003-2016), which sought to reconcile the interests of capital and labor, the allocation of a significant portion of public fund resources to rentiers remained unchanged.

According to ^{Reis and Macário (2022)}, EC nº 95/2016 instituted a new fiscal regime and determined the freezing of primary (non-financial) expenses of the Union for 20 years (2016-2036). All Union expenses were limited to the same amounts spent in the previous year, corrected for inflation, measured by the Extended National Consumer Price Index (IPCA), except for financial expenses, such as public debt. Henrique Meirelles, Minister of Finance at the time, seeking to justify the need to approve such an Amendment, claimed that “it is necessary to change the direction of public accounts, so that the country can, as soon as possible, restore confidence in sustainability expenses and public debt” (BRASIL/ MF, 2016).

The fundamental objective of EC nº 95/2016 is to guarantee, with absolute priority, the payment of expenses with the public debt, to the detriment of the financing of social policies. While social (non-financial) expenses are frozen for 20 years, financial and public debt expenditures can grow without limit. This amendment especially restricts education and health expenses that are linked to tax collection, given that the growth of tax collection, in most years, is higher than inflation. It all indicates that in the coming years, in real terms, there will be a reduction in federal public resources destined to expenses linked to Union taxes, as is the case of education, as discussed in this article.

Table 1 demonstrates the amounts of Union resources⁴ allocated to the public debt in the period from 2015 to 2021. 2015 was the year immediately before the approval of the Constitutional Amendment nº 95/2016.

In the period from 2015 to 2021, BRL 10.288 trillion was cumulatively allocated for the payment of interest and charges, amortization, and refinancing of the public debt. Such resources represented, on average, 41.55% of the Union’s budget, equivalent to 17.06% of GDP. In 2021, there was a reduction in resources allocated to the payment of interest, charges, and debt amortization. However, there was substantial growth in refinancing. In 2021, there was a 21.29% reduction in interest payments and amortization compared to 2020: from BRL 752.768 billion to BRL 592.534 billion. However, refinancing grew by 78.75%: from BRL 826.705 billion to BRL 1.478 trillion. Through refinancing, the federal government issued debt securities and contracted new debt to pay interest and amortization expenses on an old debt. Refinancing is one of the mechanisms that produce exponential growth in the amount of Brazilian public debt.

Considering only amortization, interest, and charges (excluding refinancing), the federal government allocated no less than BRL 4.602 trillion in the period. This amount of resources represented, on average, 18.87% of the Union’s budgetary expenditure, equivalent to 7.66% of GDP.

The total resources allocated, cumulatively, only to the payment of amortization, interest, and public debt charges from 2015 to 2021 (BRL 4.602 trillion) represented 4.5 times more than the resources allocated by the federal government to the health function (BRL 1.015 trillion), 5.5 times more than resources allocated to education (BRL 832.301 billion), 3.9 times more than resources allocated to social assistance (BRL 1.170 trillion), 10.5 times more than resources allocated to universities and their hospitals (BRL 438.380 billion) and 85.5 times more than the resources allocated to science and technology (BRL 53.820 billion).

Payment of public debt, without carrying out the audit provided for in the federal constitution⁵, constitutes, among others, a structural blockage that prevents the necessary expansion of investments in social policies.

FINANCING OF FEDERAL UNIVERSITIES (2015-2021)

Federal Universities (including their hospitals), in the period from 2015 to 2021, received from the federal government, on average, 1.80% of the Union budget, equivalent to 0.73% of GDP (Table 2). At the same time, expenses with amortization, interest, and public debt charges (excluding refinancing), according to Table 2, represented, on average, 18.87% of the Union’s budgetary expenses, equivalent to 7.66% of GDP.

From 2015 to 2021, there was a restriction of 2.13% of global resources destined for federal universities: from BRL 61.023 billion to BRL 59.726 billion. From 2016 to 2019, there was a 5.86% growth in such resources: from BRL 61.023 billion in 2015 to BRL 64.602 billion in 2019. From 2019 to 2021, there was a restriction of 7.55% on the resources received by universities: from BRL 64,602 to BRL 59,726. The global budget of universities settled in 2021 (BRL 59.726 billion) was lower than in previous years.

According to the Group on the Nature of Expenditure, analysis of the budget of federal universities reveals that in recent years the resources allocated to funding (Other Current Expenses) and investment have been significantly reduced, as shown in Graph 1 below.

Source: Chamber of Deputies, 2022. SIOP, 2022. Development of this study.

Graph 1 Evolution of Union Expenditure with federal universities(including their hospitals) by Type of Expenditure Group (GND):2015-2021 (in millions of BRL). 

In 2015, universities received BRL 9.154 billion to fund their activities (Other Current Expenses). In 2021 they received BRL 5.826 billion, a reduction of 36.35%. The situation is even worse in the case of funds reserved for investment. In 2015, federal universities received BRL 997.204 million from the federal government, and in 2021 only BRL 132.089 million, a reduction of 86.75%.

However, the reduction of resources for funding universities has been observed since 2014 and investments since 2011 (Dilma government). These numbers reveal that federal universities have been facing severe difficulties in developing their activities for some time now. In 2013, universities received BRL

11.413 billion to fund their activities and in 2021 they received BRL 5.826 billion, a reduction of 48.95%. In the case of resources destined for investments, in 2011, federal universities received BRL 4.528 billion from the federal government; in 2021 they received only BRL 132.089 million, a reduction of 97.08%.

FINANCING OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (2015-2021)

As for the financing of science and technology, the resources allocated by the federal government, from 2015 to 2021, for the financing of the function of science and technology, to the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development - CNPq) and the Coordination for the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel - CAPES), will be presented below.

Concerning the resources destined for science and technology, there was a reduction in the Union’s expenses in this area: from BRL 9.359 billion, in 2015, to BRL 5.320 billion, in 2021, a decrease of 43.15%. In 2021, the amount settled was the lowest amount of funds allocated by the federal government throughout the period (2015-2021).

The drastic fall in funding for science and technology began in 2014, the last year of Dilma Rousseff ’s first term, as part of a fiscal adjustment policy. The cuts lasted and worsened in the post-2016 period. In 2013, BRL 17.775 billion was allocated to science and technology. And in 2021 the liquidated amounts did not exceed BRL 5.320 billion, a reduction of 70.07%.

Part of the resources for science and technology are allocated to the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq).

CNPq is linked to the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, and should play an important role in promoting activities carried out by research groups in Brazilian Public Universities. The resources allocated to the agency by the Union in 2021 (BRL 972.702 million) were lower than the amounts settled in 2015 (BRL 2.290 billion), a reduction of 57.52%, as shown in Table 4.

It is important to note that since 2014 (Dilma Government), there has been a constant decrease in resources allocated to CNPq: in 2013, BRL 3.495 billion were allocated, and in 2021 BRL 972.702 million, a decrease of 72.17% in eight years.

As a result of the education underfunding crisis, CAPES has faced severe budget constraints in recent years.

Capes is linked to the Ministry of Education and has as one of its objectives to promote the training of high-level human resources in the country and abroad, through the granting of master’s, doctoral and post-doctoral scholarships. It should play an important role in the training of future researchers. However, budget constraints have nearly made it impossible for Capes to play an important role in training the future generation of researchers in Brazil.

The resources allocated by the Union to Capes (Table 5) were reduced from BRL 10.928 billion, in 2015, to BRL 3.317 billion, in 2021, a drop of 69.65%.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

It can be said that consecutive Brazilian governments (FHC, Lula, Dilma, Temer, and Bolsonaro) implemented neoliberal adjustment policies, in which the public and private spheres were redefined within the scope of the State and civil society. Under the effect of the neoliberal strategy, a process of expansion of the private space was triggered, not only in activities linked to the productive sector but also in the field of social rights conquered by the struggles of the working class. As a consequence for the educational sector, especially in Brazilian higher education, an intense process of privatization is observed in two directions: a) by the expansion of profitable private institutions and their financialization, through the liberalization of educational services, the opening to the market of actions and the directing of resources from the public fund to entrepreneurs in this sector; b) directing public institutions to the private sphere, by cutting public resources and encouraging public-private partnerships, and other mechanisms aimed at opening these institutions to the market.

When analyzing the content of PEC n. 32/2020, whether in the original proposal sent by the government or in the text approved by the Special Commission established in the Chamber of Deputies, we identified that, in essence, the purpose is to reduce the state’s role in guaranteeing public policies and social rights. It also aims to expand the use of public-private partnerships and the commodification of social services. In summary, the propositions move towards the devaluation and precariousness of work in the public sector.

The payment of the public debt is treated as an absolute priority of the current economic policy, since the Fernando Henrique government and in all the subsequent governments. Furthermore, it is one of the pillars of Brazil’s capital accumulation pattern. The public fund has been used to enable the accumulation of capital, especially rentier capital, to the detriment of the needs of most of the Brazilian population. A series of counter-reforms have been implemented by different governments to guarantee the solvency capacity of the Brazilian State and to ensure the transfer of socially produced wealth to feed the profitability of capital. Federal universities and the public science and technology complex have been facing budget cuts since 2014 when the capital crisis again manifested itself more acutely.

The drastic reduction in resources could derail the functioning of federal universities and the public set for the production and socialization of scientific knowledge in Brazil. This situation will not be overcome without confronting the ongoing regressive agenda, the regressive tax system, and the public debt issue. It is necessary to link the defense of the university and the general complex of science and technology to the significant national issues that affect the working class as a whole to change the correlation of forces and build a national project inspired by the immediate and historical needs of those who must work to survive.